CAF - Tax structure in Latin America its impact on the real economy and compliance

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TAX STRUCTURE IN LATIN AMERICA: ITS IMPACT ON THE

REAL ECONOMY AND COMPLIANCE

N° 2011/09

Agosto, 2011

Martínez-Vázquez, Jorge Vulovic, Violeta

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© CAF, 2011 por Martínez-Vázquez, Jorge y Vulovic, Violeta. Todos los derechos reservados. Pequeñas secciones del texto, menores a dos párrafos, pueden ser citadas sin autorización explícita siempre que se cite el presente documento. Los resultados, interpretaciones y conclusiones expresados en esta publicación son de exclusiva responsabilidad de su(s) autor(es), y de ninguna manera pueden ser atribuidos a CAF, a los miembros de su Directorio Ejecutivo o a los países que ellos representan. CAF no garantiza la exactitud de los datos incluidos en esta publicación y no se hace responsable en ningún aspecto de las consecuencias que resulten de su utilización.

FINANCIANDO EL DESARROLLO • AMÉRICA LATINAESTRUCTURA IMPOSITIVA EN AMÉRICA LATINA: SU IMPACTO SOBRE LA

ECONOMÍA REAL Y CUMPLIMIENTO Martínez-Vázquez, Jorge y Vulovic, Violeta CAF Documento de trabajo N° 2011/09 Agosto, 2011

RESUMEN

En este trabajo se evalúa la estructura de los sistemas impositivos en América Latina y se analiza su impacto en la economía real to mando en cuenta variables como el

CAF Documento de trabajo N° 2011/09 Agosto, 2011

RESUMEN

En este trabajo se evalúa la estructura de los sistemas impositivos en América Latina y se analiza su impacto en la economía real to mando en cuenta variables como el crecimiento económico, la estabilidad macroeconómica, la redistribución del ingreso y la inversión extranjera directa. Asimismo, se evalúa su impacto sobre la extensión de la informalidad y la moral impositiva.

Palabras clave: sistema impositivo, crecimiento, estabilidad, desigualdad, informalidad, moralidad impositiva

TAX STRUCTURE IN LATIN AMERICA: ITS IMPACT ON THE REAL ECONOMY AND

COMPLIANCE

Martínez-Vázquez, Jorge y Vulovic, Violeta CAF Working paper N° 2011/09 August, 2011

ABSTRACT

In this paper we review the structure of tax systems in Latin America and analyze their impact on the real economy -- economic growth, macro -economic stability, income redistribution and foreign direct investment --, and on the extent of informality –the size of the shadow economy—and ‘tax morale.’

Keywords: tax structure, growth, stability, inequality, informality, tax morale

Jorge Martínez-Vázquez Violeta Vulovic Georgia State University Georgia State University jorgemartinez@gsu.edu vvulovic2@gsu.eduTax Structure in Latin American: Its Impact on the Real Economy and Compliance

Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Violeta Vulovic1

International Studies Program Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Georgia State University

(Revised) August 2011

“Desafortunadamente, los países de América Latina tributan poco y mal”

International Studies Program Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Georgia State University

(Revised) August 2011

“Desafortunadamente, los países de América Latina tributan poco y mal” Alicia Bárcena, Executive Secretary, CEPAL (2010)

1 We are thankful to Gabriel Leonardo for helpful research assistance. We are also grateful to Pablo Sanguinetti, Roberto Steiner, and other participants at the CAF conference on “Public Finance and Development ” held in Bogotá in June 2011 for helpful comments.2

I. Introduction One of the most researched questions about tax systems in Latin America is the relatively low, with some minor exceptions, tax revenue-to-GDP ratio. The interest in this issue emanates from the likely linkage between low tax levels and inadequate public spending on public infrastructure and human capital (health and education) improvements necessary for sustained economic growth, as well as the impact on income distribution and other economic policy objectives.2 Less research has been carried out on the structural composition of tax systems in Latin America and its consequence vis-à-vis the real economy.3

The choice between direct and indirect taxes has contributed to a long political and academic debate regarding advantages and defects of those two forms of taxation. The choice of direct versus indirect taxes is fundamental to the optimal design of tax structures si nce those forms of taxation may affect differently the goals of efficiency and equity. While some early contributions drove to demonstrate the superiority of direct over indirect taxes under specific conditions (Hicks, 1939), 4 most of the focus early on in the optimal tax literature was on separate forms of taxation (e.g., Ramsey, 1927; Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971).

A key development in the optimal tax literature from the perspective of the optimal tax mix was Atkinson and Stiglitz’s (1976) seminal paper, who for the first time considered the interaction of

A key development in the optimal tax literature from the perspective of the optimal tax mix was Atkinson and Stiglitz’s (1976) seminal paper, who for the first time considered the interaction of direct and indirect taxes in the attainment of efficiency and equity goals. The Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem states that, in an economy where individuals differ only in their earning abilities, governm ent can impose a general income tax, and where the utility function is separable between labor and all commodities, then in the optimum tax design there is no need to employ indirect taxation. This important result was followed by a significant number of other theoretical contributions showing how important aspects of the economy (e.g., the scope

2 See, for example, Jimenez et al. (2010), Bernardi et al. (2007), Bird et al. (2006). 3 This has been also a less researched question in general; this literature is reviewed in Martinez -Vazquez et al. (2011). 4 Essentially Hicks (1939) assumed identical individuals with perfectly inelastic labor supply (Atkinson, 1977).3

of tax evasion) and heterogeneity among taxpayers would justify the existence side by side of direct and indirect forms of taxation. The mix of direct and indirect taxes5 can have important consequences in the relative efficiency of economic systems and on their overall performance in terms of economic growth, macroeconomic stability (via built -in stabilizers), and the overall ability to redistribute income. The structure of tax systems in Latin America is also likely to affect and be affected by the extent of informality – the size of the underground economy —and attitudes toward voluntary compliance—or what has become known as ‘tax morale.’ These phenomena, also present in other regions of the world, have taken center stage in the evolution and performance of Latin -American tax systems. And despite their importance, little research has been conducted on these issues in a systematic fashion. This paper has as direc t focus the structure and composition of tax systems in Latin America and their impact on economic growth, macro-economic stability, income distribution, and foreign direct investment

evolution and performance of Latin -American tax systems. And despite their importance, little research has been conducted on these issues in a systematic fashion. This paper has as direc t focus the structure and composition of tax systems in Latin America and their impact on economic growth, macro-economic stability, income distribution, and foreign direct investment flows. The paper also explores the interactions between tax structure an d the underground economy and tax morale. The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows . Section II provides general background on taxation in Latin America, while section III discusses the trends in tax structure in Latin America. Section IV inv estigates the determinants of the direct -indirect tax mix. Section V evaluates the impact of tax structure on four important measures of macroeconomic performance: economic growth, macroeconomic stability, income distribution, and foreign direct investment flows. Section VI, investigates the interaction between tax structure and the extent of the informal economy and the level of tax morale. Section VII concludes.

5 Although different definitions exist, we will follow Atkinson (1977) defining as direct taxes those that may be adjusted to the individual cha racteristics of the taxpayer and as indirect taxes those that are levied on transactions irrespective of the circumstances of buyer or seller.4

II. Some general background on taxation in Latin America Although it is frequently address ed in fiscal matters as a homogeneous block of countries, the Latin America region shows considerable diversity in economic structure as well as tax systems

(Gomez Sabaini and Martner, 2007; Tanzi, 2007). The diversity in tax systems is induced by diversity in per capita income with low, low -medium and medium-high income countries in the region; in the availability of natural resources and therefore the relative ease of obtaining alternative revenues to taxes; and in size, with three large federations (Arge ntina, Brazil and Mexico) representing over two -thirds of the region’s gross product. This all means that we should expect also considerable diversity in tax systems across countries in the region. Of particular relevance for tax systems is the importance of non-tax revenue in some countries in

Mexico) representing over two -thirds of the region’s gross product. This all means that we should expect also considerable diversity in tax systems across countries in the region. Of particular relevance for tax systems is the importance of non-tax revenue in some countries in the region; for example in recent years, non -tax revenues in Ecuador comprised close to half of total revenues, over one-third in Mexico, and over one-fourth in Chile. From one perspective, Latin American country ta x structures look like those of countries in other regions of the world, including income taxes (Personal and Corporate – PIT/CIT), some social security taxes, and value added taxes (VAT) or other consumption taxes —excises and those on imports. From anothe r perspective, Latin American country tax structures do not look like those of most other countries in that it is frequent to observe the use of what has been called “heterodox” taxes, 6 including taxes on financial transactions, on business assets, and even exports. Main features of ‘traditional’ taxes Personal income taxes traditionally have raised relatively low revenues in most Latin America n countries.7 The reasons for this appear to be multiple (Tanzi, 2007; Profeta and Scabrosetti , 2007) . They include: (i) the presence of larger than usual informal economies; (ii) the low share of workers compensation in the composition of national incomes-- less than 30 percent in many countries in the regions versus over 70 percent in most industrial countries —and therefore a

6 See Gonazalez (2009). 7 Some countries, like Brazil and Chile, and more recently Argentina, are somewhat of an exception, but even in these countries the actual use of the PIT is limited by international standards.5

lower role played by withholding and automatic reporting mechanisms; (iii) political economy considerations related to the pronouncedly uneven distributions of income -- with Gini coefficients approaching 0.60 —and the successful opposition of the best - off groups to significantly progressive taxation opposition 8; (iv) not unrelated to political economy

lower role played by withholding and automatic reporting mechanisms; (iii) political economy considerations related to the pronouncedly uneven distributions of income -- with Gini coefficients approaching 0.60 —and the successful opposition of the best - off groups to significantly progressive taxation opposition 8; (iv) not unrelated to political economy considerations, the structure of the tax is typically riddled with high exemption levels and other provisions narrowing the base;9 (v) in particular, the low taxation of capital income, often taxed at lower rates if not exempted combined with considerable capital flight.10 The story with the enterp rise income taxation (the corporate income tax, CIT) is different. The experience and performance of Latin American countries with the CIT is similar to that in other countries, and in some ways comparable to that in OECD countries. The CIT is not as diver se regarding its structure but tax rates differ markedly -- from about 10 percent to about 38 percent. The region has joined the worldwide trend toward lower CIT rates, with the difference that tax bases have not been broadened as much as in other places du e to the continuation of exemptions and special tax advantages and incentives. 11 Tax revenues from the CIT nevertheless have improved in recent times because tax bases are now better adapted to deal with inflation than in the past and the sharp increases in international prices and profits of companies exploiting natural resources. To address the problem of the ‘hard to tax’ almost every country has introduced a simplified taxation system for small enterprises, often based on presumptive methods of defining the tax bases. Social security taxes are not as important or as

8 As Tanzi (2007) points out, this outcome contradicts the prediction in public choice theory that political majorities would use their power to redistr ibute income in their favor. Profeta and Scabrosetti (2007) explain the pol itical economy puzzle for the lack of tax redistribution in Latin America by the role played by “vested interests, financial sector, and populist economic policies.” These authors a rgue that Latin America n political parties only weakly

economy puzzle for the lack of tax redistribution in Latin America by the role played by “vested interests, financial sector, and populist economic policies.” These authors a rgue that Latin America n political parties only weakly represent voters’ political preferences and that they are more influenced by elites and interest groups. Profeta and Scabrosetti (2007) also make an argument for weaker tax administration in Latin America due to disintermediation and lower penetration of financial institutions in the economy -- an argument originally made by Gordon and Li (2005). 9 Castelletti (2008) points out that in the vast majority of countries in Latin America (over 90 percent in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica) most earnings are below the minimum exempt threshold. 10 For example, Peru exempts interest and capital gains. The fear of capital flight has been a real one; for example, capital still flows to the U.S. in large am ounts, in part due to the fact that there deposits by “nonresident aliens” enjoy tax free status (Tanzi, 2007). 11 Tax expenditures vary from about 1.4 percent for Brazil and 7.4 percent for Colombia (Gomez Sabaiani and Martner, 2007).6

common in the region as in OECD countries, but here again there is considerable diversity. For example, Brazil raises over 15 percent of GDP to finance social security services. On the side o f consumption taxes, the VAT is generally a success in the region, and the most important form of indirect taxation in some countries, like Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, raising over 8 percent of GDP in tax revenues — comparable to other successful experiences in OECD countries (Tanzi, 2007). Rates, which have been increasing, vary considerably -- Panama at 5 percent versus Uruguay at 23 percent, and on average are almost 5 percentage points below those of the EU. Most countries operate on a single general rate. The productivity of the VAT -- the ratio of actual collections to GDP times the standard rate -- is low in some countries (for

percent versus Uruguay at 23 percent, and on average are almost 5 percentage points below those of the EU. Most countries operate on a single general rate. The productivity of the VAT -- the ratio of actual collections to GDP times the standard rate -- is low in some countries (for example, less than 25 percent in Mexico) due to the application of multiple rates and the narrowing of the base through the use o f exemptions. Like in other regions of the world, the operation of the VAT in the region has suffered from fraud with fake credits and delays in paying the legitimate refunds to exporters and other taxpayers. Overall, even though the VAT has been performin g well, there is ample fiscal space in the region to increase the yield of the VAT. Excise taxation has been declining in importance in part due to the lack of indexation of specific rates. Finally, customs revenues have also declined as the result of int ernational trade reforms, although revenues from export taxes are quite significant at least in Argentina. Main features of ‘heterodox’ taxes: In search of Eldorado? A feature that separately defines tax systems in the Latin America n region vis -à-vis tho se in other part s of the world is the use of innovative if ‘heterodox’ forms of taxation (Gonzalez, 2009) in a persistent search for the “Eldorado of the tax world” (Tanzi, 2007). These are approaches to provide for tax revenues in more administratively effective and polit ically less painful ways but that potentially can impose far more severe distortions and excess burdens in the economy, and supposedly be induced by the relative failure of many countries in the region in applying the ‘traditional tax model. 12 Often introduced in times of crisis, they have become

12 This is the general argument used in Gonzalez (2009) and Tanzi (2007). On the other hand, other regions of the world, such as Africa and South and Southeast Asia, have faced similar problems in implementing the ‘traditional tax model,’ but there the adoption of heterodox forms of taxation has been much less common.7

world, such as Africa and South and Southeast Asia, have faced similar problems in implementing the ‘traditional tax model,’ but there the adoption of heterodox forms of taxation has been much less common.7

permanent fixes of tax structures; besides providing easy tax handles they also have been justified as providing information to improve the enforcement of traditional taxes. The list of heterodox taxes includes: tax es on financial transactions, taxes on business assets, and export duties. 13 Far from being “nuisance taxes” —that is, with revenues collected being less than administration costs -- heterodox taxes can be significant revenue raisers. Gonzalez (2009) reports that the tax on financial transactions represented close to 2 percent of GDP in Argentina in 2007, and that it represented up to 3.5 percent of GDP in Ecuador before it was abolished. That needs to be weighted against the large potential excess tax burden s, especially in the case of financial transactions tax and the export tax. 14 The financial transactions tax initially fell on bank account withdrawals, but generally has been extended to other bank and non-bank financial transactions, and it is currently used in countries such as Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela (Table 1.a).15 The rates actually applied varu from 0.15 percent of value to 1.5 percent (Table 1.b). Baca-Campodonico el al. (2006) have investigated the performance of the “bank transactio n tax” (BTT) in six Latin American countries, which at some point have used this tax. They conclude that the BTT is an unreliable source of revenue, with tax collections declining over time and with increases in tax rates narrowing the tax base leading to further revenue declines. These authors also review the literature showing that the BTT promotes considerable financial disintermediation, 16 and leads to increases in the cost of government borrowing.

13 Gonzalez (2009) also includes presumptive income taxation and simplified tax regimes for small taxpayers as forms of heterodox taxation. However, these are common in other countries outside Latin America and they

promotes considerable financial disintermediation, 16 and leads to increases in the cost of government borrowing.

13 Gonzalez (2009) also includes presumptive income taxation and simplified tax regimes for small taxpayers as forms of heterodox taxation. However, these are common in other countries outside Latin America and they probably do not belong to the “heterodox” category. In addition Gonzalez (2009) lists also the ‘impuesto empresarial de tasa unica’ (IETU)” recently introduced in Mexico which is accompanied by a tax “impuesto a los depositos en efectivo” (IDE) on cash deposits on both local and foreign currencies in excess of $2,300 a month (approximate amount) at a 2 percent rate. While the Mexican tax on cash deposits could be considered among the taxes on financial transactions and therefore just one more heterodox manifestation, the IETU is, however, a cash flow-based business tax (excluding wages and salaries) supplementing the regular income ta x levied at a uniform tax rate of 17.5 percent which in different forms has been discussed in the tax literature and likely a desirable form of innovation (McLure et al., 1990; Shome and Schutte, 1993; and Auerbach and Bradford , 2002). 14 See Coelho (2009) for a discussion of disintermediation and other economic effects of financial transaction taxes. 15 Brazil abolished this type of tax in 2007. The tax collection had been earmarked to finance the health system. Other Latin American countries that have or have had bank or financial transactions taxes include Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Paraguay and Venezuela. 16 Kirilenko and Perry (2004) find that the application of the BTT has led to disintermediation; for every dollar raised in revenues by the BTT, they observed disintermediation of 46 cents in Argentina, 58 cents in Brazil, 64 cents8

The business assets tax was first introduced in the regi on by Mexico in 1989 with the goal of having a minimum creditable tax against the corporate income tax, and got to represent

The business assets tax was first introduced in the regi on by Mexico in 1989 with the goal of having a minimum creditable tax against the corporate income tax, and got to represent upwards to 1 percent of GDP in revenues. Some form of this tax, receiving different names, has been used on and off by a number of countries in the region (Table 1 .c), most of the time used with the purpose of controlling evasion and, as in the case of Mexico, making it a minimum tax creditable against CIT.

Table 1. a. Usage of the financial transaction tax in the region

Country Name Argentina Impuesto al debito y credito bancario y otras operatories Bolivia Impuesto a las transacciones financieras Brazil Contribucion provisoria sobre el movimiento o transmission de valores y creditos de naturaleza financiera Colombia Gravamen a los Movimientos Financieros Dominican Republic Impuesto sobre los cheques Ecuador Impuesto a la circulacion de capitales Peru Impuesto a las transacciones financieras Venezuela Impuesto a las transacciones financieras

() abolished

Table 1. b. Base and rate of the financial transaction tax in the region

Country Tax Base Tax Rate Argentina Debits/credits on bank accounts (checking), other operations made through financial institutions, and payments made through other payment systems 0.60% Bolivia Debits and credits on bank accounts 0.15% Brazil Debits and credits on financial system accounts, payments through other payment systems 0.38%

in Colombia, 48 cents in Ecuador, 66 cents in Peru, and 49 cents in Venezuela. These losses alone can represent a loss of over 0.5 percent of GDP.9

Colombia Debits on bank accounts , cashier checks 0.40% Dominican Republic Debits 0.15% Peru Debits and credits on bank accounts 0.08%

loss of over 0.5 percent of GDP.9

Colombia Debits on bank accounts , cashier checks 0.40% Dominican Republic Debits 0.15% Peru Debits and credits on bank accounts 0.08% Venezuela Debits on bank accounts and other types of accounts within the financial system 1.5% () abolished Table 1. c. Usage of the business assets tax in the region Country Name Argentina Impuesto Ganancia Mínima Presunta Colombia Impuesto Renta y Complementarias Ecuador Impuesto sobre Activos Guatemala Impuesto a Empresas Mercantiles y Agropecuarias Honduras Impuesto sobre Activos Netos Mexico Impuesto al Activo Nicaragua Impuesto al Patrimonio Neto Peru Impuesto Transitorio a los activos netos (ITAN) Dominican Republic Impuesto a los Activos Uruguay Impuesto a los Activos de Empresas Bancarias Sources: Based on Gonzalez (2009); () currently abolished. The export tax is a phenomenon nowadays exclusive to Argentina, where revenues from this source represented close to 3 percent of GDP in 2009. Decades ago, especially in the 1950s and 60s, export taxes had some prominence in many tax systems in the region. 17. Typically export taxes are seen as leading to trade distortions and large excess burdens. Besides its ability to raise revenues, the Argentinean government has justified this levy as a way to capture some of the rents received by exporters after devaluation of national currency and also to pursue income redistribution goals. The evolution of tax levels (Tax to GDP ratio) For decades, the Latin American region has been identified as a low tax pressure region vis-à-vis other regions of the world, with average levels even below much poorer African countries (Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler, 2006). This has changed over the past decade with average

For decades, the Latin American region has been identified as a low tax pressure region vis-à-vis other regions of the world, with average levels even below much poorer African countries (Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler, 2006). This has changed over the past decade with average fiscal pressure increasing from an average of 12 percent in the 1990s to an average of 18

17 These countries included Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Haiti and covered agricultural products and raw materials. (Tanzi, 2007).10

percent in the 2000s -- but still at less than half of the average tax pressure in OECD countries (IMF, 2010; Gomez -Sabaini and Martner, 2007; Tanzi, 2007). However, thes e average figures mask important persistent differences in tax pressure across countries in the region with persistent underperformers like Guatemala, and Paraguay collecting less than 10 percent of GDP and countries like Mexico that has been constantly st uck at 12 percent of GDP for decades.18 Gomez Sabaini and Martner (2007) aptly classify the countries in the region into three separate groups: the relative high performers (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Costa Rica) which had tax revenues (including Social Security contributions) as percent of GDP of 26.0 in 2005—with Brazil as high as 37.4 percent and Costa Rica at 20.5 percent; a middle group with most countries with an average ratio in 2005 of 17.0 percent; and a lower group with a mean value of 11.7 percent in which stands Guatemala and Hai ti both at 9.7 percent of GDP. Also in this last group are countries like Venezuela and Ecuador, which have significant non -tax revenues from natural resource, and Panama also with substantial non tax revenues from exploiting the Canal. The improvements in the tax ratio in countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, or Nicaragua have been generally attributed to policy reforms, improvements in tax administration with the incorporation of information technology, and also increases in international prices fo r those

exploiting the Canal. The improvements in the tax ratio in countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, or Nicaragua have been generally attributed to policy reforms, improvements in tax administration with the incorporation of information technology, and also increases in international prices fo r those countries exporting natural resources ; although this latter is only partially reflected in tax revenues and more so on non-tax revenues. Typically the discussion of tax levels is accompanied by an analysis of tax effort. This latter is defined as the comparison of the taxes actually raised to those that a country may theoretically raise given its economic structure and if it were to employ certain standards (average or maximum) of diligence in collecting taxes. 19 In order to control for economic st ructure or availability of tax bases, typically GDP per capita, openness (exports plus imports to GDP ratio), value added in agriculture, population growth, etc, are used as control variables. Table 2

18 See Martinez-Vazquez (2008a) for a discussion of the “Mexican constant” tax pressure. 19 See, for example, Bird et al. (2006) and the references therein.11

reports some recent calculation of tax effort in Latin American countries by Pessino and Fenochietto (2010) estimated using a stochastic frontier approach.20 Table2. Tax Ratio and Tax Effort for Selected Latin American Countries, 1991-2006 Country Tax ratio (in % of GDP) Estimated effort (actually collected over potential in % ) Argentina 27.4 79.3 Brazil 34.2 98.0 Bolivia 26.6 67.6 Colombia 19.6 71.6 Costa Rica 22.2 66.7 Dominican Republic 14.2 48.3 El Salvador 15.3 53.8 Guatemala 10.7 38.1 Nicaragua 21.5 65.2 Panama 14.3 48.3 Paraguay 15.3 64.5

Dominican Republic 14.2 48.3 El Salvador 15.3 53.8 Guatemala 10.7 38.1 Nicaragua 21.5 65.2 Panama 14.3 48.3 Paraguay 15.3 64.5 Peru 15.3 55.3 Uruguay 25.0 87.5 Median low-income countries 13.9 77.6 Lower middle-income countries 16.5 63.2 Upper middle-income countries 26.8 77.2 High income countries 36.0 78.4

Source: Pession and Fenochietto (2010)

It is notable how effort varies across countries, with Guatemala collecting at 38.1 percent of its potential while Brazil is at 98 percent. Poor performance is generally explained by low buoyancy/elasticity of the tax system, large size of the underground economy, high levels of tax evasion, underperforming tax administration, high tax expenditures (multiple exemptions and deductions), and political reasons aiming to keep tax effort low. These are many i