CIDH - Informe 197-26 de 2026

14.754

REPORT No. 197/26

CASE 14.754

REPORT ON THE ADMISSIBILITY AND MERITS (PUBLICATION)

CHRISTA PIKE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Approved electronically by the Commission on September 18, 2026

OEA/Ser.L/V/II

Doc. 206 September 18,2026

Original: English

Cite as: IACHR, Report No. 197/26, Case 14.754, Admissibility and Merits (Publication), Christa

Pike, United States of America. September 18, 2026.

www.cidh.org1

INDEX

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................................... 2

II. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES .......................................................................................................................................... 2

A. Petitioners ................................................................................................................................................................................ 2

B. State ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 2

III. ADMISSIBILITY ...................................................................................................................................................................... 3

A. Preliminary question .................................................................................................................................................. 3

B. Competence, duplication of procedures and international res judicata .............................................. 4

C. Exhaustion of domestic remedies and timeliness of the petition .......................................................... 4

D. Colorable claim ............................................................................................................................................................. 5

IV. FINDINGS OF FACTS ............................................................................................................................................................ 5

A. Regarding Christa Pike .............................................................................................................................................. 5

B. Christa Pike’s trial ........................................................................................................................................................ 5

V. ANALYSIS OF LAW ............................................................................................................................................................. 10

A. Preliminary considerations ................................................................................................................................... 10

IV. FINDINGS OF FACTS ............................................................................................................................................................ 5

A. Regarding Christa Pike .............................................................................................................................................. 5

B. Christa Pike’s trial ........................................................................................................................................................ 5

V. ANALYSIS OF LAW ............................................................................................................................................................. 10

A. Preliminary considerations ................................................................................................................................... 10

B. Right to a fair trial, due process of law and equality before the law (articles XVIII, XXVI and II of the American Declaration) ............................................................................................................................... 11

C. The deprivation of liberty on death row, the right of protection against cruel, infamous or unusual punishment and equality before the law (articles I, XI, XXV, XXVI and II of the American Declaration) ............................................................................................................................................ 14

D. Right to life and the protection against cruel, infamous or unusual punishment with respect to the eventual execution of Christa Pike (articles I and XXVI of the American Declaration) . 19

VI. REPORT No. 54/25 AND INFORMATION ABOUT COMPLIANCE .................................................................. 20

VII. ACTIONS SUBSEQUENT TO REPORT No. 175/26 ................................................................................................ 21

VIII. FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................................. 22

IX. PUBLICATION ....................................................................................................................................................................... 222

I. INTRODUCTION1

1. On November 17, 2020, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the “Inter-American Commission”, “Commission” or “IACHR”) received a petition submitted by Sandra Babcock, Zohra Ahmed, Stephen Ferrell and the Cornell Law School Clinic (the “petitioners”). The petitioners alleged the international responsibility of the United States of America (the “State” or “the United States”) for the violation of the rights of Christa Pike because the application of the death penalty and conditions of detention.

2. On October 26, 2021, the IACHR informed the parties that it decided to apply Resolution 1/16 and jointly decide in due course the admissibility and merits of the matter.2 The parties enjoyed the time periods provided for in the IACHR’s Rules of Procedure to present additional observations on the merits. All the information

decide in due course the admissibility and merits of the matter.2 The parties enjoyed the time periods provided for in the IACHR’s Rules of Procedure to present additional observations on the merits. All the information received by the Commission was duly transmitted.3

II. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

A. Petitioners

3. They claim that Ms. Pike has spent over 28 years on death row in Tennessee, where she faces execution after being convicted for the murder of Colleen Slemmer. Concerning the right to an adequate defense, the petitioners maintain that Ms. Pike’s defense team failed to present substantial mitigating evidence that could have spared her sentence.

4. Regarding Ms. Pike’s confinement on death row, the petitioners argue that her solitary confinement constitutes a form of inhumane treatment and unusual punishment. They highlight that it has had severe physical implications on Ms. Pike, as well as being detrimental to her mental health. Additionally, the petitioners allege that the execution protocols in use in the state of Tennessee create a risk of causing pain and suffering in the moments leading to the execution, which would constitute a form of cruel, infamous, or unusual punishment.

5. Regarding the petition’s admissibility, the petitioners explain that the Commission has competence under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and that there has been no other submission of the matter before international organizations. They express that Ms. Pike has exhausted all local remedies regarding the right to an adequate defense. They add that on June 8, 2020 the Supreme Court of the United States denied her petition for a writ of certiorari, meaning that the petition is timely.

B. State

6. The State requests that the petition be declared inadmissible because the petitioners failed to exhaust domestic remedies, was not presented timely, did not state a prima facie violation of the American Declaration, or was manifestly groundless. They add that declaring the petition admissible would violate the fourth instance doctrine. Finally, the State stresses that the Commission’s practice of joining the admissibility and merits

domestic remedies, was not presented timely, did not state a prima facie violation of the American Declaration, or was manifestly groundless. They add that declaring the petition admissible would violate the fourth instance doctrine. Finally, the State stresses that the Commission’s practice of joining the admissibility and merits consideration of a petition is against the International Court of Justice’s standards of process.

7. Regarding the issues mentioned about Ms. Pike’s defense and fair trial guarantees, they consider them already been raised, analyzed and answered by the domestic courts. Thus, they believe that if the Commission were to express itself on the matter, it would violate the fourth instance doctrine. They conclude that the petitioners are exposing a mere disagreement with defense strategies that did not affect Ms. Pike’s rights.

1 Pursuant to Article 17.2 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure, Commissioner Rosa María Payá Acevedo, citizen of the United States, did not participate in the discussion or decision of this report. Likewise, pursuant to Article 17.3 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure, Commissioner Riyad Insanally, permanent resident in the United States, did not participate in the discussion or decision of this report. 2 The Commission applied said resolution given that the petition refers to the use of the death penalty. 3 On December 11, 2020, the IACHR granted precautionary measures No. 1080-20, on behalf of Ms. Pike pursuant to Article 25(1) of its Rules of Procedure. The Commission requested the United States to a) adopt the necessary measures to protect the life and personal integrity of Christa Pike; b) refrain from carrying out the death penalty on Christa Pike; c) ensure that Christa Pike’s detention conditions are consistent with international standards, giving special consideration to her personal conditions; and, d) agree on the measures to be adopted with the beneficiary and her representatives. The precautionary measures are still in effect.3

8. They contend that the imposition of the death penalty itself and the time spent on death row is not contrary to the American Declaration. Specifically, they indicate that individuals suffering from mental illness can be

adopted with the beneficiary and her representatives. The precautionary measures are still in effect.3

8. They contend that the imposition of the death penalty itself and the time spent on death row is not contrary to the American Declaration. Specifically, they indicate that individuals suffering from mental illness can be lawfully executed if they understand the reasons for their conviction, as is the case of Ms. Pike. Additionally, they assert that the delay in her execution is the natural result of the appeals process, which does not constitute a form of cruel and unusual punishment.

III. ADMISSIBILITY

A. Preliminary question

9. The Commission notes that the State expressed its disagreement with the Commission's decision to defer the analysis of the admissibility of the petition until the discussion and decision on the merits in application of Resolution 1/16. The State argued that the criterion applied (related to the subject matter of the petition or its recommendation of precautionary measures) does not constitute an exception that justifies the treatment of admissibility and merits in a single stage in accordance with the provisions of Article 36.3 of the Commission's

Rules of Procedure.

10. In this regard, the Commission emphasizes that, as indicated in its Resolution 1/16, paragraph b) mentions circumstances in which “in cases of seriousness and urgency, or when the Commission considers that the life or personal integrity of a person may be in imminent danger”. Among the exceptional circumstances included in the Resolution are petitions concerning the use of the death penalty. The IACHR explained that the establishment of this circumstance as grounds for deferral was based "on the need to implement decisive measures to reduce the procedural backlog and thus ensure that the passage of time does not prevent the Commission's decisions from having a useful effect".4 In addition, the Inter-American Commission highlights that the parties had the opportunity to present their arguments regarding both the admissibility and the merits of the case, and the Commission will analyze and rule on them without incurring a violation of the right of defense.

11. The Commission considers that this criterion applies in the present case since the State has not

that the parties had the opportunity to present their arguments regarding both the admissibility and the merits of the case, and the Commission will analyze and rule on them without incurring a violation of the right of defense.

11. The Commission considers that this criterion applies in the present case since the State has not demonstrated that the deferral decision has affected its right to a defense, and it has had the opportunity to present its arguments regarding both the admissibility and the merits of the case, which are analyzed in the following sections of this report. The Commission takes note of the State's claim that the deferral decision was adopted based on an inadmissible petition, making it an inappropriate use of the procedural rule. In this regard, the Commission emphasizes that the purpose of the power established in Article 36(3) is precisely to allow the treatment of admissibility issues to be deferred to the time of the debate and decision on the merits, as has been done in the present case.

12. Regarding the fourth instance doctrine claim by the State, the Commission recalls that in previous cases, it

has established the following:

it is competent to declare a petition admissible and rule on the basis of it when the petition refers to a judgment by a domestic court handed down without regard to due process or which apparently violates any other right guaranteed by the Convention. The Commission recalls that it has admitted petitions when it transpires from the arguments of the parties prima facie that the court judgments or procedures followed could have been arbitrary or might have involved arbitrary unequal treatment or possible discrimination.5

13. In that sense, the adequacy of all the processes followed at the internal level, as state acts, can be analyzed by the IACHR, an analysis that corresponds to the substance of the matter. Based on the above, the IACHR rejects the previous objection presented by the State.

4 IACHR, Resolution 1/16 of October 18, 2016.

by the IACHR, an analysis that corresponds to the substance of the matter. Based on the above, the IACHR rejects the previous objection presented by the State.

4 IACHR, Resolution 1/16 of October 18, 2016. 5 IACHR, Report No. 64/14, Petition 806-06, Admissibility, Laureano Brizuela Wilde, Mexico, July 25, 2014, para. 43.4

B. Competence, duplication of procedures and international res judicata

Competence Ratione personae: Yes

Competence Ratione loci: Yes Competence Ratione temporis: Yes Competence Ratione materiae: Yes, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man

(ratification of the OAS Charter on June 19, 1951) Duplication of procedures and international res judicata: No

C. Exhaustion of domestic remedies and timeliness of the petition

14. For admissibility purposes, the Commission must evaluate whether domestic remedies are adequate and effective, that is, whether they provide a real opportunity for the alleged human rights violation to be remedied and resolved by the national authorities before resorting to the Inter-American System.6 The exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies provided for in Article 31 of its Rules of Procedure are: i) the domestic legislation of the state concerned does not afford due process of law for the protection right or rights that have allegedly been violated; ii) the party alleging violation of his rights has been denied access to the remedies or was prevented from exhausting them; or iii) there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under the aforementioned remedies. Therefore, determining whether or not the exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies provided in said p rovision are applicable to a particular case requires an examination carried out in advance of and separate from the analysis of the merits of the case since it depends on a different standard of assessment to that used to establish whether or not there has been a violation of the

exhaustion of domestic remedies provided in said p rovision are applicable to a particular case requires an examination carried out in advance of and separate from the analysis of the merits of the case since it depends on a different standard of assessment to that used to establish whether or not there has been a violation of the right to fair trial, and due process of law.

15. The IACHR notes that the object of the petition relies on the following aspects : i) legal representation in the trial was inadequate and failed to investigate and present substantial mitigating evidence; ii) solitary confinement for over 25 years; and iii) Tennessee’s execution methods and protocols.

16. The Commission notes that after Ms. Pike’s conviction she s the following remedies: i) on November 26, 1998, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee confirmed Ms. Pike’s convictions and sentence to death (infra para. 33); ii) on April 25, 2010, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee denied Ms. Pike relief on four claims: the post -conviction court should have recused itself, the Petitioner's trial and appellate counsel were ineffective, the Petitioner is ineligible for the death penalty; and the d eath penalty is unconstitutional (infra para. 33); iii) on November 3, 2016, the United States District Court denied Ms. Pike petition for a writ of habeas corpus regarding different claims: that her lawyers were grossly ineffective during the trial stage as well as during the guilt/innocence phase of her capital trial, that she was deprived of the right to unconflicted counsel, that the imposition of the death penalty violated the U.S. Constitution because of her mental illness (infra para. 34); iv) on August 22, 2019 United States Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit, confirmed the denial of a writ of habeas corpus (infra para. 34). In addition, the IACHR notes that Ms. Pike petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari based on these claims, which was denied on June 8, 2020 (infra para. 35).

habeas corpus (infra para. 34). In addition, the IACHR notes that Ms. Pike petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari based on these claims, which was denied on June 8, 2020 (infra para. 35).

17. In this regard, the Commission has repeatedly held that if the alleged victim raised the issues by any lawful and appropriate alternative under the domestic juridical system and the State had the opportunity to remedy the matter within its jurisdiction, the purpose of the international rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies has thus been served .7 In the instant case the State did not indicate there were other remedies to be exhausted.

Based on the aforementioned, the Inter -American Commission concludes that the petitioners properly exhausted domestic remedies under Article 31(1) of its Rules of Procedure, taking into account that the last decision was adopted on June 8, 2020, as established in the previous paragraph. In addition, the petition was presented on November 17, 2020. Thus, the Commission finds that in the circumstances, the petition has been submitted within the requirement specified in Article 32(1) of its Rules of Procedure.

6 IACHR, Report No. 89/21, Petition 5-12, Admissibility, Cananea Mine Workers and their families, Mexico, March 28, 2021, par. 32; Report No. 317/21, Petition 1841-14, Admissibility, M and C, Costa Rica, November 4, 2021, par. 25. 7 IACHR, Report No. 54/14, Petition 684-14, Admissibility, Russel Bucklew and Charles Warner, United States, July 21, 2014, para. 28.5

18. Finally, regarding the petitioner’s argument regarding abuses during her childhood, the Commission notes that it does not have enough information to analyze the exhaustion of domestic remedies.

D. Colorable claim

20. The IACHR observes that the case relates to the following aspects: i ) legal representation in the trial was

18. Finally, regarding the petitioner’s argument regarding abuses during her childhood, the Commission notes that it does not have enough information to analyze the exhaustion of domestic remedies.

D. Colorable claim

20. The IACHR observes that the case relates to the following aspects: i ) legal representation in the trial was inadequate and failed to investigate and present substantial mitigating evidence; ii) solitary confinement of over 25 years; iii) Tennessee’s execution methods and protocols.

21. Given the foregoing, the Commission considers that the arguments presented by both parties require an in-depth analysis of the substance of the matter to be resolved. In this regard, the Commission considers that prima facie, the facts alleged by the petitioners would tend to establish violations of Articles I (right to life, liberty and security of the person), II (right to equality before law), XI (right to preservation of health), XVIII

(right to fair trial), XXI (protecti on from arbitrary arrest), XXV ( right to humane treatment while in custody), and XXVI (right to due process of law).

IV. FINDINGS OF FACTS

A. Regarding Christa Pike

22. According to the petitioners i) Christa Pike is a survivor of child abuse, domestic violence, and multiple rapes; ii) at the time of her arrest, Ms. Pike was 18 years old; iii) had “neurological impediments” and was “mentally ill”.8 The State did not dispute this information.

23. Dr. Jonathan Henry Pincus, who conducted interviews with Ms. Pike, practiced physical examinations and studied previous clinical examinations practiced on her , concluded that she was born with “neurological abnormalities” in her brain, which also caused her to suffer from epilepsy as a 14 -month-old baby , and diagnosed her with obsessive -compulsive disorder.9 After conducting a psychiatric evaluation in 2001, 2002, and 2007, Dr. William Kenner, diagnosed Ms. Pike with bipolar disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder

diagnosed her with obsessive -compulsive disorder.9 After conducting a psychiatric evaluation in 2001, 2002, and 2007, Dr. William Kenner, diagnosed Ms. Pike with bipolar disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) caused by the prevalence of physical and sexual violence in her early childhood. Because of bipolar disorder, Ms. Pike would experience maniac periods where her decision-making abilities would be influenced by feelings of “omnipotence and grandiosity”, followed by periods of depression and suicidal ideation.10

24. According to the petitioners, Ms. Pike met Tadaryl Shipp while they were both attending the Job Corps program and began a romantic relationship when they were 18 and 17 years old, respectively. They explained that Mr. Shipp was mentally and physically abusive towards Ms. Pike.11

25. The petitioners described that Ms. Pike was fixated on Mr. Shipp, which led her to have issues with another student, Colleen Slemmer, who apparently was interested in him. They mentioned that one night, Christa woke up and realized Ms. Slemmer was in her room “with a box cutter going through her things”. They stated that on January 12, 1995, Mr. Shipp and Ms. Pike went on a walk with Ms. Slemmer and killed her.12

B. Christa Pike’s trial

26. There is no controversy that Ms. Pike was on trial for capital murder. The Commission has no information about the start date or duration of the trial. The petitioners argued that the State appointed her public attorneys who were inexperienced and unprepared to defend her. Ms. Pike’s trial lead counsel, William Talman, testified that he had never previously worked on a capital case .13 Julie Martin Rice was appointed 55 days before the

8 Petitioners Brief, November 11, 2020. 9 Annex 1. Declaration of Dr. Jonathan Henry Pincus, Petitioners Brief, November 11, 2020, Exhibit B.

that he had never previously worked on a capital case .13 Julie Martin Rice was appointed 55 days before the

8 Petitioners Brief, November 11, 2020. 9 Annex 1. Declaration of Dr. Jonathan Henry Pincus, Petitioners Brief, November 11, 2020, Exhibit B. 10 Annex 2. Declaration of Dr. William Kenner, Petitioners Brief, November 11, 2020, Exhibit I. 11 Petitioners Brief, November 11, 2020. 12 Petitioners Brief, November 11, 2020. 13 Annex 3. Declaration of William Talman, Petitioners Brief, November 11, 2020, Exhibit Z.6

trial began; she indicated that at the time of the trial, she had been a lawyer for less than four years and had no experience in murder cases.14 The State did not dispute this information.

27. According to the petitioners, Mr. Talman and Ms. Rice failed to investigate and present “crucial” mitigating evidence during the trial . They added Ms. Pike’s counsel failed to i) seek a continuance to better prepare the case; ii) present Ms. Pike’s social history report; iii) present expert testimony of the mitigating specialist who elaborated the report to inform the jury about the traumatic consequences of the repeated abuses Ms. Pike endured; iii) present evidence of Ms. Pike’s brain damage ; iv) present adequate and accurate evidence of Christa’s mental illness; v) prepare the expert witnesses called to provide their findings on Ms. Pike’s mental health; v) present witness testimonies to illustrate the type of childhood Ms. Pike had and the symptoms she exhibited of mental illness; and vi) prepare the witnesses and investigate properly the context of Ms. Pike’s life and relevance of said testimonies.15 The State did not dispute this information.

28. Ms. Pike’s public defense hired Dr. McCoy as a “mitigation specialist” to conduct an investigation into her life history16. She explained that she carried out different interviews with family and friends and examined Ms.

and relevance of said testimonies.15 The State did not dispute this information.

28. Ms. Pike’s public defense hired Dr. McCoy as a “mitigation specialist” to conduct an investigation into her life history16. She explained that she carried out different interviews with family and friends and examined Ms.

Pike’s education and health record s. Dr. McCoy produced a “three -volume social history report ”. 17 The petitioners indicated that at the last minute, Mr. Talman chose not to submit the report and to not have Dr. McCoy testify in the case. Instead, he called Ms. Pike’s parents and aunt, who were present at the hearing , as witnesses.18

29. According to Dr. McCoy’s testimony, Mr. Talman presented the report late to the prosecution, and when they objected, he asked her to lie and claim that she had submitted the report the night before. She added that since she opposed doing so, Mr. Talman “was very distraught, in a total meltdown”, and in the end, she was not

called to testify. Dr. McCoy said about the delay in submitting the report to the prosecution, “I assumed that if you get picked to be the first chair in a death penalty case , you know wh at the Rules of Evidence are” .19 The petitioners clarified that “under the Tennessee rules of evidence, counsel is only required to disclose material used by expert witnesses if it contains opinion evidence and if the expert witness is going to give their opinion during the testimony”.20 The State did not dispute this information.

30. During the trial's penalty phase, Ms. Pike’s public defense counsel called only three witnesses: her mother, her father, and her aunt.21 The petitioners explained that they were called “on the spot” because they were the only people at the court that day after Mr. Talman decided not to have Dr. McCoy testify. They pointed out that all three witnesses were “complicit in Christa’s abuse during her childhood and teenage years and thus had their own motives to downplay the tragedies Ms. Pike suffered during her lifetime” and that the entire penalty phase of the case lasted “barely a day”.22

all three witnesses were “complicit in Christa’s abuse during her childhood and teenage years and thus had their own motives to downplay the tragedies Ms. Pike suffered during her lifetime” and that the entire penalty phase of the case lasted “barely a day”.22

31. The petitioners stated that the public trial counsel also failed to present the testimonies of Christa’s friends and different professionals who had interacted with Christa during her childhood, such as social workers, teachers and instructors. They understand that these witnesses would have been able to provide important mitigating testimony to humanize Ms. Pike. The petitioners alleged that Ms. Pike’s public defense neglected to investigate and present evidence of her “brain damage,” PTSD, and bipolar disorder resulting from the physical and sexual abuse she endured throughout her life.23 The State did not dispute this information.

14 Annex 4. Declaration of Julie Martin Rice, Petitioners Brief, November 11, 2020, Exhibit AA. 15 Petitioners Brief, November 11, 2020. 16 Annex 3. Declaration of William Talman, Petitioners Brief, November 11, 2020, Exhibit Z. 17 Annex 5. Declaration of Dr. Diana McCoy, Petitioners Brief, November 11, 2020, Exhibit M. 18 Petitioners Brief, November 11, 2020. 19 Annex 5. Declaration of Dr. Diana McCoy, Petitioners Brief, November 11, 2020, Exhibit M. 20 Petitioners Brief, November 11, 2020. 21 Annex 3. Declaration of William Talman, Petitioners Brief, November 11, 2020, Exhibit Z. 22 Petitioners Brief, November 11, 2020. 23 Petitioners B