OCDE - Early resolution of cartel cases in Latin America and the Caribbean de 2026

OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers Early resolution of cartel cases in Latin America and the Caribbean No. 338Early resolution of cartel cases in Latin America and the Caribbean

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EARLY RESOLUTION OF CARTEL CASES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN © OECD 2026

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Disclaimers 3

EARLY RESOLUTION OF CARTEL CASES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN © OECD 2026

This paper provides an overview of the state of play of early resolution of cartel cases in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) jurisdictions, covering the legal framework, enforcement experiences, as well as challenges and particularities. Competition authorities may benefit from the early resolution of cartel cases by saving on time and the resources that the case would require in an adversarial procedure, allocating them more efficiently to the detection and prosecution of other cartels and providing for a greater deterrence and wider impact of their enforcement actions. The paper highlights that LAC competition authorities may consider designing and using these tools as a way to achieve procedural expediency. The design and implementation of early resolution programmes requires consideration of the incentives of parties to resolve cases early and the interplay with leniency programmes, damages and the pursuit of other policy objectives.

Keywords: early case resolution; settlements; cartel enforcement, competition law enf orcement; Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).

JEL code: K210, K400

Abstract4 

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This paper was prepared by Pablo Ramírez Ayala and benefited from comments from Ori Schwartz and Paulo Burnier (all from the OECD Competition Division). The paper serves as background material for the discussion on “ Early resolution of cartel cases in Latin

This paper was prepared by Pablo Ramírez Ayala and benefited from comments from Ori Schwartz and Paulo Burnier (all from the OECD Competition Division). The paper serves as background material for the discussion on “ Early resolution of cartel cases in Latin America and the Caribbean ” taking place at the 2026 OECD -IDB Latin American and Caribbean Competition Forum in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The OECD is thankful to the Brazilian Administrative Council for Economic Defenc e (CADE) who kindly provided a voluntary contribution in support of the LACCF’s work this year. Acknowledgements 5

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Table of contents Disclaimers 2 Abstract 3 Acknowledgements 4 Executive summary 7 Policy considerations, legal frameworks and enforcement experiences in LAC 7 Key takeaways 8 1 Introduction 9 2 Overview of early resolution of cartel cases 11 2.1. Objectives of early resolution of cartel cases 11 2.2. Broader policy considerations 14 3 Legal framework in LAC jurisdictions 16 3.1. Preliminary remarks 16 3.2. Timing considerations 17 3.3. Requirements 18 3.4. Discretion of the authority 22 3.5. Consequences 23 3.6. Monitoring compliance of obligations 24 4 Experiences in LAC jurisdictions 26 4.1. Selection of cases 26 4.2. Design of obligations 27 4.3. Experiences with leniency 29 5 Conclusion 31 References 32 Endnotes 356 

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Tables Table 1. Requirements in selected LAC jurisdictions 18 Table 2. Specific guidelines related to early case resolution in selected LAC jurisdictions 22

Boxes

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Tables Table 1. Requirements in selected LAC jurisdictions 18 Table 2. Specific guidelines related to early case resolution in selected LAC jurisdictions 22

Boxes Box 1. Comparative approaches to the objectives of early resolution of cartel cases in the United States and the European Union 12 Box 2. Evolution of the implementation of early resolution of cartel cases in some LAC jurisdictions 16 Box 3. Exercise of discretion when analysing cases that could be resolved early 26 Box 4. Measures to promote competition and revert the effects in the water jugs case in Peru 27 Box 5. Assessment of proposed commitments in Colombia in the road safety software case 28 Box 6. Structural remedies in a cease-and-desist agreement in Brazil 29 Box 7. Early resolution case contributed to adoption of leniency policy in Chile 30 7

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Cartels are serious infringements of competition law, yet cartel enforcement requires consid erable time and resources. Against this background, many jurisdictions have adopted mechanisms that allow cartel cases to be resolved before the end of a regular procedure. These mechanisms, commonly referred to as early case resolution tools, include settlements, plea agreements and commitments. Their primary objective is to enable competition authorities to conclude cases more efficientl y, while allowing resources to be redirected towards the detection and prosecution of additional cartels. At the same time, investigated parties may benefit from greater certainty, reduced financial exposure and faster resolution of proceedings. This paper examines the policy considerations, legal frameworks and enforcement experiences surrounding the early resolution of cartel cases in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). It reviews how jurisdictions in the region have designed and implemented these tools, the incentiv es they provide to investigated parties and the broader implications for cartel enforcement. The analysis draws on legislation, regulations, guidelines and case experiences from across the region to identify common trends, challenges

jurisdictions in the region have designed and implemented these tools, the incentiv es they provide to investigated parties and the broader implications for cartel enforcement. The analysis draws on legislation, regulations, guidelines and case experiences from across the region to identify common trends, challenges and lessons for policymakers and competition authorities. Policy considerations, legal frameworks and enforcement experiences in LAC Early case resolution mechanisms can advance several policy objectives. They c an reduce the duration and costs of proceedings, increase the certainty and finality of enforcement outcomes and e nable corrective measures to be implemented more rapidly. In some jurisdictions, they al so support cartel enforcement by requiring investigated parties to co-operate with ongoing investigation s and provide evidence against other participants. Authorities nevertheless face important trad e-offs when designing these programmes. The extent of co-operation required, the existence of admissions of guilt or facts and the level of financial obligations can affect the attractiveness of the programme and its interaction with wider enforcement goals such as leniency, deterrence, private damages and criminal liability. The legal frameworks in LAC jurisdictions reveal some diversity. Some jurisdictions rely on settlement models that involve admissions and financial sanctions, while others us e commitment-based systems centred on legally binding obligations. Several jurisdictions combine element s of both approaches. Requirements also vary across jurisdictions, particularly regarding admissions of gu ilt or facts, duties to co-operate with the authority, financial contributions and behavioural or structural c ommitments. Despite these differences, all systems seek to balance incentives for participation wit h the need to preserve effective enforcement. Experience in the region demonstrates that competition authorities have incorporated commitments aimed at restoring competition, strengthening compliance, reversing the effects of infringements , strengthening investigations with evidence and addressing market conditions that may have fac ilitated collusion. Cases from Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru show how negotiated outcomes may include s tructural remedies, compliance programmes, compensation measures or other commitments designed to gen erate competitive benefits. The selection of cases suitable for early resolution also reflects broader enforcement Executive summary8 

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compliance programmes, compensation measures or other commitments designed to gen erate competitive benefits. The selection of cases suitable for early resolution also reflects broader enforcement Executive summary8 

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priorities, including considerations relating to deterrence, the gravity of the infring ement and the value of judicial precedent. Key takeaways Early resolution mechanisms are already part of the cartel enforcement toolkit in many LAC jurisdictions, although their use remains limited. As competition authorities continue to str engthen cartel enforcement, these mechanisms offer opportunities to improve procedural efficiency, expand enforcement reach and achieve outcomes that support competition policy objectives. Their successful implementation requires a careful balancing of incentives, enforcement goals and institutional realities. When properly designed and applied, early resolution programmes can become a valuable complement to traditional cartel enforcement and contribute to more effective competition law enforcement across the region. 9

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Cartels are seen as the most egregious infringement of competition law and competition authoriti es act to prevent and enforce their laws against them. A part of an effective framework to achieve this is the enabling and incentivisation of early case resolution tools, as stated in the OECD Recomm endation of the Council concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels [OECD/LEGAL/0452]. Most commonly, early case resolution takes the form of settlements or plea negotiation, which often require an admission of guilt and/or the admission of facts and/or a waiver of the right to appeal [OECD/LEGAL/0452]. Early case resolution can also involve commitments if they include legally binding obligations voluntarily submitted to a competition authority by parties in an antitrust investigation with the objective of eliminating the grounds for the enforcement action to continue (OECD, 2016 [1]). Competition authorities may benefit from the early resolution of cartel cases by s aving on time and the resources that the case would require in an adversarial procedure, allocating them mor e efficiently to the

objective of eliminating the grounds for the enforcement action to continue (OECD, 2016 [1]). Competition authorities may benefit from the early resolution of cartel cases by s aving on time and the resources that the case would require in an adversarial procedure, allocating them mor e efficiently to the detection and prosecution of other cartels, and contributing to a wider impact of their enforcement actions. An additional benefit is the possibility of co-operation from investigated parties 1 who can add value to the investigation and enforcement of other cartelists, for instance by providing evidence or clarifying details of the functioning of the wrongdoing . Investigated parties, on the other hand, benefit from reduced financial exposure, certainty and predictability of the outcome of the proceedings and a faster resolution of their cases. In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), early case resolution is also avail able in many jurisdictions , although the experience seems limited and could be further developed. The share of settlements over total infringements fluctuated considerably between 2020 and 2024, with the overall trend declini ng to approximately 32% by 2024 (OECD, 2025 [2]). The design of early case resolution contributes to the incentives of investigated parties in applying for the tool, which can have a significant impact on other elements of cartel enforcement such as leniency programmes, private enforcement and deterrence. The legal framework also matters, including the requirements such as admission of guilt and duty to co-operate with competition authority. This note builds on past OECD work on the topic and related issues, focussing on LAC jurisdictions. Over the years, the OECD has conducted extensive work on mechanisms for the early resol ution of a cartel case, such as the background notes on the Competition Committee Roundtable on “Plea Bargaining/Settlement of Cartel Cases” (OECD, 2008 [3]), the WP3 Roundtable on the “Experience with Direct Settlements in Cartel Cases” (OECD, 2009 [4]), and the Competition Committee Roundtable on

Bargaining/Settlement of Cartel Cases” (OECD, 2008 [3]), the WP3 Roundtable on the “Experience with Direct Settlements in Cartel Cases” (OECD, 2009 [4]), and the Competition Committee Roundtable on “Commitment Decisions in Antitrust Cases” (OECD, 2016[1]), which were focussed on a global context. This note is organised as follows: • Section 2 presents a general overview of early case resolution, including the policy objectives when investigating and prosecuting cartels, as well as the risks and considerations while designing the tools to achieve them. • Section 3 provides an overview of the legal framework of early case resolution in the region, exploring its availability and the forms they take, considering the models of s ettlements and 1 Introduction10 

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commitments and looking at the key features that can be seen across the legisl ation and policies in the region. • Section 4 presents enforcement experiences in the region, showcasing how competition authorities in the region address some of the issues that may affect the implementation of effective early case resolution programmes. • Section 5 sets out the key conclusions. 11

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This section provides an overview of the objectives that competition authorities have when designing their own early case resolution systems applied to cartels and the benefits for the investigated parties . 2.1. Objectives of early resolution of cartel cases In cartel enforcement, competition authorities face several challenges, including the detection of cases and the gathering of evidence that may be sufficient to warrant a penalty. However, fighting cartels requires the allocation of resources (both human and financial resources), which are limited for competition authorities. In this context, competition authorities in several jurisdictions have devel oped an interest in accelerating anti-cartel proceedings through mechanisms of early case resolution, such as settlements and plea negotiation.

the allocation of resources (both human and financial resources), which are limited for competition authorities. In this context, competition authorities in several jurisdictions have devel oped an interest in accelerating anti-cartel proceedings through mechanisms of early case resolution, such as settlements and plea negotiation. The most common objectives for adopting early case resolutions in cartel investigations are: • Efficient use of time and resources . Instead of investing them in a prolonged investigation and prosecution of a cartel case, a competition authority can quickly move forward in cl osing the case and focus on the detection, investigation and prosecution of additional cases (ICN, 20 08[5]). This provides the authority with the opportunity to have an expanded reach in its enforcement activities by handling more cases. • Enhanced cartel enforcement through the duty to co-operate. Some authorities use these tools to help with the investigation in a similar way to leniency, by requiring inves tigated parties to co-operate with the investigation by providing information that may be helpful for the inv estigation and subsequent prosecution of the other cartelists (Hammond, 2006 [6]). • Certainty and finality. The early resolution involves a mutual understanding between the authority and the investigated parties on certain issues. This provides the opportunity to reduce the risk of appeal proceedings or subsequent reviews based on the terms agreed upon (Bellis, 2014 [7]). • Earlier results. The early resolution of a case can provide the authority with a faster impact on the market than a full adversarial procedure. Commitments or corrective measures set in pl ace in a timely manner can mitigate the negative effects of cartels and repair or restore competition quicker (Wils, 2008[8]). • Contribution to deterrence. The early resolution may be tied to a penalty, commitments and/or corrective measures, and the consequences may be more dire in the event of recidivis m or non-compliance. For the market in general, early resolution tools send the mes sage that the authority is active on the subject, increasing the fear of cartels being detected (IC N, 2008[5]). And,

corrective measures, and the consequences may be more dire in the event of recidivis m or non-compliance. For the market in general, early resolution tools send the mes sage that the authority is active on the subject, increasing the fear of cartels being detected (IC N, 2008[5]). And, as argued by Ascione and Motta (2008 [9]), deterrence arising from reduced consequences, such 2 Overview of early resolution of cartel cases12 

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as penalty deductions, obtained through early case resolution tools may not be diluted if the freed resources of the authority are aimed at the detection of other cartel cases. The effectiveness of early case resolution mechanisms also depends on the willi ngness of parties to participate in them. As a result, the design of these tools must provide incentiv es that sufficiently address the interests of both competition authorities and the parties concerned. In this regard, certain objectives may align. Greater certainty and predictability regarding the outcome of the proceedings, as well as a faster resolution of cases, can benefit both authorities and parties by reducing the c osts, risks and burdens associated with lengthy adversarial proceedings and potential appeals. In addition, early case resolution may provide parties with reduced financial exposure through fine reductions or lower pecuniary obligations, reflecting the procedural efficiencies generated by their participation. Depending on the jurisdiction and the specific design of the mechanism, parties may also benefit from the possibility of negotiating commitments or corrective measures tailored to the circumstances of the case. These incentives are often essen tial to encourage participation and, consequently, to enable competition authorities to achieve the efficiency and enforcement objectives pursued through early case resolution. Jurisdictions across the world consider these objectives and incentives differently when devising their own early resolution programmes. The United States and European Union, for example, have diffe rent approaches as to the objectives of their early resolution programmes when it comes to carte l cases, with co-operation during the investigation being a distinctive element between the two of them.

early resolution programmes. The United States and European Union, for example, have diffe rent approaches as to the objectives of their early resolution programmes when it comes to carte l cases, with co-operation during the investigation being a distinctive element between the two of them. Box 1. Comparative approaches to the objectives of early resolution of cartel cases in the United States and the European Union United States: A tool that can assist the investigation One objective of early resolution in cartel cases in the United States through plea agreements in criminal cartel enforcement is to obtain information that may assist the investigation and prosecuti on of other cartel participants . Plea agreements may be available to defendants that do not qualify for non-prosecution protection under the corporate leniency policy of the Department of Justice ( DOJ). In exchange for the information provided, if the co-operation and other obligations undertaken by the defendant are useful and timely, then, the defendant may benefit from reduced penal ties and, where applicable, other sentencing benefits. After a plea agreement has been reached by the DOJ and the defendant, it is s ubmitted to the court which may accept it, reject it or defer a decision on whether to accept it. In practice, however, most plea agreements and related sentencing recommendations in criminal cartel enforcement recommended by DOJ have been accepted by courts, offering a significant degree of predictability as to the outcome of a plea agreement.

European Union: An alternative procedure after the investigative phase Settlements in the European Union are an alternative procedure available in cartel cas es. The procedural choice is made once the investigation is completed, as the evidence gathered and the Commission case are disclosed to the parties in bilateral parallel meetings for them to be heard and to make up their mind.

If the Commission choo ses to explore the parties’ interest in entering into settlement discussions, all the parties to the case will be offered the possibility to engage. If settlement discussions succeed, the undertakings would introduce a submission acknowledging their participation in a cartel, the relevant facts and the legal assessment, including the liability for the infringement and the range of potential 13

the parties to the case will be offered the possibility to engage. If settlement discussions succeed, the undertakings would introduce a submission acknowledging their participation in a cartel, the relevant facts and the legal assessment, including the liability for the infringement and the range of potential 13

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fines (which are not negotiated); and procedural economies materialise (short state ment of objections reflecting the settlement submissions followed by the corresponding short decision with fines within the range, without the need for an oral hearing, access to file limited to evidence). The settling party gets a 10% reduced fine, while the Commission gets to handle more cases with the same resources and reduces drastically the number or scope of appeals to the EU courts. Through this, the decisions become final and enforceable earlier than through the ordinary procedure. If a settling party had previously also applied and obtained leniency benefits, the benefits of the leniency and the settlement will add up. If settlement discussions fail, the case returns to the ordinary procedure for th e relevant parties. In so-called “hybrid” procedures, some parties may settle, while others contest the case in t he ordinary procedure.

Sources: Hammond, S. (2006[6]), The U.S. Model of Negotiated Plea Agreements: A Good Deal With Benefits For All. Address to the OECD

Competition Committee Working Party No. 3, https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/file/518421/dl?inline=; Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in cartel cases, OJ 2008 C167/1. The approaches reflect the different legal systems of competition enforcement (i.e. prosecutorial in the United States and administrative in the European Union), but they also demonstrate th at early case resolution does not follow a single enforcement model. There are several types of tools that can be adapted depending on the different institutional needs. The significance that each jurisdiction assigns to objectives

United States and administrative in the European Union), but they also demonstrate th at early case resolution does not follow a single enforcement model. There are several types of tools that can be adapted depending on the different institutional needs. The significance that each jurisdiction assigns to objectives such as co-operation, procedural efficiency and legal certainty influences the design of the programme, including its timing, requirements and incentives. Regardless of the approach ado pted, early case resolution tools are not isolated and operate within the wider framework of cartel enforcement. Therefore, as in an adversarial procedure, decisions taken with respect to the design of t he tools must take into consideration the overarching objective of deterring cartel conduct. In Latin America and the Caribbean, jurisdictions have adopted approaches that have procedural efficiency as a central objective, but many early resolution tools in the region also incorporate requirements aimed at encouraging co-operation, promoting compliance, restoring competition or addressing broader policy concerns through corrective measures and commitments. Since they pursue several objectives simultaneously, competition authorities may face trade-offs when designing these tools. For example, and as further explored in Section 3, greater flexib ility in the negotiations with respect to requirements such as the admission of guilt or facts may facilitate participation and procedural efficiency, but may also affect other enforcement objectives, such as the adequate compensation of cartel victims through private damages. Conversely , stricter requirements, including extensive co-operation obligations or high amounts of financial obligations, may strengthen certain enforcement outcomes, but they may also reduce the incentives of investigated parti es to resolve cases early and lead them to opt to defend the case through the adversarial path . Careful balancing of these policy considerations is necessary to design these tools. As a result of these different policy objectives , jurisdictions in the region have a diversity of institutional arrangements that reflect their enforcement priorities. This means that what works in one jurisdiction may require some adaptation before being implemented in another. Nevertheless, there are common elements, experiences and challenges that can inform policymakers and competition authorities in the design of early case resolution tools.14 

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experiences and challenges that can inform policymakers and competition authorities in the design of early case resolution tools.14 

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2.2. Broader policy considerations 2.2.1. Interplay with leniency policy Through leniency programmes, and in exchange for full immunity or a reduction of penal ties, cartel members have the opportunity to report their conduct and provide information and ev idence of the infringement at a lower cost to the agency compared to a regular investigation. Leniency programmes are credited with increasing the number of detected cartels in many jurisdictions and facilitating the successful prosecution of cases (OECD, 2022 [10]). Leniency also provides for deterrence, due to the risk that one of the members blows the whistle on the cartel, which may discourage potential memb ers from engaging in the conduct (Vera and Fernández, 2024[11]). While some of the objectives of leniency and the early resolution of cases may concur, as both involve a degree of co-operation, the main focus of each mechanism