OCDE - ODA projections for 2026 and the near‑term

| ODA PROJECTIONS FOR 2026 AND THE NEAR-TERM © OECD 2026 19 June 2026

Key messages • Net official development assistance is projected to fall again by 6.9% in 2026 . This marks a third consecutive year of decline, bringing ODA to its lowest level since 2014. These projections do not account for the potential further escalation of ongoing crises or additional budgetary responses to them. • Aid cuts are broad-based but uneven . Most reductions come from a small number of the largest providers. Some EU countries are more stable, but not enough to offset global declines. Many highly aid-dependent countries rely on a small number of providers, increasi ng vulnerability to shocks. • The poorest countries are hit hardest . Bilateral ODA to sub-Saharan Africa and the least developed countries is projected to fall again in 2026, by 11.6% and 10.9% respectively, marking a third straight year of decline that leaves both at their lowest levels since the early 2000s. Multilateral channels are not expected to fill the gap. • Health bears the deepest sectoral cuts, dropping below pre-pandemic levels. Health ODA is projected to fall by 29-46% from 2024 to 2026, with population and reproducti ve health (-54.1%) and the control of communicable diseases (malaria: -59 .6%, tuberculosis: -57.2%, other infectious-disease control: -40.4%) most exposed. Humanitarian aid (-40.3%) and government and civil society (-39.8%) follow. • Multilateral ODA has broken from a long-standing upward trend. It is projected to fall again by 3.4% in 2026. Core funding to UN organisations is expected to fall by around 31% from 2024 to 2026 and remain about 18% below its 2016 level by 2028. Current reform processes of the multilateral system are expected to unfold in a context of significantly constrained funding. • In light of these projected trends, development co-operation providers must : o Target scarce ODA grants to the poorest countries.

to 2026 and remain about 18% below its 2016 level by 2028. Current reform processes of the multilateral system are expected to unfold in a context of significantly constrained funding. • In light of these projected trends, development co-operation providers must : o Target scarce ODA grants to the poorest countries. o Plan exits from partner countries responsibly and co-ordinate them. o Make remaining resources, and wider policies, work harder for development. ODA projections for 2026 and the near-term: Implications for vulnerable countries and sectors2 

ODA PROJECTIONS FOR 2026 AND THE NEAR-TERM © OECD 2026

Policy context What is the outlook for official development assistance (ODA)? This policy brief – the second in an annual series – examines this question by drawing on a survey of members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee and other reporting institutions, as well as their public announcements, and by projecting ODA for the period 2026 to 2028 (see Box 1 for the methodology). These projections are based on the OECD’s calculations, and final figures may differ. In 2025, the latest year of official preliminary data, net ODA fell by 23.3% 1, the largest annual contraction on record and a second consecutive year of decline, outrunning the OECD’s projections from a year earlier (Box 1). T hese cuts were concentrated in the top five providers : Germany, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which accounted for 93% of the total decline in net ODA, with 70% being driven by the United States. Further reductions are still to come. Some major providers are partway through multiyear cuts that are planned until at least 2028. A decline in 2026 would mark only the second ti me on record that ODA has fallen for three consecutive years, with the last being in the wake of the Cold War (1992 -95). The forces behind these decisions to cut aid – fiscal consolidation, heightened geopolitical tension, pressure to increase spending for defence and security, and align public spending with do mestic priorities, among

fallen for three consecutive years, with the last being in the wake of the Cold War (1992 -95). The forces behind these decisions to cut aid – fiscal consolidation, heightened geopolitical tension, pressure to increase spending for defence and security, and align public spending with do mestic priorities, among others – are likely to persist. At the same time, the need for ODA is growing, sharpening the trade-offs providers face. The c risis in the Middle East is disrupting energy markets, global value chains, and growth in developing countries (Box 2), while the Ebola outbreaks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda in recent weeks strain already-fragile health systems. The result is a landscape in which a smaller v olume of ODA must stretch to meet rising needs from more frequent, overlapping crises. Assessing what that outlook implies for regions, income groups and sectors is the first step to directing scarce resources where they matter most and strengthening co-ordinated action that protects the most vulnerable countries and people.

Box 1. Methods This is the second edition of an annual DAC exercise to give regular visib ility on members’ and other providers’ forward spending plans . Projecting ODA is inherently uncertain: it reflects not only evolving needs in developing countries but also political and budgetary processes in provider governments. The methodology and its limits are set out below. Total ODA The projections of total ODA are based on three approaches: • Providers’ responses to the 2026 edition of the DAC Survey on ODA Projections for 2026, 2027, and 2028, undertaken in March 2026. Twenty-three of thirty-four members and associates have responded to the survey as of June 2026, indicating their projected budget for one or more of the requested years. The absence of responses from the remaining members does not indicate an unwillingness to share information on their part but may rather reflect budgetary constraints and planning cycles particular to each country. • Providers’ official announcements of their forward spending intentions, sourced from government documents. The projections assume that budget appropriations will be executed in full.

an unwillingness to share information on their part but may rather reflect budgetary constraints and planning cycles particular to each country. • Providers’ official announcements of their forward spending intentions, sourced from government documents. The projections assume that budget appropriations will be executed in full. • If information was not available from either of the previous two sources, projections were based on the multiplication of preliminary net ODA/GNI ratios in 2025 by projections of GNI in 3

ODA PROJECTIONS FOR 2026 AND THE NEAR-TERM © OECD 2026

2026-28. Projections of GNI are based on applying forecasted gross domestic product (G DP) growth rates (published by the International Monetary Fund in its April 2026 World Econo mic Outlook (IMF, 2026 [1])) to estimates of GNI reported by members from 2025 onwards. In this case, the approach reflects the preliminary economic impact of the crisis in the M iddle East on growth rates in provider countries. Combining these sources yields a single projected scenario for total ODA in 2026 and the near term , rather than the lowerand higher-cut range used in the June 2025 brief. However, higherand lowercut estimates for ODA to health were calculated to reflect uncertainty in the treatment of the United States’ share of health ODA. Reported data in the DAC Survey are the most complete for 2026. For 2027 and 2028, where fewer providers reported/published official figures, the projec tion increasingly applies the third approach above of flatlining based on reported ODA/GNI in 2025. The flatter trend after 2026 is partly due to this conservative assumption and may therefore understate further cuts. All amounts are expressed in constant 2024 USD to allow comparison over time, using exchange rates and GDP deflators from the OECD Economic Outlook 119 database (OECD, 2026[2]). Disaggregation by recipient, sector and modality Disaggregated projections apply each DAC member’s historical share of total ODA – by region, income

and GDP deflators from the OECD Economic Outlook 119 database (OECD, 2026[2]). Disaggregation by recipient, sector and modality Disaggregated projections apply each DAC member’s historical share of total ODA – by region, income group, sector, and modality – to its projected total, with a focus on least developed countries, subSaharan Africa, health, and multilateral ODA. Shares use the 202425 average (or the member’s reported survey figure) for multilateral ODA, Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and sub-Saharan Africa, and 2024 alone for sectors and other groups, where 2025 preliminary data are not yet available. Six members provided projections for ODA to LDCs, five for sub-Saharan Africa and fourtee n for multilateral ODA in their survey response – for these countries, the reported values were applied. However, when comparing multiple sectors and recipient groups in a single graph, the same method is applied across all groups – e.g., for comparison of regions (Figure 4), 2024 shares are applied to all regions including sub-Saharan Africa, since the other regions do not have 2025 data available. In these cases, all percentage and volume changes are analysed on a two-year basis. ODA is projected to fall for a third straight year in 2026 DAC countries’ net ODA is projected to fall by 6. 9% in 2026, amounting to USD 152 billion – its lowest level since 2014 and, after the 23.3% drop in 2025 and 8.5% drop in 2024, a third consecutive annual decline. The projected amount in 2026 is equivalent to 0.23% of projected gross national income (GNI) in net terms, down from 0.25% in 2025. The cut in 2026 is broad-based: sixteen DAC members are projected to cut their ODA by a combined USD 12 billion, against USD 0.7 billion of increases projected by seventeen others, fourteen of which are EU members. The G7 accounts for USD 9.3 billion of the reduction.

to cut their ODA by a combined USD 12 billion, against USD 0.7 billion of increases projected by seventeen others, fourteen of which are EU members. The G7 accounts for USD 9.3 billion of the reduction. The fall is expected to continue beyond 2026: by 2028, net ODA is projected to be 9.9% lower than it was in 2025, with the ratio slipping further to 0.21% of GNI. These cuts reflect policy choices: if DAC members were to hold their 2025 ODA/GNI ratios, total ODA would rise by 1.4% in 2026 rather than falling and would have stood 4.4% above its 2025 level by 2028 – instead of a projected 9.9% below. These projections reflect current inflation forecasts that could worsen in the case of a prolonged crisis in the Middle East, resulting in an upward revision to inflation that would further erode the real value of fixed ai d budgets (Box 2).4 

ODA PROJECTIONS FOR 2026 AND THE NEAR-TERM © OECD 2026

Figure 1. ODA projected to drop again in 2026 Total net ODA from DAC member countries, 2000-24 (official data), 2025 (preliminary) and 2026-28 (projections), USD billion, constant 2024 prices

Source: OECD (2026[3]), Preliminary official development assistance levels in 2025,

https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD(2026)8/en/pdf. Box 2. Implications of crisis in the Middle East The crisis in the Middle East, ongoing since late February, is both a huma nitarian emergency and macroeconomic shock. It is pushing up the prices of food, fuel, and fertiliser while sl owing growth worldwide. It bears on ODA in two ways: it raises needs in the most exposed d eveloping countries and it strains the budgets of development co-operation providers.

macroeconomic shock. It is pushing up the prices of food, fuel, and fertiliser while sl owing growth worldwide. It bears on ODA in two ways: it raises needs in the most exposed d eveloping countries and it strains the budgets of development co-operation providers. ODA has historically been stable and resilient in times of crisis. It grew by 38% across the two 1973-79 oil shocks and by 20% from 1982-90 during the debt crises, while also rising through the 2008 financial crisis (with a lag in 2011-12). Most recently, health spending during COVID-19 lifted total ODA by 15% from 2019 to 2021, and support to Ukraine, which increased from USD 1 billion in 2021 to USD 18.6 billion in 2023, drove total ODA up by 20%. As of June 2026, following members’ answers to a dedicated DAC survey on their anticipated response to the crisis, the fiscal space to respond is largely absent. Most survey respo ndents do not expect the crisis in the Middle East to affect the level of their total ODA this year, though a handfu l reported a re-allocation towards or preservation of humanitarian aid in the Middle East region. None reported new measures to address the economic fallout of the crisis in developing countries. Exposure to this economic fallout is greatest where few providers dominate (Figure 2 ). A single provider accounts for most ODA in several LDCs and small island developing states (SID S), such as the United States in Marshall Islands and Micronesia, or Australia and New Zealand in Tonga and Tuvalu. These countries are also already facing multidimensional risks, with overlapping vulnerabilities that are reinforced through multiple channels (OECD, 2025[4]). In these countries especially, a shift in aid could therefore spill over quickly into broader macroeconomic and societal stress. Up to 45 million more people could face crisis-level food insecurity if the conflict runs past mid-year with oil a bove USD 100 a barrel, with the

through multiple channels (OECD, 2025[4]). In these countries especially, a shift in aid could therefore spill over quickly into broader macroeconomic and societal stress. Up to 45 million more people could face crisis-level food insecurity if the conflict runs past mid-year with oil a bove USD 100 a barrel, with the greatest risk in already-stressed importers such as Sudan and Somalia (WFP, 2026 [5]). rojections

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ODA PROJECTIONS FOR 2026 AND THE NEAR-TERM © OECD 2026

Figure 2. Countries most exposed to the crisis rely on a limited set of providers Providers’ shares of total ODA in the ten LDCs and SIDS most dependent on energy and fertiliser imports, 2024

Notes: AFESD = Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development; AfDF = African Development Fund; ADB = Asian Development Bank; BCIE = Central American Bank for Economic Integration; CERF = Central Emergency Response Fund; EU Inst. = European Union Institutions; GAVI = Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization; GEF = Global Environment Facility; IDA = International Development Association; IDB = InterAmerican Development Bank; IMF = International Monetary Fund (Concessional Trust Funds); OFID = OPEC Fund for International

Development; UK = United Kingdom; USA = United States.

Sources: OECD (2026[6]),DAC2A: Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions , http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/ob; World Bank (2026[7]), World Development Indicators (database) , https://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/; World Bank (2026 [8]), World

Integrated Trade Solution (database), https://wits.worldbank.org/. Sub-Saharan Africa and the least developed countries face the steepest cuts

World Development Indicators (database) , https://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/; World Bank (2026 [8]), World Integrated Trade Solution (database), https://wits.worldbank.org/. Sub-Saharan Africa and the least developed countries face the steepest cuts The deepest cuts are projected to fall on the countries least able to absorb them. DAC cou ntries’ bilateral net ODA to sub-Saharan Africa is projected to fall by 11.6% in 2026, after a 26.3% decline in 2025; bilateral net ODA to LDCs, down by 25.8% in 2025, is projected to fall a further 10.9%. For both groups, this would6 

ODA PROJECTIONS FOR 2026 AND THE NEAR-TERM © OECD 2026

be a third straight year of decline, leaving ODA at its lowest level since t he early 2000s, at the start of the Millennium Development Goal era. The cuts to these groups span many providers, but the burden is uneven. Cuts to sub-Saharan Africa and LDCs from G7 countries run above the DAC average – at 13.9% and 12.1% respectively in 2026 – while DAC EU members are less severe on average, at projected declines of 3.6% and 1.6%. Multilateral channels are not filling the gap. Imputed multilateral aid 2 to these groups is projected to fall by 6.6% each in 2026. Counting bilateral and multilateral aid together, total support to sub-Saharan Africa and LDCs would drop by 9.8% and 9.4%, respectively (Figure 3). Some providers have framed lower bilateral aid to these regions as a shift toward multilateral channels of deli very: in 2021-24, bilateral ODA to sub-Saharan Africa and LDCs declined by 7.2% and 12% respectively, while concessional outflows from multilateral organisations to these groups increased by 23.4% and 11.3% in t he same period. However,

to sub-Saharan Africa and LDCs declined by 7.2% and 12% respectively, while concessional outflows from multilateral organisations to these groups increased by 23.4% and 11.3% in t he same period. However, data on projections suggest that absent a re-allocation toward multilateral organisatio ns serving the poorest countries, multilateral ODA is not likely to offset the bilateral decline – especially as DAC members’ multilateral ODA is projected to decline for the third straight year, as discussed in the section, “Multilateral ODA is set to fall again in 2026”. Figure 3. Total ODA by DAC member countries to sub-Saharan Africa and LDCs is projected to decline again Net bilateral and imputed multilateral ODA for sub-Saharan Africa and LDCs from DAC countries, 2010-2025 (official data) and 2026-2028 (projections), USD billion, constant (2024) prices

Notes: Data from 2010 to 2024 reflect final statistics reported to the OECD. 2025 data are preliminary. 2026-28 values are projected.

Sources: OECD (2026 [3]), Preliminary official development assistance levels in 2025 , https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD(2026)8/en/pdf; OECD (2026[6]), OECD Data Explorer, DAC2A: Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/ob.

rojections

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5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 2 6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 25 e 2 26p 2 2 p 2 2 p et bilateral ODA mputed multilateral ODA east developed countries 7

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Cuts span every region and income group From 2024 to 20263, Europe shows the largest two-year projected decline (40.3%), of which 88.7% reflects lower aid to Ukraine, extending a fall from the 2022 peak. Excluding Ukraine, ODA to the rest of Europe is projected to fall by 29.1%, less than every region except South and Central Asia (-27.6%) (Figure 4). Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) show similar percentage cuts (37.2% and 35.0%, respectively), but the volumes diverge sharply: USD 11.8 billion is projected to leave sub-Saharan Africa by 2026, against USD 3.0 billion for LAC. The difference in volume matters because 32 of 49 (65%) of sub-Saharan African countries are also LDCs, against just 1 of 27 in LAC. Cuts within sub-Saharan Africa are projected to be widespread, particularly to countries experienc ing fragility. Aid to contexts in high or extreme fragility in the sub-continent i s projected to fall by 37.9 % from 2024 to 2026, and aid to the Sahel by 35.6%. Every income group is affected by the cuts, particularly the lower-income countries (Figure 4). The largest two-year decline is projected for lower-middle-income countries (- 35.1%), driven by the fall in aid to

2024 to 2026, and aid to the Sahel by 35.6%. Every income group is affected by the cuts, particularly the lower-income countries (Figure 4). The largest two-year decline is projected for lower-middle-income countries (- 35.1%), driven by the fall in aid to Ukraine, followed by LDCs (-34.5%); aid to upper-middle-income countries (UMICs) is projected to fall by 31.0%. The decline in volume amounts to USD 10.5 billion in LDCs and USD 4.8 billion in UMICs. Small island developing states (SIDS) are among the hardest hit individu ally: five of the fifteen recipient countries with the largest cuts are SIDS, with declines between 2024 and 2026 reachi ng up to 60%. As a group, ODA to SIDS is projected to fall 3 3.3% from 2024 to 2026 – more steeply for Caribbean SIDS (- 36.6%) and those in Asia and Oceania (-33.4%), while African small island states are less affected (-8.9%). Aid to landlocked developing countries and aid to fragile states are each projected to decline by 34% over this period. In each case, most of the two-year decline is the projected 2025 drop – to be confirmed or revised when the activity-level data are published in December 2026 – rather than the smaller projected fall in 2026.8 

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Figure 4. Two-year declines projected for ODA to all income groups, regions and other vulnerable groups Projected change in net bilateral ODA from DAC countries by region and income group from 2024 to 2026p

Notes: MENA=Middle East and North Africa; LAC=Latin America and the Caribbean; LDCs=Le ast Developed Countries; LICs=Low-income countries; LMICs=Lower-middle income countries; UMICs=Upper-middle income countries.

Sources: OECD (2026 [3]), Preliminary official development assistance levels in 2025 ,

countries; LMICs=Lower-middle income countries; UMICs=Upper-middle income countries.

Sources: OECD (2026 [3]), Preliminary official development assistance levels in 2025 ,

https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD(2025)6/en/pdf; OECD (2026[6]), OECD Data Explorer, DAC2A: Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/ob. Health, humanitarian aid, and governance bear the deepest sectoral cuts ODA to health is projected to decline further in 2026 and fall below pre-pandemic levels Health faces the steepest cuts of all sectors. Net ODA for health and population servi ces (hereafter , “health”) is projected to be up to one-third lower in 2026 than in 2019 and 63% below the 2022 peak – this represents a decline of 29-46%4 from 2024 to 2026 , or USD 5-8 billion (Figure 5) . This would pull health ODA well below pre-pandemic levels , back toward where it stood in 2008. Alongside funding cuts, ODA for health may also be affected by changes in how development co-operation for health is delivered.

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Figure 5. Health aid is projected to fall below pre-pandemic levels Net bilateral ODA for health from DAC countries, 2002-2024 (official data) and 2025-2028 (projections), USD billion, constant (2024) prices

Figure 5. Health aid is projected to fall below pre-pandemic levels Net bilateral ODA for health from DAC countries, 2002-2024 (official data) and 2025-2028 (projections), USD billion, constant (2024) prices

Notes: Data from 2002 to 2024 reflect final statistics reported to the OECD. 2025 sectoral breakdowns are estimated based on 2024 shares applied to preliminary total ODA. 2026-28 values are projected ODA.

Sources: OECD (2026 [3]), Preliminary official development assistance levels in 2025

https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD(2026)8/en/pdf; (OECD, 2026[9]), CRS: Creditor Reporting System (flows), http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/52. The cuts will fall unevenly, concentrated where external financing for health ma tters most. Malawi and South Sudan, for example, each fund about 60% of current health expenditure from external sources (World Health Organization, 2025 [10]); their bilateral health ODA is projected to fall by 50.8% and 42.4 % from 2024 to 2026. Mozambique, Lesotho, and Uganda are similarly exposed, combining heavy reliance on external health finance – with particular dependence on G7 providers, the group responsible for the largest cuts – in countries with little space to raise domestic revenue. Within the health sector, population and reproductive health – including HIV/AIDS and other STD control – faces the largest cut , with ODA projected to fall by up to 54.1% in 2026 against 2024. Fundin g for the control of communicable diseases is also under acute pressure. From 2024 to 2026: • ODA for malaria control is projected to fall by up to 59.6%; • ODA for tuberculosis control is projected to fall by up to 57.2%; • ODA for other infectious-disease control is projected to fall by up to 40.4%. The cuts reach beyond response to preparedness. Funding for pandemic preparedness , prevention, and

• ODA for tuberculosis control is projected to fall by up to 57.2%; • ODA for other infectious-disease control is projected to fall by up to 40.4%.

The cuts reach beyond response to preparedness. Funding for pandemic preparedness , prevention, and response (PPR) is essential not only for responding to disease outbreaks but al so minimising disruptions to essential health services during outbreaks. Such funding is affected across sectors. For example, ODA for water supply and sanitation, which supports PPR, is projected to fall by 22.3% from 2024 to 2026. The risk is most acute where outbreaks occur . In the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, which are facing an active Ebola outbreak at the time of writing, health aid is projected to fall by 46.6% (to USD 208.9 million) and 53.5% (to USD 234.8 million) respectively. Humanitarian aid and governance support face the next deepest cuts Ranked by the rate of decline, health leads (29-46% decline from 2024), follo wed by general budget support (43.0% decline, though this is volatile and driven by Ukraine) and humanitarian assistance (40.3%,10 

ODA PROJECTIONS FOR 2026 AND THE NEAR-TERM © OECD 2026

a USD 9.3 billion fall) (Figure 6). Preliminary 2025 data already sh ow humanitarian ODA down 35.8% in

2025. This impact across sectors is driven by the relative prominence of the providers making the largest cuts5.

ODA for government and civil society 6 is projected to fall by 39.8% (USD 8.9 billion), largely because kraine, which received . of this sector’s ODA in 2 2 , is projected to see sharp reductions. Figure 6. Health, humanitarian aid, and governance face the steepest declines Net bilateral ODA from DAC countries by sector, 2018-24 (official data) and 2025-28 (projections), USD billion, constant (2024) prices

Figure 6. Health, humanitarian aid, and governance face the steepest declines Net bilateral ODA from DAC countries by sector, 2018-24 (official data) and 2025-28 (projections), USD billion, constant (2024) prices

Projected change in net bilateral ODA from DAC countries by sector, from 2024 to 2026p, USD billion, constant (2024) prices

Notes: Data from 2018 to 2024 reflect final statistics reported to the OECD. 2025 secto ral breakdowns are estimated based on 2024 shares applied to preliminary total ODA. 2026-28 values are projected ODA.

Sources: OECD (2026[3]), Preliminary official development assistance levels in 2025

https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD(2026)8/en/pdf; OECD (2026[9]), CRS: Creditor Reporting System (flows), http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/52. .5 5. 2.5 . umanitarian Assistance overnment Civil Society ealth ood aid Education 11

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Other sectors impacted by ODA cuts from 2024 to 2026 include: • ODA for education, projected to fall by 22.2%; • Food aid, projected to fall by 44.5% (USD 2.6 billion), with the United States – accounting for twothirds of DAC food aid in 2024 – being the dominant provider; • ODA for energy, projected to fall by 22.6%. DAC-EU members see milder sectoral cuts , largely driven by G7-EU members: their steepest reductions as a group are in transport and storage (-25.9%), other social infrastructure and services (-17.8 %), communications (-17.5%), and business and other services (-16.5%) in 2026 over 2024. Multilateral ODA is set to fall again in 2026

as a group are in transport and storage (-25.9%), other social infrastructure and services (-17.8 %), communications (-17.5%), and business and other services (-16.5%) in 2026 over 2024. Multilateral ODA is set to fall again in 2026 Multilateral ODA has broken from a long-standing trend of steady growth. Prelimina ry data show a 12.7% decline in net multilateral ODA from 2024 to 2025, leaving levels 28.4% b elow the 2023 peak. Volumes are projected to fall again by 3.4% in 2026, marking three years of consecutive decline. This would be the second-longest downward streak in the history of multilateral ODA , after a decline of 20% from 1992 to 1997. Figure 7. Multilateral ODA breaks from historical pattern of growth Multilateral ODA from DAC countries, 2000-2024 (official data), 2025 (preliminary data) and 2026-2028 (projections), USD billion, constant (2024) prices Notes: Data from 2000 to 2024 reflect final statistics reported to the OECD. 2025 data are preliminary. 2026-28 values are projected ODA.

Source: OECD (2026[11]), DAC1: Flows by provider (ODA+OOF+Private),

http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/9w. The contraction in 2025 was uneven across institutions. Core funding to UN entities fell by 27%, the largest annual drop on record, while core support to the World Bank rose by 6.4% and to regional banks by 11.9%, reflecting disbursements from previous multi-year replenishment cycles. All institutions are projected to see cuts in 20