OEA - Governance Challanges Policy Securitization

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GOVERNACE CHALLENGES FOR POLICY SECURITIZATION An application to climate change in developing countries Silverio Zebral Filho1 August 2025 [1] Introduction There is no need to look much further to find it. Google it and you will figure out that even the most sophisticated AI boot is uncapable to estimate how many mentions per day were made in the digital world since last Tuesday. Jump out the bed and the buzz will follow you throughout the day. The Paris Agreement commitment just months before COP30 makes the frontpage of morning paper. The Weather Channel warns you about “the hottest summer in a century”. Your favourite podcaster advocates a “greener attitude toward marriage” during your morning commute. You try to figure out what that means, sipping an organic maccha tea in a recycled glass cup. While you head to your office’s cubicle, you notice a new set of colourful recycling bins seated at the aisle. Check your emails and the footnotes advise you: “do not print this message”. An electric SUV will bring you home, where dimming lights powered by solar energy during the day and your Amazon’s Alexa are just waiting to greet you. Despite another slow and sleepy Monday, evening news commentators seem deeply concerned: “disaster”, emergency”, “security”, “challenge”, “volatility”, “uncertainty” are the most common frames asserting that we are all under the same unescapable “existential threat”: climate change. Empirical data support the collective anxiety. According to UNDP (2024), “more than half of people globally said they were more worried about climate change now than last year, and four out of five want their countries to strengthen commitments to address climate change”. Deliberated or not, these dramatic frames serve a political purpose: they mobilize hearts and minds of the audience to actively join a global fight led by nation-States organized under “alliances of the willingness” hosted by international organizations and funded by multilateral development bank to mitigate transnational economic, social and demographic adverse effects already expressed

minds of the audience to actively join a global fight led by nation-States organized under “alliances of the willingness” hosted by international organizations and funded by multilateral development bank to mitigate transnational economic, social and demographic adverse effects already expressed in several hot spots across the globe [Fan 2021]. All of that in the name of global security [Emmers, 2013]. The idea is not new. The 2008 financial crisis, the 2014 Ebola upsurge in West Africa, the 2015 European migrant crisis and the 2019 covid pandemia are examples of (fairly successful?) securitization – a political communication strategy to conceptualize a policy challenge as a security problem, in a particular way that government can claim extraordinary temporary powers to put in

1 Silverio Zebral Filho serves as Head of Governance Unit at Organization of American States (OAS) and Academic Coordinator of OAS School of Governance. Invited professor at Georgetown University (USA), IE University (Spain), INSPER and Dom Cabral Foundation (Brazil) and IESA (Venezuela). Comments are welcome at szebral@oas.org3

place exceptional measures to remedy it “on behalf of the people and according to the socially desirable outcome” [Collins, 2013]. These measures would not receive majoritarian consent in normal times due to the potential adverse effects on other non-securitized aspects of social life, such as economic growth, political freedoms, the rule of Law, and the protection of human rights. Does the securitization of the climate change a smart strategy to set the public agenda, mobilize collective action, and fundraise policy and non-policy responses to climate threat? Do public narratives deliberated biased toward “security’ performs better to sparks action to advance policy change (mitigation and/or adaptation initiatives towards SDGs or Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) toward Paris Agreement targets) than less dramatic approaches? In the specific case of climate-related issues, especially in developing countries of the Global South, securitization is neither easy nor often desirable. [Adger 2007, and Sullivan et al. 2018].

Contributions (NDC) toward Paris Agreement targets) than less dramatic approaches? In the specific case of climate-related issues, especially in developing countries of the Global South, securitization is neither easy nor often desirable. [Adger 2007, and Sullivan et al. 2018]. Solutions must originate from an environment favouring bottom-up, crowdsourced, innovative, collaborative experimentation and learning—quite the opposite of what is sparked by a securitizing actor promising “a bold response to an imminent existential crisis” [UN 2022]. Furthermore, climate change securitization is unlikely to produce results similar to those of (allegedly successful) strategies used in other policy areas (such as health emergencies, international trade, or human mobility) when targeting different securitizing objects (like pandemics, trade imbalances, or refugee crises) to protect other referent objects (for example, “the humankind,” “the national economy,” or “our national identity”). The primary reasons for this are the very ontology of “the environment” (here understood as a broad and vague “securitizing object”) and the institutional challenges that arise in conjunction with securitization moves. Additionally, climate securitization tends to generate a vast (and unpredictable!) array of unintended consequences, negative externalities, and adverse spillover effects, igniting disorder and resistance where smooth, steady, collaborative, and innovative collective action is desperately needed [Olson 1971]. However, before discussing the pros and cons of framing climate change as a “security threat” and, therefore, claiming security-based extraordinary measures to mitigate its risks [Buzan et al. 1998], it is essential to understand the nature of climate change phenomena from a policy theory perspective and from a developing world lens. [2] Climate Change: a wicked problem coming out of a common-pool resource We can think of the environment as a common-pool resource prone to depletion, degradation, or depreciation due to low costs of consumption (e.g., air pollution or clean water) and a lack of rules4

[2] Climate Change: a wicked problem coming out of a common-pool resource We can think of the environment as a common-pool resource prone to depletion, degradation, or depreciation due to low costs of consumption (e.g., air pollution or clean water) and a lack of rules4

and norms that individualize property rights (e.g., solid waste management). [Hardin 1968 and Ostrom 1990].2 Similarly, we can consider climate change as a wicked problem. Head (2022) defines it as “wicked” as a complex policy problem with the following characteristics: (a) no clear ex ante definition, making multi-source identification difficult, (b) no immediate or definitive test for solutions, requiring translation of uncertainty and ambiguity into risks for various securitization strategies, (c) solutions are not right or wrong but better or worse, challenging a Pareto-maximization approach, (d) solutions often have unintended consequences, (e) improvements tend to be marginal, raising concerns about cost-effectiveness, (f) boundaries are unclear, complicating jurisdiction, (g) ownership is ambiguous, hindering enforcement, (h) path dependence and stickiness hinder quick change, (i) stochastic and multiplier dynamics make reversal difficult after reaching a tipping point (“no stopping rule”), (j) solutions depend on context, complicating scaling and transferability, (k) no final solutions, necessitating ongoing experimentation, and (l) worldview limitations restrict the solution space, creating challenges for persuasion and consent even within countries.

Finally, we can view climate securitization as an initiative for institutional change. Successfully securitizing a complex policy issue like climate change doesn’t rely solely on clever political framing (i.e., “crisis,” “emergency,” “survival,” “Armageddon”). First, the main securitizing actor must persuade the public (“the audience”) that they and their agents (“the securitizing supporting actor”) are acting in good faith and in the interest of the people (“the silent majority”), despite resistance from a small group of advocates (“the noisy minority”). Second, it requires

actor must persuade the public (“the audience”) that they and their agents (“the securitizing supporting actor”) are acting in good faith and in the interest of the people (“the silent majority”), despite resistance from a small group of advocates (“the noisy minority”). Second, it requires convincing the audience that these agents can not only develop securitizing narratives but also communicate complex policy measures (such as mitigation and adaptation policies like net zero and urban energy transitions). Actually, the survival of securitization depends on policymaking competence. Early policy victories need to generate positive political headlines. Political leaders are held accountable for their promises and actions, especially during crises. Their willingness to grant a new mandate to securitizing agents (technocrats) for extraordinary measures mainly depends on their popularity levels [Skeril et al. 2024]. So, effective securitization must succeed in two different areas: political persuasion and policy implementation. Keeping this in mind, here are four types of institutional challenges that threaten success in the second area. First, consider the principal-agent paradox [Olson 1971, Buchanan and Tulloch 1962]. For example, agreements on global net-zero targets made in the international arena by national government representatives (“the principals”) must be implemented through policies by subnational

2 Ostrom (1971) characterizes a common-pool good as a good that is prone to be overused and depleted due to is uncontrolled (aka, rivalrous and non-excludable) consumption pattern, often leading to “the tragedy of the commons”. Please see Hardin (1968) for the original insight.5

authorities. These actions are carried out at the local level by street-level bureaucrats and stakeholders (“the agents”) who may not necessarily share the same vested interests, preferences, or capacity as the principals. Compliance rules from above may encounter diverse practices or technologies (e.g., controlled firing or coal stoves) among local “beneficiaries” who are often too busy dealing with current hardships to pay much attention to their future [Green 2016].

or capacity as the principals. Compliance rules from above may encounter diverse practices or technologies (e.g., controlled firing or coal stoves) among local “beneficiaries” who are often too busy dealing with current hardships to pay much attention to their future [Green 2016]. Second, open governance in complex settings requires state actors to co-design and coimplement actions while collaborating with societal participants within loosely connected networks. These networks are vulnerable to various collective action failures, including path dependence, conflict, opportunism, clientelism, free riding, information asymmetry, disparities in bargaining power, and veto players— to name just a few institutional challenges related to policy implementation [Andrews 2017]. Third, wicked problems like climate change present an intertemporal dilemma. Climate mitigation and adaptation require facing immediate, tangible, and individually assigned costs, while the benefits are uncertain, widespread, collective, and realized over the long term. This creates not only a challenge of foresight—such as setting targets, developing scenarios, and imagining plausible futures—but also raises intergenerational moral dilemmas related to equity, justice, freedom, and reparation rights. The intertemporal uncertainty also creates a distributive puzzle. Kuznets (1955) highlights that economic growth is linked to income inequality and fossil-fuel use in an inverted U shape over time. While the production frontier expands quickly during the early stages of industrialization due to productivity gains and higher returns on investment, fossil fuel consumption rises alongside the concentration of income among the productive elite in early-developed countries. When the point of diminishing marginal returns is reached, advanced economies shift to the service sector, and income inequality and CO2 emissions decrease as elites favor clean growth. Elites in developed countries impose a “new normal” on late-developing countries (i.e., green conditionalities), which hinders their progress toward higher per capita income levels by “kicking the ladder” [Chang, 2003] and traps them in a middle-income status. Finally, climate change knows no borders. To effectively combat COVID-19, governments

progress toward higher per capita income levels by “kicking the ladder” [Chang, 2003] and traps them in a middle-income status. Finally, climate change knows no borders. To effectively combat COVID-19, governments around the world focused mainly on its transnational nature. Flights were cancelled, and passengers were grounded to prevent the deadly spread of the virus. Air pollution, ash storms, and wildfires are also unwanted, but they do not ask permission to travel across the sky and oceans, reaching different jurisdictions. This requires governance by a transnational government network that can’t be easily “securitized’ [Slaughter 2000]. Considering the above, securitization appears to be a challenging strategy to reduce climate change risks, due to a poor value proposition: it requires too much too soon from the silent majority (“the poor”); and, so far, it has delivered too little, perhaps too late for all of us, including the elites.6

[3] From Copenhagen to Escazu: from global threat to individual responsibility The United Nations (2022) has recognized climate change as a “threat multiplier,” potentially worsening existing stressors like poverty, environmental degradation, social tension, and, in extreme cases, the risk of conflict. So, at first glance, climate could be seen as a key securitization issue. However, practically speaking, securitization is not easy to achieve given the problems mentioned above. Nevertheless, from a normative perspective, is securitization beneficial? Considering some positive (really?) results achieved during the COVID-19 crisis, it’s time to examine the advantages and disadvantages of climate securitization as a political strategy. First, let’s examine agenda setting. The “climate security” framing has already turned the climate challenge into a political priority in the Global North. According to The Climate Policy Initiative (2024), annual climate investments surged after a period of slow growth, reaching a high of $1.9 trillion in 2023, with most of that focused on climate mitigation initiatives. The COP30 Belen expects

climate challenge into a political priority in the Global North. According to The Climate Policy Initiative (2024), annual climate investments surged after a period of slow growth, reaching a high of $1.9 trillion in 2023, with most of that focused on climate mitigation initiatives. The COP30 Belen expects to convene over 40,000 delegates from more than 190 national governments. There is no doubt that securitization has brought attention to the issue, mobilized resources, and driven innovations in green technologies worldwide. However, the perceived urgency of the matter (partially in dissonance with a “long-term crisis” framing) and the allegedly catastrophic consequences of late action have triggered different attitudinal responses in key audiences: eco-anxiety has become a new mental health concern [Hayes 2018], and carelessness about the future is growing among young Millennials and Genz’s [Haidt 2013]. Second, let’s evaluate policy space. On one side, securitization expands the options by bringing in solutions that are not politically viable during normal times. On the other side, securitization tends to push out policy options that come from bottom-up or subnational groups. Policy choices from small-scale and local self-governance efforts and regulations struggle to make it onto the public agenda because those in charge are often too busy to listen, assess, and manage the coordination costs of unconventional solutions. Security and military responses frequently discourage local actors due to fear, lack of ownership, and a sense of belonging. Freeriding is a common reaction to complexity when “someone smarter and more capable than me is taking care of it”. Third, collaboration. Sometimes, the government adopts securitization strategies that unintentionally create “legal sandboxes” enabling experimentation and adaptive tactics during a crisis (consider special procurement rules during COVID-19). However, more often than not, securitization hampers the autonomy and agency needed to foster collaborative innovation and maintain a steady flow of “positive deviance from the normal” over time [Andrews, 2017]. As

crisis (consider special procurement rules during COVID-19). However, more often than not, securitization hampers the autonomy and agency needed to foster collaborative innovation and maintain a steady flow of “positive deviance from the normal” over time [Andrews, 2017]. As Hirschman (1970) once observed, in times of crisis, change requires voice (here, “divergence”)—not loyalty or exit.7

Fourth, let’s consider innovation. Climate change has different sources and effects across various regions. This means that preparation, adaptation, and mitigation require developing local solutions for local manifestations of a global problem that call for trial-and-error, responsible experimentation, learning, and adaptation (remember COVID-19 vaccines…). Narrative frames such as “existential” introduce fear, uncertainty, and sometimes inevitability, pushing the public into inaction and a fatalist or careless mindset. Fifth, let’s consider accountability. Securitization of any policy domain broadens the scope of data the government claims to treat as “confidential.” Official secrecy increases, and transparency declines. Decision-making becomes more centralized, and accountability measures are either waived or dismissed. Sixth, the danger of soft authoritarianism. Typically, securitization is meant to promote cooperation even when disagreements exist. For example, only a crisis of enormous scale like the COVID-19 pandemic can cause citizens to give up their most basic rights (movement and assembly) to the State in the name of security. A world filled with fear can shift citizens’ preferences toward security over liberty, increase tolerance or passivity in response to abusive actions by the securitizing actor exerting “temporary extraordinary powers.” Coercive cooperation leads to adherence to current standards (rules, plans, protocols, procedures) and lowers the costs of information and coordination in collective actions. However, it also drains other key factors that inspire and energize civic participation: ownership, belonging, and identity. That leads us to a sensitive corollary: military leadership. In underdeveloped countries that lack state administrative capacity, it is the Armed Forces that handle responses in humanitarian

in collective actions. However, it also drains other key factors that inspire and energize civic participation: ownership, belonging, and identity. That leads us to a sensitive corollary: military leadership. In underdeveloped countries that lack state administrative capacity, it is the Armed Forces that handle responses in humanitarian emergencies (such as famine, displacements, pandemics) or natural disasters (like floods, droughts, storms). Sometimes, the military is the only government presence in remote areas, responsible for providing basic public services to isolated populations. This can be beneficial, but it can also open the door to military political influence, which remains a constant concern in the developing world. Let’s consider monitoring. Narratives framing climate change as a long-term, ongoing crisis require tracking short-term progress toward ambitious long-term goals. These measures incentivize frequent deviations from the target, allowing adjustments for the next period – creating a mixed culture of moral hazard, adverse selection, opportunism, and complacency among securitizing agents. Let’s consider unintended consequences. Pre-emptive securitization can anticipate pressures to competition around potentially affected natural resources, such as clean water, food, and arable land—especially in poor rural areas. Geoeconomic competition among superpowers to gain strategic advantages in green technologies (i.e., sensors, batteries, superconductors) production by controlling access to rare earths and trade routes across the Arctic is making the breaking news of the day.8

Let’s examine responsibility. When it comes to climate change, securitization narratives can be crucial in shifting historical responsibilities from developed countries in the North to developing countries in the South, by blaming the latter for the costs of environmental protection borne by the former. A clear example is the current emphasis on Amazon deforestation, while discussions about the ecological footprint and environmental impact of European colonization across the Americas and Africa during the 16th-17th centuries have been silenced. Let’s consider opportunism. Selective and discretionary securitization of a policy challenge can be used as an excuse to avoid commitments made by nation-states to their peers at the

the ecological footprint and environmental impact of European colonization across the Americas and Africa during the 16th-17th centuries have been silenced. Let’s consider opportunism. Selective and discretionary securitization of a policy challenge can be used as an excuse to avoid commitments made by nation-states to their peers at the international level (i.e., trade), creating exclusions, exceptions, and safeguards for inconvenient policy situations under the guise of “national security.” In this sense, it is important to emphasize that securitization may sound like “necessary actions to ensure well-being for all,” but very often it indicates “convenient actions to benefit a few.” In this regard, securitization is not only a domestic political choice but also a strategy of selective international integration where developed countries shield themselves from the burden of their own commitments. Finally, let’s examine deep into fiscal imbalances. Urgency has the potential to increase fiscal imbalances among developed and developing countries even when compensatory funds flow from the first to the second [Antimiani, 2017]. As in the fable of the ants, a bleak future suggests excess in the present; therefore, public debt will grow over time while large current deficits are pushed onto future generations. As usual, the public sector will be willing to mitigate systematic undiversifiable risk related to investments in basic knowledge and green transition, up to the point where private start-ups catch up to turn fundamental knowledge into marketable technology and profits. That socializes costs and privatizes gains [Hardin, 1986]. [4] The real threat: securitizing everything? Some might argue that humankind's survival during the COVID-19 crisis is clear evidence supporting the securitization of all policy problems that require decisive collective action. However, this is only partly true. Exceptional security measures that limited individual freedom—such as lockdowns, bans, and mandatory vaccinations—were accepted by the public (not without protests and some civil disobedience) to protect life as we know it from an “imminent” existential threat to all. Climate change is a different game. It’s tough to sell it as “imminent,” “existential,” and a

lockdowns, bans, and mandatory vaccinations—were accepted by the public (not without protests and some civil disobedience) to protect life as we know it from an “imminent” existential threat to all. Climate change is a different game. It’s tough to sell it as “imminent,” “existential,” and a “threat to all.” Securitization would put mitigation and adaptation costs on specific regions, populations, and societal groups, while offering vague, dispersed, and uncertain benefits to those who haven't even been born yet. Despite the size of the advocacy coalition, the same level of consensus gained during COVID-19 is unlikely to be achieved. The failure to rally exceptional action—especially at the local level—serves as clearer evidence of climate securitization’s shortcomings so far.9

So, what to do instead? Securitization option is beyond “yes or no”. As we saw, it can elevate the issue on public priorities. Still, a frame that combines “uncertainty”, “long-term”, and “scientific” is somehow counterproductive: it crowds out innovative policy options, ignores unintended consequences, and feeds political fatigue. Addressing the climate change “challenge” (a much better frame, isn’t it?) in liberal democracy requires a “holistic understanding of intertwining factors” and a “more nuanced and blended approach,” avoiding “governmentalization of security” as a quick fix [Von Lucke 2020]. This combined approach must account for the shared nature of environmental resources (forests, rivers, ponds), the complex nature of climate change, and the institutional hurdles that hinder flexible policy responses embedded in complexity. It must go beyond the Eurocentric worldview and balance the interests of Northern elites by including the knowledge, voices, and agency of indigenous peoples.

It will be a mix: a little bit of Copenhagen, a bit more of Paris, and significantly more of Escazu [UN

2017]. Scholars should conduct more research on the moral limits of policy securitization. The core problem with climate securitization is that it involves securitizing an undesired byproduct of many

2017]. Scholars should conduct more research on the moral limits of policy securitization. The core problem with climate securitization is that it involves securitizing an undesired byproduct of many legal, legitimate, and valuable human development activities. If we focus on securitizing the output, we cannot avoid securitizing the inputs. This means securitizing—and thus politicizing—the rights related to how the poorest people cook dinner across Southeast Asia, how Brazilian farmers plant soy or raise livestock, how Pepsi uses clean water to make soft drinks near the Mississippi River, migration flows from Africa to Europe, and data centres that overconsume energy worldwide to power AI applications. That would be “the securitization of everything." Prosperity, democracy, justice, freedom, and human rights will be undermined.

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