OEA - Informe AICD JD INF. 138 26 de 2026

INTER-AMERICAN AGENCY FOR OEA/Ser.W

COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT AICD/JD/INF.138/26

MEETING OF THE MANAGEMENT BOARD 2 September 2026

Original: Textual

OAS DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AND PARTNERSHIPS

INSTITUTIONAL AND LANDSCAPE ASSESSMENT

(Document prepared by an external consultant)Disclaimer

This document was prepared by an external consultant under a contract commissioned by the previous Executive Secretary for Integral Development. The analysis, findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or official positions of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, the Executive Secretariat for Integral Development (SEDI), the Inter -American Council for Integral Development (CIDI), the Inter-American Agency for Cooperation and Development (IACD), or the Member States of the Organization.

The document is of a strictly informative and analytical character. It does not constitute a mandate, a policy determination, a negotiated text, or a decision of any organ of the Organization, nor does it prejudge any future consideration by the Member Sta tes. References to institutional arrangements, mechanisms, or entities are descriptive in nature and do not entail any commitment on the part of the General Secretariat.

The General Secretariat assumes no responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or currency of the information contained herein, nor for any use that may be made of it. The publication or dissemination of this document does not imply endorsement of its content.

/ Descargo de Responsabilidad

El presente documento fue elaborado por una consultora externa en virtud de un contrato encomendado por la anterior Secretaria Ejecutiva para el Desarrollo Integral. El análisis, los hallazgos, las interpretaciones y las conclusiones que en él se expresan corresponden a su autora y no reflejan necesariamente las opiniones

la anterior Secretaria Ejecutiva para el Desarrollo Integral. El análisis, los hallazgos, las interpretaciones y las conclusiones que en él se expresan corresponden a su autora y no reflejan necesariamente las opiniones ni las posiciones oficiales de la Secretaría General de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, de la Secretaría Ejecutiva para el Desarrollo Integral (SEDI), del Consejo Interamericano para el Desarrollo Integral (CIDI), de la Agencia Interamericana para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo (AICD) ni de los Estados Miembros de la Organización.

El documento tiene carácter estrictamente informativo y analítico. No constituye un mandato, una determinación de política, un texto negociado ni una decisión de ningún órgano de la Organización, ni prejuzga consideración futura alguna por parte de los Estados Miembros. Las referenc ias a arreglos institucionales, mecanismos o entidades son de naturaleza descriptiva y no entrañan compromiso alguno de la Secretaría General.

La Secretaría General no asume responsabilidad por la exactitud, integridad o vigencia de la información aquí contenida, ni por el uso que pueda hacerse de ella. La publicación o difusión de este documento no implica aval de su contenido.OAS Development Cooperation and Partnerships Institutional and Landscape Assessment May, 2026Table of Contents

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................... 1

2. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 3 2.1 Purpose and Objectives ......................................................................................................... 3 2.2 Scope and Coverage ................................................................................................................ 4

3. GLOBAL AND REGIONAL LANDSCAPE ANALYSIS ...................................................................................... 5 3.1 Global Trends in International Development Cooperation ................................................... 5 3.2 Development Cooperation Trends in the Americas .............................................................. 10 3.3 OAS Positioning in the Evolving Cooperation Landscape...................................................... 13

3. GLOBAL AND REGIONAL LANDSCAPE ANALYSIS ...................................................................................... 5 3.1 Global Trends in International Development Cooperation ................................................... 5 3.2 Development Cooperation Trends in the Americas .............................................................. 10 3.3 OAS Positioning in the Evolving Cooperation Landscape...................................................... 13

4. MANDATE, GOVERNANCE, AND STRATEGIC FRAMEWORKS ....................................................................... 14 4.1 Founding Mandate and Regional Role .................................................................................. 14 4.2 Governance and Decision-Making Structures ....................................................................... 15 4.3 Strategic Frameworks for Development Cooperation .......................................................... 17

5. MAPPING OF COOPERATION MECHANISMS, PROGRAMS, AND INITIATIVES .................................................. 19 5.1 Cooperation Modalities ......................................................................................................... 20 5.2 Programming Cycles and Operational Channels ................................................................... 23 5.3 Cooperation Networks and Thematic Platforms ................................................................... 23 5.4 Coordination and Implementation Arrangements ............................................................... 24

6. STAKEHOLDER AND PARTNERSHIP MAPPING: CURRENT LANDSCAPE AND STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES ........... 25 6.1 OAS Member States and Permanent Observer States ........................................................... 26 6.2 Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations ............................................................................ 27 6.3 International Organizations and Development Partners ..................................................... 28 6.4 Private Sector, Philanthropy, and Financial Institutions ...................................................... 29 6.5 Academia, Think Tanks, and Subnational Implementation Partners ................................... 30

7. BENCHMARKING AGAINST COMPARABLE REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS .. 31 7.1 Comparator Selection ........................................................................................................... 31 7.2 Benchmarking Dimensions ................................................................................................... 32 7.3 Lessons and Good Practices .................................................................................................. 35

8. INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS ........................................ 37 8.1 Strengths and Comparative Advantages ............................................................................... 378.2 Gaps and Constraints ............................................................................................................ 38 8.3 Opportunities for Institutional Strengthening ...................................................................... 39

9. KEY FINDINGS AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS .................................................................. 42

8.1 Strengths and Comparative Advantages ............................................................................... 378.2 Gaps and Constraints ............................................................................................................ 38 8.3 Opportunities for Institutional Strengthening ...................................................................... 39

9. KEY FINDINGS AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS .................................................................. 42 9.1 Key Findings.......................................................................................................................... 42 9.2 Institutional Implications ..................................................................................................... 43 9.3 Overall Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 45

10. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK .................................................................... 46

11. ANNEXES ................................................................................................................................... 50ACRONYMS

CARICOM Caribbean Community CooperaNet Cooperation Exchange Network CIDI Inter-American Council for Integral Development DCF Development Cooperation Fund ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean FEMCIDI Special Multilateral Fund of the Inter-American Council for Integral Development GDP Gross Domestic Product IACD Inter-American Agency for Cooperation and Development IDB Inter-American Development Bank LAC Latin America and the Caribbean LDC Least Developed Country MICs Middle-income countries OAS Organization of American States ODA Official Development Assistance OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OECS Organization of Eastern Caribbean States PACCI Ibero-American Cooperation Action Program PIFCSS Ibero-American Program for the Strengthening of South-South Cooperation SDGs Sustainable Development Goals SEDI Executive Secretariat for Integral Development SEGIB Ibero-American General Secretariat SELA Latin American and Caribbean Economic System SIDS Small Island Developing States TOSSD Total Official Support for Sustainable Development UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNOSSC United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation1

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This assessment finds that the Organization of American States (OAS) continues to hold a relevant, differentiated role in hemispheric development cooperation, with institutional assets that remain valuable in a fragmented regional landscape. Its hemispheric reach, political legitimacy, convening power, and established cooperation mechanisms give the

This assessment finds that the Organization of American States (OAS) continues to hold a relevant, differentiated role in hemispheric development cooperation, with institutional assets that remain valuable in a fragmented regional landscape. Its hemispheric reach, political legitimacy, convening power, and established cooperation mechanisms give the organization a platform that few other institutions in the Americas replicate. While the OAS has the core instruments of a development cooperation function, it could strengthen the coherence, connectivity, and strategic discipline of these instruments to deliver stronger operational value to Member States.

The assessment finds that the OAS has developed a substantial cooperation architecture through the Development Cooperation Fund (DCF), the Cooperation Exchange Network (CooperaNet), the Meetings of High-Level Cooperation Authorities, the Inter-American Council for Integral Development (CIDI), the Inter-American Agency for Cooperation and Development (IACD), and a wider set of sectoral and thematic bodies. Yet these mechanisms do not consistently function as parts of an integrated system. Their respective roles are not always clearly defined and the progression from priority-setting and dialogue to programming, partnership development, and follow-up is often unclear. The result is a cooperation function with multiple institutional entry points, but limited cumulative effect across them.

Member States continue to value the OAS as a hemispheric political and convening platform, particularly given its broad membership and intergovernmental legitimacy. At the same time, they expect a cooperation function that is easier to navigate, more responsive to country-defined priorities, and better able to connect technical exchange with implementation support, partnerships, and practical opportunities for collaboration. The assessment therefore points to a gap between the institutional value the OAS is recognized as holding and the operational value it is consistently delivering through its cooperation mechanisms.

The DCF remains one of the OAS’s most important cooperation instruments because of both its practical and catalytic value. It provides an established channel for technical cooperation and, at its strongest, can help surface priorities, seed initiatives, and create entry points for broader technical and financial partnerships. That catalytic potential,

The DCF remains one of the OAS’s most important cooperation instruments because of both its practical and catalytic value. It provides an established channel for technical cooperation and, at its strongest, can help surface priorities, seed initiatives, and create entry points for broader technical and financial partnerships. That catalytic potential, however, is only partly realized under the current model. The Fund’s modest scale, periodicity, process burdens, and limited visibility constrain its reach and reduce its ability to function as part of a wider cooperation system. The issue is not only how the DCF operates as a project mechanism, but how it is positioned within a broader institutional approach to cooperation.

A similar dynamic applies to CooperaNet. The platform offers a practical mechanism for identifying needs, matching capacities, and facilitating exchange among Member States, but it does not yet function as a sufficiently active pipeline for cooperation opportunities. This matters because CooperaNet should be one of the clearest instruments through which the2

OAS converts expressed demand into actual cooperation. Its underperformance reflects a broader institutional issue: the organization has useful platforms and processes in place, but they are not yet generating a steady and visible flow from country needs to mobilized support.

The assessment also identifies significant unrealized potential in external engagement. The OAS is well positioned to deepen structured engagement with Permanent Observers, regional and subregional organizations, Inter-American system entities, international financial institutions, private-sector actors, philanthropic institutions, academic institutions, and selected civil society and subnational partners. There is also a strong case for the OAS to pursue observer status, formal recognition, or other structured institutional relationships with relevant regional and international organizations where doing so would raise the organization’s visibility, expand networking opportunities, and strengthen its role as a development coordination actor. Current engagement appears more episodic than strategic, which limits the OAS’s ability to convert institutional access and convening power into sustained cooperation value.

Benchmarking against comparable organizations reinforces these findings. Other institutions active in development cooperation generally show greater clarity in how they

as a development coordination actor. Current engagement appears more episodic than strategic, which limits the OAS’s ability to convert institutional access and convening power into sustained cooperation value.

Benchmarking against comparable organizations reinforces these findings. Other institutions active in development cooperation generally show greater clarity in how they define and communicate their role, whether as financing platforms, technical hubs, implementing agencies, or partnership brokers. The OAS is strongest as a hemispheric convener and broker across a diverse and fragmented regional landscape. That remains a meaningful comparative advantage, but it requires a stronger operational expression than the organization currently provides. The OAS is well placed to connect actors, elevate priorities, and create an intergovernmental platform through which cooperation can be identified, structured, and advanced. What is less developed is the institutional model needed to do so consistently.

The report also identifies a visibility problem with practical consequences. The OAS cooperation function is more active and more institutionally developed than is always apparent to Member States and external stakeholders, yet it is not consistently presented in a way that makes its purpose, instruments, and value proposition easy to understand. This weakens institutional positioning externally and contributes internally to a cooperation function that can appear fragmented rather than cumulative. For an institution whose comparative advantage depends heavily on convening, brokerage, and trust, weak articulation of the cooperation offer becomes an operational constraint.

Taken together, these findings point to a practical institutional agenda. The OAS would benefit from clearer differentiation and articulation of its principal cooperation mechanisms; stronger links between priority-setting, programming, partnership development, and follow-up; more strategic positioning of both the DCF and CooperaNet within the wider cooperation function; a more deliberate approach to external partnerships and institutional recognition; and clearer communication about what the OAS is offering, to whom, and for what purpose.3

The overall conclusion of the assessment is that the OAS remains well positioned to play a meaningful role in hemispheric development cooperation, but that this role will depend

partnerships and institutional recognition; and clearer communication about what the OAS is offering, to whom, and for what purpose.3

The overall conclusion of the assessment is that the OAS remains well positioned to play a meaningful role in hemispheric development cooperation, but that this role will depend increasingly on how effectively it organizes and deploys the assets it already has. The path forward is greater coherence, stronger operational linkages, more deliberate partnership strategy, and clearer articulation of the value the OAS can provide to Member States in a crowded and evolving cooperation landscape.

2. INTRODUCTION

2.1 Purpose and Objectives

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development affirms that international development cooperation is indispensable for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Specifically, SDG 17 underscores the centrality of multistakeholder partnerships – bringing together governments, civil society, the private sector, and international organizations to mobilize finance, knowledge, innovation, and technical capacity in support of sustainable development. These principles align with longstanding commitments within the InterAmerican system, where the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) establishes integral development and cooperation among its Member States as core purposes of the organization.

The global development cooperation architecture is, however, undergoing profound transformation. Major donors have announced significant reductions in Official Development Assistance (ODA), projected to result in a 31 percent decrease in overall ODA volumes between 2024 and 2029. At the same time, developing countries face mounting fiscal constraints, climate-related vulnerabilities, migration pressures, and persistent inequality that threaten progress towards national development goals. Traditional aid models – largely bilateral and characterized by predominantly North-South financial and technical flows – are increasingly insufficient to address the scale and complexity of these challenges. Countries will need to diversify partnerships, mobilize innovative sources of finance, and strengthen regional and South-South cooperation mechanisms to sustain and advance development gains.

These dynamics are reflected across the Americas. The region is experiencing shifts in donor engagement alongside growing demand for results-oriented, impact-driven

challenges. Countries will need to diversify partnerships, mobilize innovative sources of finance, and strengthen regional and South-South cooperation mechanisms to sustain and advance development gains.

These dynamics are reflected across the Americas. The region is experiencing shifts in donor engagement alongside growing demand for results-oriented, impact-driven cooperation and measurable outcomes. Many middle-income countries (MICs) face reduced access to concessional finance despite persistent inequality and institutional capacity gaps. Small island developing states (SIDS) in the Caribbean confront acute vulnerabilities related to climate change, natural disasters, high debt burdens, and limited economies of scale, further constraining long-term development planning.

The OAS requested this assessment to provide an independent analysis of its integral development pillar and its role within the broader regional and global cooperation architecture. The assessment reviews mandates, institutional arrangements, cooperation mechanisms, partnership modalities, and the Organization’s function as a hemispheric4

convener. It is intended to provide the analytical foundation for the subsequent development of a forward-looking strategy and roadmap, clarifying the OAS’s comparative advantage and strengthening its strategic value-add as a facilitator of development cooperation in the Hemisphere.

Through an institutional and external landscape review, including comparative benchmarking against relevant regional and international organizations, the assessment identifies strengths, gaps, and opportunities; analyzes emerging trends; and outlines options to enhance coherence, responsiveness, and strategic alignment within the integral development pillar.

2.2 Scope and Coverage

The assessment focuses on the OAS integral development pillar, as mandated by Member States to advance development cooperation in the hemisphere. It examines the principal institutional entities that exercise policy, governance, and operational responsibility for cooperation:

▪ Inter-American Council for Integral Development (CIDI): One of two councils reporting to the OAS General Assembly, CIDI serves as the principal forum for policy dialogue and decision-making on integral development and provides strategic guidance for hemispheric initiatives.

▪ Meeting of High-Level Authorities of Cooperation: Convened within CIDI’s

reporting to the OAS General Assembly, CIDI serves as the principal forum for policy dialogue and decision-making on integral development and provides strategic guidance for hemispheric initiatives.

▪ Meeting of High-Level Authorities of Cooperation: Convened within CIDI’s ministerial framework, this forum brings together national cooperation authorities to provide policy guidance and promote regional coordination on development cooperation priorities.

▪ Inter-American Agency for Cooperation and Development (IACD): A subsidiary body of CIDI, the IACD promotes horizontal and triangular cooperation among Member States and oversees the approval and implementation of cooperation programs.

▪ Executive Secretariat for Integral Development (SEDI): As CIDI’s technical secretariat, SEDI supports mandate implementation and facilitates development cooperation initiatives, including partnership development and technical assistance through its Technical Cooperation Section.

The geographic scope encompasses the Western Hemisphere, consistent with OAS membership, which comprises 35 countries across North America, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean.1 The analysis also considers relevant subregional dynamics, including Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), where pertinent to cooperation patterns and institutional engagement.

1 An OAS member since 1948, Cuba was suspended from participation in 1962. Although the suspension was lifted in 2009, Cuba has not resumed active participation in OAS bodies or activities.5

This assessment examines development cooperation as both a thematic area within CIDI’s structure and an enabling function supporting the broader objectives of the integral development pillar. It considers the modalities, coordination mechanisms, and partnership approaches through which cooperation is implemented – including horizontal and triangular cooperation and technical assistance – and assesses how these mechanisms contribute to coherence and strategic alignment across thematic areas. Consistent with the terms of reference, the assessment focuses on the analytical and diagnostic components of the assignment - institutional analysis, external landscape assessment, and consultation synthesis - and is intended to inform the subsequent strategy, roadmap, and validation phases.

contribute to coherence and strategic alignment across thematic areas. Consistent with the terms of reference, the assessment focuses on the analytical and diagnostic components of the assignment - institutional analysis, external landscape assessment, and consultation synthesis - and is intended to inform the subsequent strategy, roadmap, and validation phases.

3. GLOBAL AND REGIONAL LANDSCAPE ANALYSIS

Development cooperation is changing in ways that matter directly for the OAS. Financing is tighter, countries are operating in a more crowded, less predictable, and more transactionheavy environment, and governments are facing a wider range of interconnected development pressures. In that context, institutions that can help governments navigate fragmentation, facilitate exchanges, and connect priorities to wider technical and financial ecosystems become more valuable. For the OAS, the question is not whether it can compete with larger financing or implementation institutions, but whether it can use its hemispheric reach and cooperation tools to respond effectively to this changing landscape.

3.1 Global Trends in International Development Cooperation

International development cooperation2 is undergoing a structural transition. Concessional financing is becoming more constrained and crisis-oriented, the provider base is expanding beyond traditional donors, and coordination demands are increasing as financing instruments multiply. These shifts are reshaping how development cooperation is financed, delivered, and governed.

The global agenda has also become more demanding. Climate change, pandemic recovery, conflict and fragility, migration pressures, food insecurity, demographic change, and widening digital divides are all placing sustained pressure on existing cooperation mechanisms. At the same time, the gap between sustainable development aspirations and available financing remains substantial. As reflected in the 2025 Sevilla Commitment for Financing for Development, the annual financing gap for achieving the SDGs remains on the order of US$4 trillion. Geopolitical instability and declining trust in international institutions further complicate collective action. Within this context, several structural trends are reshaping the global development cooperation system.

2For the purposes of this report, the term “international development cooperation” refers to the collective

order of US$4 trillion. Geopolitical instability and declining trust in international institutions further complicate collective action. Within this context, several structural trends are reshaping the global development cooperation system.

2For the purposes of this report, the term “international development cooperation” refers to the collective efforts of governments, international organizations, civil society, and other partners to support sustainable development through financial assistance, technical cooperation, knowledge sharing, and policy coordination, guided by internationally agreed standards and development commitments.6

Declining and Shifting Official Development Assistance

Official development assistance (ODA) remains a central component of international development finance. As seen in Figure 1, in real terms ODA more than doubled between 2000 and 2023, reaching a record $223.7 billion. However, that growth trend has now reversed. After a 6 percent decline in 2024, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) projected a further reduction of 9 to 18 percent in 2025, while some analyses estimate that total ODA could decline by as much as 31 percent by 2029. A contraction of this magnitude would return ODA volumes to levels not seen since the 2015 adoption of the SDGs. Figure 1. ODA flows, 2000-2024 (Source: OECD)

The scale and trajectory of these reductions suggest that the decline in ODA is structural rather than cyclical. Donor governments face rising public debt, aging populations, and sustained domestic fiscal pressures. At the same time, heightened geopolitical tensions have increased defense spending and redirected budgetary priorities. In this environment, ODA is increasingly treated as discretionary spending rather than as a protected component of long-term international engagement.

The change is not only in volume, but also in allocation. Humanitarian assistance and indonor refugee costs have grown as a share of total net ODA, increasing from approximately

ODA is increasingly treated as discretionary spending rather than as a protected component of long-term international engagement.

The change is not only in volume, but also in allocation. Humanitarian assistance and indonor refugee costs have grown as a share of total net ODA, increasing from approximately 9 percent in 2000 to 25 percent in 2022 (see Figure 2.) By contrast, country programmable aid—the portion that is predictable and directly accessible to partner countries—has declined to less than half of total ODA. Prev