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OIM - World Migration Report 2026 Chapter 6

OIM - Organización Internacional para las Migraciones

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Título
OIM - World Migration Report 2026 Chapter 6
Autor
OIM - Organización Internacional para las Migraciones
Categoría
Infralegal
Área del derecho
Migratorio
Año
2026

ALINA NARUSOVA-SCHMITZ MICAELA LINCANGOThe opinions expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the report do not imply expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IOM concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries. IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants. _____________________________ Publisher: International Organization for Migration 17 route des Morillons P.O. Box 17 1211 Geneva 19

Switzerland T el.: +41 22 717 9111

Fax: +41 22 798 6150

Email: hq@iom.int Website: www.iom.int Cover photo: A worker is laying the bricks of a shelter for people displaced by a climatic disaster. A woman brings a cement bucket. Bujumbura Mairie, Burundi. © IOM 2024/Alexander DEE Required citation: Narusova-Schmitz, A. and M. Lincango (2026). Addressing climate mobility: the role of local and community action. In:  World Migration Report 2026 (M. McAuliffe and P. Ceriani Cernadas, eds.).

International Organization for Migration (IOM), Geneva. _____________________________ © IOM 2026 Some rights reserved. This work is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0

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PUB2025/026/L/61

WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2026

6

ADDRESSING CLIMATE MOBILITY: THE ROLE OF

LOCAL AND COMMUNITY ACTION 1,2

Introduction For millennia, the environment has influenced where and how people move and settle across the planet. T oday, climate change is emerging as an increasingly powerful disruptor of whole ecosystems and multiple dimensions of human life, including mobility. Climate-related migration and displacement are no longer distant concerns; they are present realities that require urgent action. More frequent and intense weather events, rising sea levels and environmental degradation are reshaping patterns of human mobility both directly and indirectly, by impacting other key factors such as livelihoods, public health, food security and water availability. In 2023, global temperatures rose 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels for the first time, marking a critical threshold. 3 Since the IPCC first drew attention to the effects of climate change on migration in 1990, 4 scientific and policy understanding of the climate–migration nexus has significantly matured. The growing importance of this link has been highlighted by successive IPCC assessments, 5 and multiple dedicated studies, as well as forecasting exercises, such as the World Bank “Groundswell” reports on climate-related internal migration.6 The World Migration Report has also dedicated significant attention to climate-related human mobility, recognizing it as a key migration trend and exploring its different angles in several earlier editions, 7 an approach this chapter continues. Positive momentum has been achieved on the policy front, too. Climate-related migration features in an array of

has also dedicated significant attention to climate-related human mobility, recognizing it as a key migration trend and exploring its different angles in several earlier editions, 7 an approach this chapter continues. Positive momentum has been achieved on the policy front, too. Climate-related migration features in an array of global and regional agreements and frameworks,8 including the UNFCCC Paris Agreement and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. 9 It is also on the agenda of multiple climate, development, humanitarian and migration forums and policy processes. Yet, despite this progress, much of the response remains reactive, 1 Alina Narusova-Schmitz, Independent consultant; Micaela Lincango, Associate Research Officer, Migration and Displacement Data and Research Analytics Division, International Organization for Migration. 2 The research and analyses included in this chapter were current at the time of writing (August 2025). 3 WMO, 2024. 4 IPCC, 1992. 5 IPCC, 2023. 6 World Bank, 2018 and 2021a. 7 McAuliffe and Khadria, 2019; McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou, 2021; McAuliffe and Oucho, 2024. 8 Linkages between population movements and climate change are made in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreements, including the 2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework, the 2015 Paris Agreement and the 2021 Glasgow Pact. The main global policy frameworks on migration, such as the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, also recognize this link. Other processes and agreements, such as the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change, and the United Nations Secretary-General’s Agenda on Internal Displacement have all included references to human mobility and climate change. Multiple regional agreements also address the climate change and migration nexus: for example, migration management agreements, which refer to environmental drivers such as free movement protocols (e.g. in ECOWAS,

of Disasters and Climate Change, and the United Nations Secretary-General’s Agenda on Internal Displacement have all included references to human mobility and climate change. Multiple regional agreements also address the climate change and migration nexus: for example, migration management agreements, which refer to environmental drivers such as free movement protocols (e.g. in ECOWAS, IGAD, Central America-4 group, the European Union); transhumance agreements (e.g. in ECOWAS and IGAD); and refugee and internally displaced person protection conventions (e.g. Kampala Convention, OAU Convention, Cartagena Convention). 9 United Nations, 2021.2

Addressing climate mobility: the role of local and community action 760 fragmented and focused on humanitarian crises rather than longer-term proactive solutions. The potential of migration as a positive climate adaptation strategy is still underutilized, despite growing evidence of its benefits.

A systemic shift, needed to consistently integrate the climate change–migration nexus into policy and planning on migration, climate and adaptation, development and humanitarian assistance, and other related fields, has not yet been achieved. Even as the urgency to step up the action grows, the policy space for constructive engagement on climate-related migration has started shrinking. Climate scepticism and negative migration rhetoric have narrowed opportunities for engagement. Geopolitical shifts, conflicts and overlapping crises increasingly command policymakers’ attention and public resources, making it ever more challenging to do more to address the climate–migration nexus. There is a need to reevaluate solutions and identify ways to keep up the momentum and continue building on the significant gains made in addressing climate-related mobility. Local level action offers a particularly promising avenue to do so. Its importance is recognized in key international frameworks, such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 10 the Global Compact for Migration and the New Urban Agenda. 11 Local governance has gained traction across multiple fields, from disaster risk reduction to development, migration and climate policy, as critical space for responsive, inclusive and innovative action. Despite the many constraints they are facing, and although their authority and capacity vary widely across countries, local stakeholders are increasingly recognized as essential actors in addressing migration and displacement in

development, migration and climate policy, as critical space for responsive, inclusive and innovative action. Despite the many constraints they are facing, and although their authority and capacity vary widely across countries, local stakeholders are increasingly recognized as essential actors in addressing migration and displacement in climate change contexts. Cities, municipalities and community-based organizations (CBOs) are often the first to experience and respond to the effects of climate-related migration. Local actors are typically better positioned to engage affected communities, tailor responses to specific vulnerabilities and innovate in areas where national or international systems may be slow to act. 12 This chapter builds on analyses presented in previous editions of the World Migration Report by focusing on the critical role played by local action in addressing climate-related migration and displacement. It explores why empowering local stakeholders is not only necessary but also strategic, especially at a time of growing political and economic instability. The chapter first maps the climate–migration nexus and outlines key dynamics that local actors must navigate. It then identifies these actors and the roles they play in addressing human mobility linked to climate change, before turning to local-level interventions in practice and opportunities to scale their impact. Throughout, the chapter draws on diverse initiatives implemented by cities, municipalities and communities, and includes quotations from migrants and local stakeholders to illustrate the diversity, richness and impacts of local level action. It takes a broad view of climate-related human mobility, covering movements occurring for a variety of reasons both within and across borders. For terminology used, see the glossary of key climate–migration nexus terms provided in Appendix A . 10 United Nations, 2015. 11 United Nations, 2017. 12 See, for example, UNDP, 2016.3

WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2026

Climate change and migration: understanding the context Main characteristics The IPCC Sixth Assessment Report and the World Meteorological Organization13 both emphasize that climate change impacts are intensifying globally, affecting where people settle, and contributing to increased pressure to move.

Climate change is reshaping human mobility through both sudden-onset hazards (e.g. floods, storms, wildfires) and slow-onset changes (e.g. drought, rising sea levels), which have different impacts on climate mobility. Sudden-onset

Climate change is reshaping human mobility through both sudden-onset hazards (e.g. floods, storms, wildfires) and slow-onset changes (e.g. drought, rising sea levels), which have different impacts on climate mobility. Sudden-onset events trigger large-scale, rapid and predominantly forced movements that are mostly short term and short distance but can become protracted if recovery is delayed or repeated hazards occur. In contrast, slow-onset changes like coastal erosion or land degradation may lead to more diverse mobility outcomes: short or long term, individual or group based, internal or cross-border. A decision to move, however, is usually a result of an interplay of multiple considerations, where climate change pressures often intersect with economic, social and political factors and other drivers of migration. 14 Made at an individual or household level, or in some cases at a community level, such decisions are influenced by perceptions of risk, social networks, wealth, age structure, health and livelihood choices and, importantly, perceived alternatives to moving. 15 Therefore, the same environmental change can have different human mobility implications for different social groups and individuals, at different times and in different locations. This causal complexity means that it is difficult to weight the impact of climate change or any other single factor in shaping mobility outcomes. Another implication of the complexity is that there is no single form of human mobility that can be attributed to climate change; instead, the full spectrum of migration patterns can be linked to climate change impacts – from voluntary to forced, within and across borders, temporary, circular or permanent. At the same time, most climate-related mobility occurs within countries, frequently from rural areas into towns and cities; and cross-border flows usually remain regional. 16 This variety and multicausality mean that migration and displacement in climate change contexts can produce different outcomes for migrants and affected societies, both negative and positive. How people move and their agency in the process are among the key factors influencing what impacts mobility has on individuals and societies. In some cases, people move because they have no choice – moving away from a disaster zone can be lifesaving. Such a move can take different forms, from disaster displacement to

negative and positive. How people move and their agency in the process are among the key factors influencing what impacts mobility has on individuals and societies. In some cases, people move because they have no choice – moving away from a disaster zone can be lifesaving. Such a move can take different forms, from disaster displacement to planned relocation. It may be initiated by governments or communities, and is often associated with complex social and ethical challenges. Forced movement, whether within a country or across a border, often brings hardship and suffering, including exposure to an array of human rights violations. Whether triggered by slowor sudden-onset hazards, displacement aggravates pre-existing patterns of discrimination and abuse. In the context of international movements, irregular migration is another significant factor increasing the vulnerability of people on the move to human rights violations, violence and exploitation. On the other hand, well-managed migration can be a positive adaptation strategy, helping migrants and their communities become more resilient in the face of climate change. 17 13 IPCC, 2023; WMO, 2024. 14 IPCC, 2023. 15 Gemenne and Blocher, 2017. 16 IPCC, 2022a; Almulhim et al., 2024; Hoffmann et al., 2024. 17 IOM, 2021a.4

Addressing climate mobility: the role of local and community action Another important dimension of the climate change and migration nexus is the issue of involuntary immobility. 18

Migration requires economic and other resources, and therefore it is not an option open to everyone. Climate change impacts not only drive migration but can also make it more difficult or even impossible for some individuals or groups to move. It is such “trapped populations”19 and individuals who face the gravest risks from climate change impacts. This complexity points to the need for nuanced, multipronged approaches to climate-related mobility that address underlying socioeconomic issues and vulnerabilities, and are context specific. Local-level action is well suited to designing and implementing such solutions. Before turning to these responses, and to how local actors can implement them more effectively, the next section briefly examines the availability and quality of data and evidence,

underlying socioeconomic issues and vulnerabilities, and are context specific. Local-level action is well suited to designing and implementing such solutions. Before turning to these responses, and to how local actors can implement them more effectively, the next section briefly examines the availability and quality of data and evidence, the essential foundation for planning and for effective responses to diverse patterns of climate-related mobility. The knowledge base and knowledge gaps The knowledge base on links between climate change and human mobility is significant, though uneven. It is grounded in a growing body of evidence drawn from diverse disciplines, combining quantitative data with qualitative field research, environmental and socioeconomic indicators, and localized case studies. This section provides a brief overview of what the current data reveal and the main gaps, from global patterns to local insights. Global level data and analysis Despite significant progress made in recent years, the global data on the effects of environmental changes on migration and displacement remain limited in several important ways. While there is a solid understanding of the anticipated biophysical effects of climate change, much uncertainty remains regarding how human mobility patterns will be influenced by these changes. 20 This is due in part to the complexity, mentioned above, of the relationship between climate impacts and human mobility. So, though “most statistical models indicate that certain climaterelated factors have some effect on migration … there is no consensus on how strong that effect is or, in some cases, even whether the effect is positive or negative.” 21 There are global data available on particular dimensions of climate-related human mobility. There are, for example, more and better data on forced movements triggered by sudden-onset disasters (see the box on internal climate displacement). However, data on other important dimensions of climate mobility – such as slow-onset impacts, 22 local-level dynamics, and marginalized and vulnerable populations – remain limited. 18 Carling, 2002. 19 Chazalnoël and Randall, 2021. The term “trapped populations” emerged from the United Kingdom Foresight 2011 report to denote people unable to move from environmentally risky places; the term has been widely used since then with varied definitions. See, for example, Ayeb-Karlsson et al., 2018. 20 IOM, 2023a.

people unable to move from environmentally risky places; the term has been widely used since then with varied definitions. See, for example, Ayeb-Karlsson et al., 2018. 20 IOM, 2023a. 21 Ibid. 22 The need for integrated approaches combining quantitative and qualitative research for a more comprehensive understanding of climate mobility together with a synthesis of data from various disciplines, including environmental science, sociology and economics, relevant to the impacts of slow-onset climate events on migration patterns is highlighted in Chazalnoël and Randall, 2021.5

WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2026

Key figures: spotlight on internal climate displacement Since 2008, storms, floods, droughts and wildfires triggered 401.6 million internal displacements worldwide.a These hazards occurred in all parts of the world but were unequally distributed. Figure 1 illustrates displacement in 2024 by geographic location and type of weather hazard.

Figure 1. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre records of weather-related internal displacements in 2024

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on IDMC data (IDMC, n.d.).

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

In 2024, there were 45.8 million new internal displacements triggered by disasters, mostly by storms (25.2 million) and floods (19.1 million). b These displacements occurred across 163 countries and territories. Moreover, an estimated 9.8 million people were internally displaced due to disasters at the end of the same year. East Asia and the Pacific and the Americas recorded the highest overall number of disaster displacements globally.c Countries such as the United States, the Philippines and India had some of the largest number of displacements. d Women and girls constitute a significant share of disaster-related displacements, with many displacements occurring in countries already ranked in the bottom quartile of the Gender Inequality Index. e This amplifies risks that displaced women are disproportionally exposed to, such as disrupted reproductive health services and gender-based violence. a IDMC, n.d.

occurring in countries already ranked in the bottom quartile of the Gender Inequality Index. e This amplifies risks that displaced women are disproportionally exposed to, such as disrupted reproductive health services and gender-based violence. a IDMC, n.d. b IDMC, 2025. c Ibid. d Ibid. e UNFPA and IDMC, 2024.6

Addressing climate mobility: the role of local and community action Global projections of future climate-related migration and displacement is another actively explored area with multiple studies dedicated to this topic over the years. While most studies anticipate that climate change will increase migration globally, some point to scenarios where international migration will be constrained, especially for low-income groups, due to climate change impacts, resulting in increased “immobility”. 23 There is a significant variation in the scale of the expected impact, as challenges of capturing the full range of implications of climate change for human mobility are further compounded by uncertainties, such as those concerning future emissions and demographic shifts. The range of existing projections for 2050 is vast – from 143 million to 1.2 billion people

(Figure 2 illustrates the range of estimates for climate migration and their sources). 24 Figure 2. Global climate migration projections

Illustration: SVR/Deniz Keskin 1990 10 million 150 million by 2050 200 million by 2050 200 million by 2050 200–250 million by 2050 300 million by 2050 1.4 billion by 2060

Geisler/Currens, 2017 1.2 billion by 2050 Institute for Economics and Peace, 2020 250 million by 2050 216 million by 2050 150–200 million by 2050 78 million by 2030 143 million by 2050 Jacobson, 1988

Myers, 1993 Myers, 1997, 2002 Friends of the Earth, 2007 Biermann/Boas, 2010 Christian Aid, 2007 CARE Danmark, 2016 Groundswell report Part 2, 2021 Clement et al., 2021 Stern, 2007 Global Humanitarian Forum, 2009 Groundswell report, 2018 Rigaud et al., 2018 2000 2010 2020

Source: SVR, 2023.

Note: This chart illustrates frequently cited projections of climate change-induced migration; the scope of movement these projections cover and the global warming scenarios vary.

Several models have been developed to forecast how climate change will affect human mobility in the future, but inconsistencies in scope and definitions, as well as regional focuses, make direct comparisons difficult. 25 Some approaches focus on estimating small-scale processes over short-time horizons. Others take a broader view over longer periods of time in order to illustrate the range of possible opportunities, challenges and responses. 23 Benveniste et al., 2022. 24 SVR, 2023. 25 Ibid.7

WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2026

IOM, for example, uses data modelling to identify areas where environmental stressors intersect with other key drivers of migration to help target resources and inform action. The Migration Data Portal includes an interactive climate mobility impacts dashboard, 26 visualizing projected overlaps between hazard exposure, high population density and economic vulnerability, which are key factors influencing climate-related migration. The dashboard allows users to explore future global hotspots and human exposure to climate impacts across time and under different climatic and socioeconomic scenarios (see Figure 3 for an illustration). Figure 3. Climate mobility impacts dashboard

Sources: Population: Jones and O’Neill, 2016; hazard: Lange et al., 2020; vulnerability: Wang and Sun, 2022; displacement: IDMC, n.d.

Note: The map shows projected land area exposed to heat waves by 2090 under a high-warming scenario (a representative concentration pathway of 6.0, or RCP6.0); the graph shows projected number of persons exposed to different mobility-related climate hazards under a low-warming (RCP2.6) and high-warming (RCP6.0) scenario. For more data, see Migration Data Portal, n.d.a. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations or the International Organization for Migration.

For a more nuanced picture, IOM carries out regional and country level analyses (e.g. Bangladesh, Haiti and Somalia). This modelling uses real-time data and vulnerability indicators to highlight “mobility hotspots” at the community or regional level. A recent review of climate-related forecasting models points to locally focused agent-based simulations of household and community behaviour, together with statistical extrapolations of observed mobility patterns, as offering the most decision-relevant insights. It also stresses the need for transdisciplinary collaboration to refine forecasts. 27 Overall, whether looking at the current situation or anticipating the future, global figures, while informative, do not reflect the complex, context-specific factors influencing climate-related mobility, such as vulnerability, governance structures and social dynamics. These factors are better captured at the local level. 28 26 The Climate Mobility Impacts dashboard draws on ensemble projections of six climate hazards (heatwaves, droughts, wildfires, river floods, tropical cyclones and crop failures) from multiple climate impact models under varying emissions scenarios. Projections are overlaid with population and income data to identify when and where vulnerable populations will be exposed. The dashboard also

includes past displacement data for context and provides both spatial and aggregate visualizations. 27 Schewel et al., 2024. 28 Almulhim et al., 2024; Hoffmann et al., 2021; Schewel et al., 2024; Boas et al, 2019.8

Addressing climate mobility: the role of local and community action Local level data and analysis Many useful insights are provided by city-level analyses, which are among the best examples of a local-level approach to understanding and anticipating the impacts of climate change, including its effects on human mobility. Cities often have access to more granular data, face distinct climate-related challenges and are on the front lines of responding to both environmental changes and population movements.

Rural to urban migration, intertwined with the effects of climate change, has been a key driver of city growth. 29 Although climate change acts as catalyst for urbanization, 30 there is also evidence that it influences rural–urban migration patterns differently across income levels. Data from 1970–2000 indicate that in middle-income countries, higher temperatures correlate with increased rural–urban migration, while in lower-income countries such temperatures correlate with decreasing rural–urban migration, possibly due to economic constraints. 31 The exposure of cities to climate hazards – including heatwaves, sea-level rise and riverine flooding – has grown disproportionally faster than the exposure of people living in rural areas. By 2040 over 2,000 cities are expected to lie in low-elevation coastal zones, and 2 billion city dwellers are projected to be exposed to a temperature increase of at least 0.5°C. 32 The evidence at the city and community level provides valuable insights into mobility intentions, demonstrating the importance of context and the need for local analysis. This includes studies exploring migration preferences within coastal communities, which are some of the most climate-vulnerable communities around the world. One such peer-reviewed study was carried out in Lagos, Nigeria, a coastal megacity exposed to recurrent flooding. It found that residents’ perceived flood risk correlates with stronger intentions to move. 33 At the same time, a community

coastal communities, which are some of the most climate-vulnerable communities around the world. One such peer-reviewed study was carried out in Lagos, Nigeria, a coastal megacity exposed to recurrent flooding. It found that residents’ perceived flood risk correlates with stronger intentions to move. 33 At the same time, a community survey in Lagos’s Ajegunle district reported that flooding and other environmental stressors were not the primary reasons for the residents’ desire to move but rather factors exacerbating poor living and health conditions. While many respondents expressed a desire to move, few were able to do so due to limited resources, and those who could move often preferred relocation within the metropolis rather than long-distance migration. 34 A study of four villages in south-west coastal Bangladesh shed light on why some populations decide to stay despite heightened risks. It found that land ownership, social connectedness and economic factors have the most influence on a household’s decision to stay even when exposed to high climate-related risks. 35 Making sure local responses are equitable, sustainable and effective requires access to disaggregated data to enable a differentiated understanding of impacts on specific groups. Mobility dynamics and adaptive capacities can vary significantly across different population groups. Factors such as gender, age, disability and socioeconomic status impact decisions and ability to move in response to climate stressors, as well as needs and levels of vulnerability of those affected. Therefore, data on who is affected are indispensable for policy and operational planning. Yet much of the data available are not systematically disaggregated by relevant sociodemographic markers, including migratory status.36 As a result, migrants and displaced people are often “invisible” in official statistics. Furthermore, recent ass

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