🇨🇴⚖️ La Rama Judicial valida a Ariel en prueba de concepto de IA. Conoce los resultados aquí

OIT - Conflicts and Climate Change in South Sudan 2012-2023

OIT - Organización Internacional del Trabajo

Icono de documento PDF

Descargar PDF

Disponible

Detalles

Título
OIT - Conflicts and Climate Change in South Sudan 2012-2023
Autor
OIT - Organización Internacional del Trabajo
Categoría
Doctrina
Área del derecho
Laboral
Año
2023

X Conflicts and climate change in South Sudan 2012-2023 Authors / Huanyue Hu, Matthieu Charpe

September / 2025 ILO Working Paper 150© International Labour Organization 2025 Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International. See: https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. The user is allowed to reuse, share (copy and redistribute), adapt (remix, transform and build upon the original work) as detailed in the licence. The user must clearly credit the ILO as the source of the material and indicate if changes were made to the original content. Use of the emblem, name and logo of the ILO is not permitted in connection with translations, adaptations or other derivative works. Attribution – The user must indicate if changes were made and must cite the work as follows: Hu, H., Charpe, M. Conflicts and climate change in South Sudan 2012-2023. ILO Working Paper 150.

Geneva: International Labour Office, 2025.© ILO.

Translations – In case of a translation of this work, the following disclaimer must be added along with the attribution: This is a translation of a copyrighted work of the International Labour Organization (ILO). This translation has not been prepared, reviewed or endorsed by the ILO and should not be considered an official ILO translation. The ILO disclaims all responsibility for its content and accuracy. Responsibility rests solely with the author(s) of the translation. Adaptations – In case of an adaptation of this work, the following disclaimer must be added along with the attribution: This is an adaptation of a copyrighted work of the International Labour Organization (ILO). This adaptation has not been prepared, reviewed or endorsed by the ILO and should

not be considered an official ILO adaptation. The ILO disclaims all responsibility for its content and accuracy. Responsibility rests solely with the author(s) of the adaptation. Third-party materials – This Creative Commons licence does not apply to non-ILO copyright materials included in this publication. If the material is attributed to a third party, the user of such material is solely responsible for clearing the rights with the rights holder and for any claims of infringement. Any dispute arising under this licence that cannot be settled amicably shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The parties shall be bound by any arbitration award rendered as a result of such arbitration as the final adjudication of such a dispute. For details on rights and licensing, contact: rights@ilo.org. For details on ILO publications and digital products, visit: www.ilo.org/publns.

ISBN 9789220426272 (print), ISBN 9789220426289 (web PDF), ISBN 9789220426296 (epub), ISBN 9789220426302 (html). ISSN 2708-3438 (print), ISSN 2708-3446 (digital) https://doi.org/10.54394/WXIX3024

The designations employed in ILO publications, which are in conformity with United Nations practice, and the presentation of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the ILO concerning the legal status of any country, area or territoryor of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. See: www.ilo. org/disclaimer. The opinions and views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the opinions, views or policies of the ILO.

Reference to names of firms and commercial products and processes does not imply their endorsement by the ILO, and any failure to mention a particular firm, commercial product or process is not a sign of disapproval. Information on ILO publications and digital products can be found at: www.ilo.org/researchand-publications ILO Working Papers summarize the results of ILO research in progress, and seek to stimulate discussion of a range of issues related to the world of work. Comments on this ILO Working Paper are welcome and can be sent to charpe@ilo.org, emplab@ilo.org.

Authorization for publication: Dorothea Schmidt-Klau, Chief, EMPLAB ILO Working Papers can be found at: www.ilo.org/research-and-publications/working-papers Suggested citation: Hu, H., Charpe, M. 2025. Conflicts and climate change in South Sudan 2012-2023, ILO Working Paper 150 (Geneva, ILO). https://doi.org/10.54394/WXIX302401 ILO Working Paper 150

Abstract Since its independence in 2011, South Sudan has confronted persistent challenges from conflict and climate change, profoundly disrupting its economic and social stability. This study analyzes the economic impacts of conflict and climate shocks—specifically floods and droughts—on South Sudan from 2012 to 2023, employing innovative remote sensing techniques and geospatial data. Using nighttime light intensity as a proxy for local economic activity, the study quantifies the effects of conflict fatalities and flooding on economic performance and employment. Results indicate that conflict has had a significant and enduring negative impact: areas within 10 km of five conflict fatalities experienced a 8.9 per cent decline in local employment in the first year, with cumulative losses reaching 17.8 per cent over three years. Similarly, flooding in 2021 led to a 4.9 per cent reduction in employment during the flood year and a 12.1 per cent reduction in the following year, underscoring the prolonged labour market disruptions caused by conflicts and climate shocks.

with cumulative losses reaching 17.8 per cent over three years. Similarly, flooding in 2021 led to a 4.9 per cent reduction in employment during the flood year and a 12.1 per cent reduction in the following year, underscoring the prolonged labour market disruptions caused by conflicts and climate shocks. The study also examines specific events, such as the 2016 Battle of Juba and the 2021 floods, producing high-resolution maps of affected areas. By adopting a pixel-level analytical approach, this research captures localized GDP and employment effects that broader regional analyses might overlook, offering valuable insights for targeted policy interventions. About the authors Huanyue Hu is an international consultant and a PhD candidate in the Department of Economics at Warwick University. Matthieu Charpe is a senior economist at the International Labour Organization.02 ILO Working Paper 150 Abstract 01 About the authors 01 X Introduction 05 X 1 Panorama of South Sudan 07 1.1 Demographics 07 1.2 Economy 09 1.3 Risks 12 1.3.1 Conflicts 12 1.3.2 Climate change and food insecurity 14 X 2 Impact of climate change and conflict on economic activity and employment a quantitative exercise 16 X 3 Conclusion 24 Appendix 25 References 27 Acknowledgements 29 Table of contents03 ILO Working Paper 150 List of Figures Map 1.1.1 Time series on total population in South Sudan (left); (Log) Population density in South Sudan in 2023 (right) 07 Maps 1.1.2 Urban agglomerations in South Sudan over time 08 Map 1.1.3 Refugee centers in South Sudan 09 Maps 1.2.1 (Log) Nighttime light in 2023 in 6 selected ADM3 regions in Juba (upper left) and in Malakal (upper right); Petroleum resources in South Sudan (down) 10

Map 1.1.3 Refugee centers in South Sudan 09 Maps 1.2.1 (Log) Nighttime light in 2023 in 6 selected ADM3 regions in Juba (upper left) and in Malakal (upper right); Petroleum resources in South Sudan (down) 10 Maps 1.2.2 Distribution of four major crops grown in South Sudan (Log-Transformed) 11 Map 1.2.3 Cattle distribution 2020 (Log-Transformed) 11 Maps 1.3.1 Political violence in South Sudan by year and fatality 12 Figure 1.3.1 Estimated (share of) population and jobs living close to or potentially exposed to conflicts over time 13 Map 1.3.2 Flood risks (left); Flooded areas in October 2024 (right) 14 Map 1.3.3 Drought in South Sudan poses threat on food security 15 Figure 1.3.2 Cereal trend; Map 1.3.4 Spatial distribution of cereal gap 15 Map 2.1 Absolute population change from 2015 to 2017 at pixel level 20 Map 2.2 Estimated contemporaneous impact of conflict fatalities on GDP growth. Battle of Juba 2016 (percentage change) 20 Map 2.3 Estimated contemporaneous effect of conflict fatalities on employment loss at pixel level: Battle of Juba 2016 (absolute number of people) 21 Map 2.2 Satellite detected water extents between 9 and 13 October 2021 over South Sudan 22 Map A1 Estimated contemporaneous impact of conflict fatalities on GDP growth in 2016 25 Map A2 Estimated contemporaneous impact of conflidt fatalities on employment loss in 2026 (absolute number of people) 2604 ILO Working Paper 150

Map A1 Estimated contemporaneous impact of conflict fatalities on GDP growth in 2016 25 Map A2 Estimated contemporaneous impact of conflidt fatalities on employment loss in 2026 (absolute number of people) 2604 ILO Working Paper 150 List of Tables Table 2.1 Impact of Conflict Fatalities on Nighttime Lights 18 Table 2.2 Impact of floods 2021 and conflict fatalities on nighttime lights 23 Table A1 Impact on floods 2021 on nighttime lights: DiD regression result 2505 ILO Working Paper 150 X Introduction Since its independence in 2011, there is a limited understanding of the economic and labour market situation of South Sudan given the lack of data and the limited capacities of domestic economic institutions in general. While some data collection efforts were initiated shortly after independence, the outbreak of the civil war in 2013 severely disrupted these efforts, making it increasingly difficult to obtain reliable information.1 Such information gaps are particularly critical as South Sudan faces multiple challenges. Among these, two stand out as especially pressing: conflicts and the impact of climate change. The human cost of the civil war between 2013 and 2020 reaches up to 400 000 casualties and up to 4 million displaced persons. However, the war’s broader effects on livelihoods and employment opportunities remain difficult to assess due to the scarcity of reliable data.2 In addition, the power-sharing deal in 2018 remains fragile and violence continues. Beyond conflict, South Sudan is also facing severe environmental crises. These include recurring floods and drought, which exposed the vulnerability of the country’s agricultural systems and exacerbated food insecurity. The pressing crises in South Sudan calls for targeted, preferably real-time, evidence-based policy interventions. To overcome the lack of reliable census data and household data,3 this work proposes to rely on GIS data and remote sensing techniques and provides a panorama of the ecoexacerbated food insecurity. The pressing crises in South Sudan calls for targeted, preferably real-time, evidence-based policy interventions. To overcome the lack of reliable census data and household data,3 this work proposes to rely on GIS data and remote sensing techniques and provides a panorama of the economic situation in South Sudan, with a focus on the impact assessment of conflicts and flooding on economic activities and the labour market over the period 2012-2023. This paper first provides a comprehensive assessment of South Sudan’s economic landscape, focusing on demographics, economic structure, conflict, climate risks, and their impact on livelihoods and employment. It begins with an overview of South Sudan’s demographic structure, urbanization trends, and displacement crisis, using data from Landscan/WorldPop, UNHCR, and Africapolis. Then it depicts the spatial distribution of economic activities using nightlight luminosity. The analysis also explores the spatial distribution of agriculture and livestock which are crucial for South Sudan’s economy. This study then examines the risks posed by conflict and climate change. It analyzes the spatial and temporal patterns of political violence from 2012 to 2023 using ACLED georeferenced data on conflicts and estimates the share of the population and jobs exposed to conflict by creating 10 km buffers around conflict incidents. The analysis shows that in 2020, 3 million persons lived within 10 km of a conflict. The number of jobs in the vicinity of conflicts equaled 1 million, almost a quarter of total employment4. This publication further assesses flood and drought risks using geospatial datasets, highlighting their impact on food security. 1 See for instance the World Bank High Frequency Surveys 2012-2014 and 2016-2017 as well as the World Bank Enterprise Survey 20132014. 2 FAO (2024), South Sudan, the impact of conflict on food security and livelihoods, DIEM-Impact Report 2024 3 See for instance Patrick McSharry, Joseph Mawejje, 2024, Estimating urban GDP growth using nighttime lights and machine learning techniques in data poor environments: The case of South Sudan, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Volume 203, 123399, ISSN 0040-1625, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2024.123399. 4 The total population of South Sudan in 2020 is approximately 10.9 million, share of population above 15is 57.6%, employment to population ratio is 62.7%. Multiplying these three numbers together gives us 3.9 million, which is an estimate for total employment.06 ILO Working Paper 150 To quantify the impact of conflict and climate shocks on economic activity, this work employs nighttime light intensity as a proxy for local economic performance. Nightlight data is widely used as a measure of economic activity because it is strongly correlated with GDP and is available at a fine spatial resolution of approximately 1 square kilometer or even less.5 Regression analysis is used to estimate economic consequences of conflict fatalities and flooding. The findings show that conflict significantly and persistently reduces economic activity and employment opportunities. The magnitude of the effect is significant and only decline slowly over time. Three years after the conflict, negative effects continue. To illustrate the results of this quantitative exercise, a map displaying the estimated decline in GDP at pixel level following the battle of Juba in 2016 is produced. To measure the impact of floods on economic activity, this work focuses on one event, the floods taking place in October 2021. Similar to conflicts, flooding also has severe effects, particularly in the year following the event, exacerbating food insecurity and economic instability. This work contributes to the ongoing efforts to produce information and knowledge about South Sudan. For instance, FAO (2024) mobilizes GIS data and conducted on the ground interviews with

ticularly in the year following the event, exacerbating food insecurity and economic instability. This work contributes to the ongoing efforts to produce information and knowledge about South Sudan. For instance, FAO (2024) mobilizes GIS data and conducted on the ground interviews with key stakeholders to assess the impact of conflict on food security.6 UNHCR(2024) conducted a Forced Displacement Survey in 2023 that gathers information on internally displaced persons as well as local communities.7 The World Bank (2024) proposes a panorama of poverty mobilizing the small scale 2022 Household Budget Survey combined with imputation techniques.8 In the academic literature, South Sudan is particularly under-studied. McSharry and Mawejje (2024) estimates urban GDP growth in South Sudan using nightlight data and machine learning. The same authors rely on synthetic control method to estimate the impact of conflict covering the early 2010s up to 2018.9 Using remote sensing Mackenhaur et al (2021) find that war in South Sudan leads to a reduction in cultivated croplands.10 The rest of the document is organized as follows. Section 1 is articulated around a panorama of South Sudan using remote sensing materials, covering population distribution, urbanization and internally displaced persons as well as economics (oil, and agriculture production) and, finally, major risks facing South Sudan (conflicts and climate change). Section 2 quantifies the economic costs associated with these risks using innovative data and quantitative methods. Section 3 concludes. 5 Henderson, J. Vernon, Adam Storeygard, and David N. Weil. 2012. “Measuring Economic Growth from Outer Space.” American Economic Review 102 (2): 994–1028. 6 FAO. 2024. South Sudan: The impact of conflict on food security and livelihoods – DIEM-Impact report, January 2024. Rome. 7 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2024. Forced Displacement Survey – South Sudan 2023. Copenhagen, Denmark: UNHCR

6 FAO. 2024. South Sudan: The impact of conflict on food security and livelihoods – DIEM-Impact report, January 2024. Rome. 7 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2024. Forced Displacement Survey – South Sudan 2023. Copenhagen, Denmark: UNHCR 8 World Bank. Republic of South Sudan - Poverty and Equity Assessment (English). Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents. worldbank.org/curated/en/099120924150066342/P1799071632dc300c1b020144b4305eb7ab See as well World Bank. 2022. “South Sudan Economic Monitor: Towards a Jobs Agenda,” 5th ed. February, Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment Global Practice, World Bank, Washington, DC. 9 Mawejje, J., & McSharry, P . (2021). The economic cost of conflict: Evidence from South Sudan. Review of Development Economics, 25(4), 1969-1990. 10 Olsen, V.M., Fensholt, R., Olofsson, P ., Bonifacio, R., Butsic, V., Druce, D., Ray, D. and Prishchepov, A.V. (2021). The impact of conflict-driven cropland abandonment on food insecurity in South Sudan revealed using satellite remote sensing. Nature Food, 2(12), 990-996.07 ILO Working Paper 150 X 1 Panorama of South Sudan

1.1 Demographics Demographic statistics are challenging in South Sudan given that the latest census dates to pre-independence time. Hence, total population and population distribution are estimated. According to UN estimates, South Sudan's population was approximately 11.5 million (2023), with a low annual growth rate of 1.5 per cent. There was a notable population drop between 2015 and 2018, driven by conflict escalation and famine that forced millions to flee the country. The population is heavily concentrated in the central and southern regions, due to suitable conditions for subnual growth rate of 1.5 per cent. There was a notable population drop between 2015 and 2018, driven by conflict escalation and famine that forced millions to flee the country. The population is heavily concentrated in the central and southern regions, due to suitable conditions for subsistence farming and livestock rearing. Major cities such as Juba, Bentiu, and Malakal are among the most densely populated areas (Map 1.1.1). The population in South Sudan is very young, with a median age of 18.7 years, reflecting a high fertility rate and low life expectancy. Life expectancy is about 57.7 years, and infant mortality is high at 63.2 deaths per 1,000 live births.11 X Map 1.1.1 Time series on total population in South Sudan (left); (Log) Population density in South Sudan in 2023 (right) Note: The time series on the left illustrates the population trend in South Sudan (SSD) from 2011 to 2023. The map on the right shows the log-transformed population density in South Sudan in 2023. Greener areas indicate higher population density. Boundaries shown anywhere in this paper do not imply endorsement or acceptance by the ILO. The Abyei area is represented with dashed lines.

Source: LandScan Global Population Database.

South Sudan is one of the least urbanized countries in Africa, with urban areas accounting for only 1 per cent of the total land area.12 Map 1.1.2 illustrates a clear trend of increasing urbanization over the years, although most urban agglomerations remain relatively small, with populations ranging between 10,000 and 100,000 residents. By 2020, urbanization had visibly expanded, with the number of urban agglomerations exceeding 30,000 residents increasing from just one in 2015—Juba—to three by 2020, reflecting a gradual shift toward urban concentration. Projections for 2025 indicate that Juba will become the first urban agglomeration in South Sudan 11 United Nations Population Division: Data Portal.

just one in 2015—Juba—to three by 2020, reflecting a gradual shift toward urban concentration. Projections for 2025 indicate that Juba will become the first urban agglomeration in South Sudan 11 United Nations Population Division: Data Portal. 12 Africapolis. South Sudan country report. https://africapolis.org/en/country-report/South%20Sudan08 ILO Working Paper 150 to surpass 1 million residents. While urbanization is progressing despite ongoing humanitarian crises, it remains limited in scale compared to other East African countries.13 X Maps 1.1.2 Urban agglomerations in South Sudan over time Note: Data for 2025 is projected. Africapolis provides a standardised and geospatial database on urbanisation dynamics in Africa, which is comparable across countries and across time. The minimum population threshold used by Africapolis to consider an agglomeration as urban is 10,000 inhabitants.

Source: Africapolis.

Due to the sustained periods of conflict, violence and natural disasters, approximately 2.2 million people remain displaced within the country, while roughly the same number of South Sudanese have sought refuge in neighboring countries, primarily Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.14 This makes it the largest refugee crisis in Africa and the third-largest globally. Map 1.1.3 illustrates the widespread distribution of refugee camps across the country. Additionally, the recent conflict in Sudan has led to a sharp increase in South Sudan’s refugee population, surpassing 500,000 by the end of 2024, with 150,000 more refugees expected to arrive in 2025.15 13 For instance, data from Africapolis shows that as of 2020, Ethiopia had three agglomerations with more than 1 million residents, while Kenya had five. 14 https://www.unrefugees.org/news/south-sudan-refugee-crisis-explained/ 15 UNHCR. South Sudan Country Refugee Response Plan 202509 ILO Working Paper 150 X Map 1.1.3 Refugee centers in South Sudan

while Kenya had five. 14 https://www.unrefugees.org/news/south-sudan-refugee-crisis-explained/ 15 UNHCR. South Sudan Country Refugee Response Plan 202509 ILO Working Paper 150 X Map 1.1.3 Refugee centers in South Sudan

Source: UNHCR. 1.2 Economy South Sudan is one of the least developed countries globally, with an estimated GDP per capita of approximately US$340, according to the IMF, a sharp decline from US$1,300 in 2015.16

Estimates from the World Bank, based on the 2022 Household Budget Survey (HBS), indicate that about three-quarters of the population live below the national poverty line of SSP 358,724 annually. Moreover, over two-thirds of the population live in extreme poverty, earning less than SSP 298,478 annually, which represents the national food poverty line.17 Applying the exchange rate at the end of 2022, the national poverty line amounts to 1.49 USD a day and the extreme poverty line amounts to 1.24 USD a day. Nighttime light data suggests significant spatial disparities in economic activity across South Sudan. Only 0.1 per cent of the country’s pixels register a positive nighttime light index, concentrating mainly around Juba, Bentiu and Malakal. Juba is the capital and main urban hub of South Sudan, while Bentiu and Malakal are abundant in oil resources (Map 1.2.1), which is crucial for South Sudan‘s economy. South Sudan is a heavily oil-dependent country, with oil exports accounting for more than 85 per cent of government revenue. However, the pipeline transporting oil to Sudan’s Red Sea coast— its main export route—has been disrupted due to ongoing conflict in Sudan. This disruption has had devastating economic consequences, shrinking the economy by over a quarter, devaluing the local currency, and driving inflation to 120 per cent in 2024. Additionally, the disruption has also resulted in a fiscal crisis, leaving the government unable to pay civil servants and soldiers for months, weakening essential public services and fueling unrest.18

had devastating economic consequences, shrinking the economy by over a quarter, devaluing the local currency, and driving inflation to 120 per cent in 2024. Additionally, the disruption has also resulted in a fiscal crisis, leaving the government unable to pay civil servants and soldiers for months, weakening essential public services and fueling unrest.18 16 https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPDPC@WEO/USA/DEU/SSD 17 World Bank. Republic of South Sudan - Poverty and Equity Assessment (English). Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents. worldbank.org/curated/en/099120924150066342/P1799071632dc300c1b020144b4305eb7ab 18 https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/12/19/south-sudans-economic-crisis-threatens-its-fragile-peace10 ILO Working Paper 150 X Maps 1.2.1 (Log) Nighttime light in 2023 in 6 selected ADM3 regions in Juba (upper left) and in Malakal (upper right); Petroleum resources in South Sudan (down) Note: Greener areas indicate higher nighttime light intensity and more economic activity. Only 0.1 %of the country’s pixels register a positive nighttime light index, concentrating mainly around Juba, Bentiu and Malakal. Oil abundant regions show higher nighttime light intensity.

Source: VIIRS; PETRODATA.

Due to the dominant role of the oil sector, agriculture and forestry contribute only about 10 per cent of the GDP .19 Around 71 per cent of the population depend on agriculture as the main source of income, yet the poverty rate is highest among these households, reaching 81 per cent.20 Sorghum is the most widely cultivated crop in South Sudan, contributing 76 per cent of the country’s primary food supply, followed by maize, rice, and millet (Maps 1.2.2). Moreover, livestock, particularly cattle, serves as the key means of subsistence for a significant portion of households.

Sorghum is the most widely cultivated crop in South Sudan, contributing 76 per cent of the country’s primary food supply, followed by maize, rice, and millet (Maps 1.2.2). Moreover, livestock, particularly cattle, serves as the key means of subsistence for a significant portion of households. These herds are mainly located in western Upper Nile State, along with East Equatoria, Jonglei, and the Bahr El Ghazal states (Map 1.2.3).21 19 ILO (2023). Decent Work Country Programme for South Sudan 2023 - 2025 20 World Bank. Republic of South Sudan - Poverty and Equity Assessment (English). Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents. worldbank.org/curated/en/099120924150066342/P1799071632dc300c1b020144b4305eb7ab 21 AfDB (2013), Infrastructure Action Plan in South Sudan: A Program for Sustained Strong Economic Growth11 ILO Working Paper 150 X Maps 1.2.2 Distribution of four major crops grown in South Sudan (Log-Transformed) Note: CROPGRIDS is a comprehensive global geo-referenced dataset providing area information for 173 crops for the year 2020, at a resolution of 0.05° (about 5.6 km at the equator). Variables are log-transformed. Darker blue indicates higher crop yield.

Source: CROPGRIDS.

X Map 1.2.3 Cattle distribution 2020 (Log-Transformed) Note: The Gridded Livestock of the World (GLW) is a peer-reviewed spatial dataset on the global distribution and abundance of livestock species, available at global extent and 5 minutes of arc resolution (approx. 10 km at the equator). Cattle density (originally in unit head/pixel) is log-transformed. Greener regions indicate higher cattle density.

Source: FAO. GLW 4: Gridded Livestock Density (Global - 2020 - 10 km).12 ILO Working Paper 150

1.3 Risks 1.3.1 Conflicts

nally in unit head/pixel) is log-transformed. Greener regions indicate higher cattle density.

Source: FAO. GLW 4: Gridded Livestock Density (Global - 2020 - 10 km).12 ILO Working Paper 150

1.3 Risks 1.3.1 Conflicts People’s livelihoods in South Sudan have been exposed to great risks due to the ceaseless conflict and violence. Shortly after its independence, a civil war broke out in the new country between the two largest ethnic groups, resulting in widespread fatalities, displacement, hunger and economic decline. Efforts to restore peace have encountered repeated setbacks. Both the 2015 peace agreement and the 2018 revitalized peace deal failed to bring lasting peace to the country, leading to continuous sporadic violence. Maps 1.3.1 illustrates the spatial distribution and intensity of conflict-related fatalities in South Sudan from 2012 to 2023. A notable increase in the number of conflicts is observed between 2012 and 2016, with violence becoming more widespread and intense, particularly in central and southern regions. Despite the 2018 peace deal, conflict levels remain high in subsequent years, although the distribution of high-fatality incidents appears to have decreased by 2023. X Maps 1.3.1 Political violence in South Sudan by year and fatality Note: This map illustrates the distribution of political violence incidents in South Sudan from 2012 to 2023 using data from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED). ACLED collects information on the dates, actors, locations, fatalities, and types of13 ILO Working Paper 150 all reported political violence and protest events around the world. Each point on the maps represents a recorded incident, with larger and darker-colored circles indicating higher fatality counts.

Source: ACLED.

Conflicts put South Sudanese lives and livelihoods at severe risk, as shown by the increasing population in conflict-affected areas (Figure 1.3.1). To estimate the population exposed to conflict, we create a 10-kilometer buffer around each recorded conflict point and use high-resoluSource: ACLED. Conflicts put South Sudanese lives and livelihoods at severe risk, as shown by the increasing population in conflict-affected areas (Figure 1.3.1). To estimate the population exposed to

Estás viendo una vista previa

Lee el documento completo con Ariel

Este es un fragmento de uno de los más de 1.2 millones de documentos de la biblioteca de Ariel. Crea tu cuenta para leerlo completo, descargarlo y consultarlo con Ariel, que siempre te lleva a la fuente exacta: Ariel NO alucina.

Consultar sobre este documento ...