OIT - World Employment and Social Outlook Trends 2025

X World Employment and Social Outlook Trends 2025 ILO Flagship ReportX World Employment and Social Outlook Trends 2025 International Labour Office • GenevaProduced by the Publications Production and Publishing Management Unit of the ILO.

Code: DESIGN/WEI/PMSERV Cover photo Munya & Paida Shadaya, directors of Invictus Steel Africa. They are beneficiaries of the ILO Start and Improve Your Business (SIYB) training. Mutare, Zimbabwe, 8 October 2024. Photo: Shaun Chitsiga/ILO

Copyright © International Labour Organization 2025 First published 2025 Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International. To view a copy of this licence, please visit (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). The user is allowed to reuse, share (copy and redistribute), adapt (remix, transform and build upon the original work) as detailed in the licence. The user must clearly credit the ILO as the source of the material and indicate if changes were made to the original content. Use of the emblem, name and logo of the ILO is not permitted in connection with translations, adaptations or other derivative works. Attribution – The user must indicate if changes were made and must cite the work as follows: World Employment and Social Outlook: Trends 2025, Geneva: International Labour Office, 2025. © ILO. Translations – In the case of a translation of this work, the following disclaimer must be added along with the attribution: This is a translation of a copyrighted work of the International Labour Organization (ILO). This translation has not been prepared, reviewed or endorsed by the ILO and should not be considered an official ILO translation. The ILO disclaims all responsibility for its content and accuracy. Responsibility rests solely with the author(s) of the translation. Adaptations – In the case of an adaptation of this work, the following disclaimer must be added along with the attribution: This is an adaptation of a copyrighted work of the International Labour Organization (ILO).

the author(s) of the translation. Adaptations – In the case of an adaptation of this work, the following disclaimer must be added along with the attribution: This is an adaptation of a copyrighted work of the International Labour Organization (ILO). This adaptation has not been prepared, reviewed or endorsed by the ILO and should not be considered an official ILO adaptation. The ILO disclaims all responsibility for its content and accuracy. Responsibility rests solely with the author(s) of the adaptation. Third-party materials – This Creative Commons licence does not apply to non-ILO copyright materials included in this publication. If the material is attributed to a third party, the user of such material is solely responsible for clearing the rights with the rights holder and for any claims of infringement. Any dispute arising under this licence that cannot be settled amicably shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The parties shall be bound by any arbitration award rendered as a result of such arbitration as the final adjudication of such a dispute. Queries on rights and licensing should be addressed to the ILO Publishing Unit (Rights and Licensing) at rights@ilo.org. Information on ILO publications and digital products can be found at: www.ilo.org/publns. ISBN 9789220411575 (print); 9789220411582 (web pdf) ISSN 2709-7080 (print); 2709-7099 (online) DOI: https://doi.org/10.54394/IZLN1673 economic recovery / labour market / decent work / just transition / youth employment 03.04.3 ILO Cataloguing in Publication Data Also available in French: Emploi et questions sociales dans le monde: Tendances 2025, ISBN 9789220411599 (print), 9789220411605 (web PDF); and in Spanish: Perspectivas Sociales y del Empleo en el Mundo: Tendencias

2025, ISBN 9789220411612 (print), 9789220411629 (web PDF). The designations employed in ILO publications and databases, which are in conformity with United Nations practice, and the presentation of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the ILO concerning the legal status of any country, area or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The opinions and views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the opinions, views or policies of the ILO. Reference to names of firms and commercial products and processes does not imply their endorsement by the ILO, and any failure to mention a particular firm, commercial product or process is not a sign of disapproval.III As we celebrate the historically low global unemployment level, of 5 per cent, one may assume that this means that the labour market is thriving. But we live in a time of contradictions and challenges, where meaningful progress exists side by side with entrenched economic obstacles. Beneath 2024’s encouraging figures lies a persistent reality: millions of people, particularly in less developed countries, remain trapped in cycles of informality, working poverty and economic marginalization. This reality, outlined in the World Employment and Social Outlook: Trends 2025 report, calls for a profound reckoning with the state of global employment and decent work. The closure of gender and skill gaps and the amelioration of wage inequalities are essential not only for economic growth but also for the advancement of social justice. Decent work and productive employment are central to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030. Fundamental imbalances persist in the labour market. Economic growth has slowed to 3.2 per cent, thereby constraining the opportunity for meaningful improvements in job creation and working conditions, particularly in low-income countries. Technological advances have lifted productivity growth and living standards less than expected. Despite the efforts made through industrial policies, structural transformation – the shift towards more diversified and productive economies – has stalled and the gains from it are concentrated in select regions.

and working conditions, particularly in low-income countries. Technological advances have lifted productivity growth and living standards less than expected. Despite the efforts made through industrial policies, structural transformation – the shift towards more diversified and productive economies – has stalled and the gains from it are concentrated in select regions. The barriers to a thriving global labour market are numerous. Youth unemployment remains a critical challenge as young people – particularly in low-income countries – struggle to find work and to access quality education. Within-country spatial inequalities limit workers’ – especially women’s – ability to transition into better-paying jobs. Labour market concentration stifles the potential of small and medium-sized enterprises, curtailing productivity gains and wage growth. Meanwhile, fragmented labour markets, compounded by sluggish trade and unsatisfied potential for labour migration, weigh heavily on prospects for dynamic employment growth. To counter these challenges, the world must embrace new approaches to social justice that generate decent work. Policies need to be coordinated across national and multilateral levels, with a focus on aligning financial and technological resources as well as relieving debt for those most in need. Too often, resources directed to the world’s poorest regions fail to yield substantial results, owing to a lack of strategic vision and coordination that would target efforts upon formalization and productive employment. A brighter path forward requires bold action. The Global Coalition for Social Justice aims to catalyse such a shift, leveraging the collective expertise of international bodies and stakeholders. The Coalition is bringing together knowledge and skills to promote coordinated responses at national, regional and global levels. This will help to bring about a human-centred approach and so ensure that social justice is recognized as the keystone of a sustainable global recovery. As we look to 2025 and beyond, the message is clear: the global community cannot afford to be complacent. The achievement of social justice through decent work is not just a goal; it is the foundation of a fairer, more prosperous world. Gilbert F. Houngbo ILO Director-General PrefaceV Preface III Acknowledgements IX Executive summary: From job recovery to sustained resilience? XI

1. From recovery to sustained resilience? 1

Tepid growth is testing labour markets 1

it is the foundation of a fairer, more prosperous world. Gilbert F. Houngbo ILO Director-General PrefaceV Preface III Acknowledgements IX Executive summary: From job recovery to sustained resilience? XI

1. From recovery to sustained resilience? 1

Tepid growth is testing labour markets 1 Benign headline jobs figures hide structural vulnerabilities 3

Outlook: Uncertainty hinders structural change 15

References 18

2. Employment and social trends by region 21

Africa 21 Labour market trends in Northern Africa 22 Labour market trends in sub-Saharan Africa 22 Formalizing and bolstering remittances as a form of private capital mobilization 24 Americas 25 Labour market trends in Latin America and the Caribbean 26 Labour market trends in Northern America 26 Climate-related risks and the Caribbean tourism industry 28 Arab States 30 Labour market trends in the Arab States 30 The adoption of artificial intelligence and digital technologies and widening gender gaps 32 Asia and the Pacific 34 Labour market trends in Asia and the Pacific 34 Progress across several decent work deficits has stalled 36 Transitions and the implications for job creation and disruption 36 Europe and Central Asia 38 Labour market trends in Europe and Central Asia 38 Slow productivity growth in the European Union is expected to weigh on real wage growth 41 References 42 ContentsX World Employment and Social Outlook | Trends 2025 VI List of boxes 1.1. Gains in per capita income growth from increasing women’s labour force participation rate 9 1.2. Evolution of labour productivity growth 11 1.3. Labour market power and real wage developments 12 1.4. The transition from internal combustion engine vehicles to electric vehicles 13 3.1. Measuring productivity to inform policy and social dialogue 54 3.2. The role of modern services and manufacturing in spatial inequality: Mexico versus Viet Nam 60 List of figures 1.1. Change in labour force participation rates between 2014 and 2024, by sex and age, world and country income groups (percentage points) 4 1.2. Change in labour force participation rates between 2014 and 2019 and between 2019

List of figures 1.1. Change in labour force participation rates between 2014 and 2024, by sex and age, world and country income groups (percentage points) 4 1.2. Change in labour force participation rates between 2014 and 2019 and between 2019 and 2024, by sex and age group, high-income countries (percentage points) 5 1.3. Global unemployment rates by age and sex, 1991–2026 (percentage) 5 1.4. Youth unemployment rates, world and country income groups, 1991–2026 (percentage) 6 1.5. Youth not in employment, education or training (NEET), by sex, world, 1991–2026 (percentage) 7 1.6. Gender gap in unemployment rate, world and country income groups, 2020–26 (percentage points) 7 1.7. Jobs gap rate, by sex, world (percentage) 8 1.8. Employment growth by country income group, 2019–26 (percentage) 10 1.9. Evolution of real wages and labour productivity, world (index, 2020 = 100) 10 1.10. Growth of GDP per worker, world and country income groups, 2010–26 (percentage) 11 1.11. Market power and labour market outcomes 12 1.12. Global employment by broad sector (percentage of total employment) 13 1.13. Annual growth of formal and informal employment, world, 2010–15 and 2024 (percentage) 14 1.14. Share of informal employment, world and country income groups, 2004 and 2024 (percentage) 14 1.15. Share of working poverty and employment by economic class, world, 1991–2024 (percentage) 15 3 . Productive employment and spatial inequalities 49 Productivity has slowed on the back of rising spatial inequalities 49 The nature of structural transformation and productivity 52 Spatial inequalities and structural shifts 56 Positive spillovers 61 References 62 Appendix. Data sources and methodology 65Contents VII 1.16. Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, world 16

Productivity has slowed on the back of rising spatial inequalities 49 The nature of structural transformation and productivity 52 Spatial inequalities and structural shifts 56 Positive spillovers 61 References 62 Appendix. Data sources and methodology 65Contents VII 1.16. Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, world 16 2.1. Remittances, ODA and FDI, sub-Saharan Africa, 2000–23 24 2.2. Direct and indirect employment in the tourism industry, share of total employment, Caribbean countries and non-mainland territories, 2019 (percentage) 28 2.3. Proportion of employment with potential exposure to automating effects of generative AI, by sex and subregion (percentage) 33 2.4. Changes in selected labour market indicators, Asia and the Pacific, 2004–24 37 2.5. Selected indicators relating to labour productivity, EU-27, 2010–23 40 3.1. The global productivity frontier, 1991–2024 50 3.2. Industrial policy interventions worldwide 51 3.3. Productivity growth: Contributions from within-sector growth versus structural transformation (percentage points) 53 3.4. Labour productivity across the manufacturing and service sectors 53 3.5. Sectors’ performance in productivity and employment growth in Ghana, 2013–22 (percentage) 54 3.6. Change in spatial inequality and change in manufacturing’s share in the workforce 56 3.7. Change in spatial inequality and change in modern (high-end) services’ share in the workforce 57 3.8. Concentration of sectoral employment across subnational regions (percentage) 58 3.9. Changes in spatial inequality and structural change 59 3.10. Contribution of different kinds of services to overall growth of the service sector across countries belonging to different levels of spatial inequality (percentage) 59 3.11. Mexico: A fairly even distribution of night light (left panel) is spatially correlated with the relatively even distribution of modern service activities (right panel) 60 3.12. Viet Nam: A higher spatial concentration of night light (left panel) is related to the

3.11. Mexico: A fairly even distribution of night light (left panel) is spatially correlated with the relatively even distribution of modern service activities (right panel) 60 3.12. Viet Nam: A higher spatial concentration of night light (left panel) is related to the localization of manufacturing activities (right panel) 60 List of tables 1.1. Change in per capita GDP from increasing women’s labour force participation rates (percentage) 9 2.1. Estimates and projections of employment, unemployment, labour force, informal employment and working poverty, regional and subregional, Africa, 2021–26 23 2.2. Estimates and projections of employment, unemployment, labour force, informal employment and working poverty, regional and subregional, Americas, 2021–26 27 2.3. Estimates and projections of employment, unemployment, labour force, informal employment and working poverty, regional and subregional, Arab States, 2021–26 31 2.4. Estimates and projections of employment, unemployment, labour force, informal employment and working poverty, regional and subregional, Asia and the Pacific, 2021–26 35 2.5. Estimates and projections of employment, unemployment, youth unemployment and labour force, regional and subregional, Europe and Central Asia, 2021–26 39IX World Employment and Social Outlook: Trends 2025 was prepared by the Macroeconomic Policies and Jobs Unit of the ILO Research Department. The report was prepared by Kanhu Charan Pradhan, Matthieu Charpe, Jorge Davalos, Sabina Dewan, Luca Fedi, Richard Horne, Stefan Kühn, Miguel Sanchez Martinez, Shamindra Nath and Diana Torres under the coordination and leadership of Ekkehard Ernst. The report was produced under the overall guidance of Richard Samans, Director (retired) of the ILO Research Department. The authors are grateful for all the input and suggestions received from the ILO Regional Offices for Africa, the Arab States, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. The ILO modelled estimates presented in this report were produced by the Data Production

and suggestions received from the ILO Regional Offices for Africa, the Arab States, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. The ILO modelled estimates presented in this report were produced by the Data Production and Analysis Unit, led by Steven Kapsos, in the ILO Department of Statistics and by the Macroeconomic Policies and Jobs Unit of the ILO Research Department. The authors especially acknowledge the modelling work carried out by Evangelia Bourmpoula, Paloma Carrillo, Marta Golin, Roger Gomis, Stefan Kühn, Avichal Mahajan and Miguel Sanchez Martinez. The underlying database of international labour market indicators used to produce the estimates was prepared by the Data Production and Analysis Unit of the ILO Department of Statistics. The authors also wish to acknowledge the efforts of David Bescond, Vipasana Karkee, Donika Limani, Quentin Mathys and Yves Perardel. Excellent comments and suggestions were provided by Sher Verick, Adviser to the ILO Deputy Director-General Celeste Drake. The ILO Research Department wishes to acknowledge the comments and suggestions provided by the following ILO colleagues: Andrew Allieu, Mario Berrios, Marlen de la Chaux, Marta Golin, Eleanor D’Achon, Sara Elder, Christoph Ernst, Roger Gomis, Paloma Carillo, Phu Huynh, Steven Kapsos, Asfaw Kidanu, Sangheon Lee, Maikel LieuwKie-Song, Dragan Radic, Dorothea Schmidt-Klau, Mito Tsukamoto and Stephan Ulrich. We would like to express our gratitude to Judy Rafferty and our colleagues in the Publications Production Unit for assisting with the production process, and to our colleagues in the ILO Department of Communication and Public Information for their continued collaboration and support in disseminating the report. AcknowledgementsXI Employment growth remains steady, but labour market resilience continues to be tested. In 2024, global employment expanded in line with a growing labour force, keeping the global unemployment rate steady at

Department of Communication and Public Information for their continued collaboration and support in disseminating the report. AcknowledgementsXI Employment growth remains steady, but labour market resilience continues to be tested. In 2024, global employment expanded in line with a growing labour force, keeping the global unemployment rate steady at 5 per cent, similar to that of 2023. At the same time, employment growth remained too weak to have a significant impact on persistent decent work deficits around the world. Young people, especially, continue to face much higher unemployment rates – around 12.6 per cent – with few signs of improvements. With the return to pre-pandemic levels of informality and working poverty, the job recovery has lost much of its ability to generate further improvements and close the gap with the targets of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). As the economic and social outlook remains highly uncertain – with geopolitical frictions, rising costs of climate change, and unresolved sovereign debt risks – the resilience of labour markets is being tested. Low-income countries appear to be particularly vulnerable, since progress in decent work creation has been slowest in these countries. The economic recovery is losing steam … The global economy continues to expand at a moderate rate, but it is projected to gradually lose steam, preventing a stronger and more durable labour market recovery. Economic growth stood at 3.2 per cent in 2024, down from 3.3 and 3.6 per cent in 2023 and 2022, respectively. A similar expansion is expected in 2025 and then a gradual deceleration to set in over the medium term. Rapidly decelerating inflation rates and strong growth in a few major economic centres have helped the global economy to stabilize. Headwinds have set in, however, as geopolitical frictions have risen and both monetary and fiscal policies have returned to pre-pandemic stances. Demographic shifts in advanced and some large emerging economies continue to be felt, while labour shortages have somewhat eased but not completely disappeared. Especially among European countries, labour hoarding remains high, preventing

have risen and both monetary and fiscal policies have returned to pre-pandemic stances. Demographic shifts in advanced and some large emerging economies continue to be felt, while labour shortages have somewhat eased but not completely disappeared. Especially among European countries, labour hoarding remains high, preventing a faster return to pre-pandemic trends. Investment rates have fallen again and energy price hikes have taken a toll on industrial production. Except in Northern America, productivity growth shows no signs of acceleration despite major technological advances, especially in information technologies and medical research. Executive summary From job recovery to sustained resilience?X World Employment and Social Outlook | Trends 2025 XII … which has helped bring inflation down … On the back of weaker growth, inflation rates came down in 2024, approaching the target rates of most central banks. Monetary policy rates have started to decline again, after reaching levels last seen in the 1980s. After failing to properly anticipate the supply bottlenecks caused by the pandemic, central banks have managed to bring inflation rates down without causing a major labour market recession. Nevertheless, price levels remain elevated, and inflation rates have yet to drop to target rates in much of the developed world. However, further tightening, especially by fiscal policymakers, would run the risk of causing serious social disruption as some high-inflation countries have recently experienced while trying to bring down their inflation rates. … but prevents real wages from recovering. Although inflation rates have come down, wage growth has not fully caught up with the pandemic-related loss of earnings, in part because of weak employment growth. Global unemployment has remained steady, but real wage growth has picked up only in a few advanced economies with particularly strong labour demand. In most countries, real wages have not recouped the losses incurred during the pandemic years and the inflationary episode that followed. Part of the reason that real wage growth has remained weak has to do with the shift in labour market power towards employers over the past decade. In countries for which data are

have not recouped the losses incurred during the pandemic years and the inflationary episode that followed. Part of the reason that real wage growth has remained weak has to do with the shift in labour market power towards employers over the past decade. In countries for which data are available, rising market concentration correlates with a shift of labour market power away from workers towards employers, with particularly adverse effects for vulnerable groups and young people. Specifically, labour market concentration seems to have contributed to faster automation without leading to improved labour productivity. Labour force participation continues to fall, adversely affecting young people. Labour force participation has declined slightly, and this has weighed on employment growth. Large differences exist between low-income countries where participation rates have declined across the board and high-income countries where labour force participation has increased, especially among older workers and women. Rising old-age participation in advanced economies has compensated for an ageing working-age population, allowing the overall participation rate to increase by almost 1 percentage point over the past ten years in this country group, versus a drop in participation for the world as a whole. Gender gaps in participation remain large, since significantly fewer women than men participate in the labour market, which means that countries forgo a significant potential for improvements in living standards. Where gaps have been falling, this has often come about not from improved female participation but from a continuous decline in male participation rates, especially among young men. Unfortunately, not all of this drop in young male participation owes to rising education levels. Indeed, the rate of young men not in employment, education or training (NEET) has increased over recent years in comparison with its historical average. In lowincome countries in particular, there has been an increase of almost 4 percentage points in young men’s NEET rate above the historical average, leaving many young men less well equipped to successfully participate in the labour market and more vulnerable to future shocks.Executive summary: From job recovery to sustained resilience? XIII

income countries in particular, there has been an increase of almost 4 percentage points in young men’s NEET rate above the historical average, leaving many young men less well equipped to successfully participate in the labour market and more vulnerable to future shocks.Executive summary: From job recovery to sustained resilience? XIII The global jobs gap has declined … On the back of stable unemployment rates, the global jobs gap, ILO’s summary estimate for the overall number of jobs missing, stood around 402.4 million in 2024. The jobs gap includes about 186 million who are unemployed, 137 million who are part of the potential labour force, mainly discouraged workers, and around 79 million who would like to work but who have obligations, such as care, that hinder them from taking up employment. Against a gradual decline in labour force participation, the jobs gap has continued its pre-pandemic downward trend but is expected to stabilize over the next two years. … but with little progress to resolve decent work deficits. Other social indicators have shown little sign of improvements since 2015. Working poverty, while improving globally, persists in low-income countries; extreme forms of working poverty affect 240 million workers or 7 per cent of the global workforce. Informality remains high and enduring in many parts of the world; more than half of the global workforce are not adequately covered by social security arrangements, legal protection or workplace safety measures. Inequality has increased. Reductions in working poverty and informality have been concentrated in a few countries in Eastern and South-Eastern Asia and Latin America. Many other countries have seen only limited reductions of informality and working poverty and continue to struggle to provide decent work. Faster productivity growth is needed to resolve decent work deficits. Slowing productivity growth remains a major bottleneck with respect to expanding the opportunities for decent work. As highlighted in previous World Employment and Social Outlook: Trends reports, productivity growth continues to follow a secular downward trend after a short blip

to resolve decent work deficits. Slowing productivity growth remains a major bottleneck with respect to expanding the opportunities for decent work. As highlighted in previous World Employment and Social Outlook: Trends reports, productivity growth continues to follow a secular downward trend after a short blip during the pandemic. Global labour productivity growth has fallen by half a percentage point from the pre-pandemic long-term average. Many countries that have yet to reach high-income status have seen their productivity growth rates fall rapidly. Countries are searching for answers to address this slowdown. Part of the slowdown is linked to slowing structural transformation towards manufacturing and highly productive services. Moreover, productivity growth within sectors has weakened as well, especially in industrial and modern services, despite significant investment in robotization over the past decade. Major industrial powerhouses are facing serious difficulties in achieving further industrial growth. High (and rising) energy prices as a result of international conflicts and the energy transition are only part of the problem, since weak industrial production pre-dates recent difficulties. At the same time, productive services are struggling to make up the shortfall left by industry. More than industry, (modern) services such as business services and information and communications technology (ICT) rely on a well-educated workforce and well-maintained public infrastructure. Absent such a skilled workforce and developed infrastructure, large spatial inequalities emerge that prevent more equitable growth across a country’s territory. Even within countries that have undergone a transformation towards manufacturing and modern services such as ICT and business services, inequality has not systematically declined. Such spatial inequalities within countries can account for the lack of convergence in living standards and productive employment between developing and advanced economies. In many emerging and developing economies, both manufacturing and modern services are failing to produce sufficient spillovers to generate productive employment outside a few advanced hubs. Without sufficient infrastructure investment, quality education and other public services, a few highly productive agglomerations will become

In many emerging and developing economies, both manufacturing and mod