TAS - CAS 3341 de 2013

Tribunal Arbitral du Sport Court of Arbitration for Sport Arbitration CAS 2013/A/3341 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v. Daniel Pineda Contreras & Chilean Olympic Committee (COC), award of 28 May 2014

Panel: Mr Michele Bernasconi (Switzerland), Sole Arbitrator Athletics (long-jump, sprint) Doping (refusal to submit to sample collection) Time limit to appeal against a decision of the sports association rendered in a doping matter Restrictive interpretation of the compelling justification to the refusal to submit to sample collection Sample collection equipment

Tampering

1. The fact that the statutes of a sports association specify a 21-day time limit to appeal a decision of the sports association to a State court shall not be interpreted as a constraint on the time limits specified in the IAAF Anti-Doping Rules (ADR) or the WADC. The ADR (and therefore not the sports association’s statutes) are relevant to determine the applicable time limit for the appellant to appeal against a decision of the sports association rendered in a doping matter and within the framework of the ADR.

2. As established in CAS jurisprudence, the defence of compelling justification of the refusal to submit to sample collection is to be interpreted restrictively. The logic of the anti-doping tests demands and expects that whenever physically, hygienically and morally possible, the sample be provided despite objections by the athlete. If that does not occur, athletes would systematically refuse to provide samples for whatever reasons, leaving no opportunity for testing. Furthermore, if the athlete is not satisfied with any of the equipment available for selection, this shall be recorded by the doping control officer.

3. After the doping control officer orders additional urine collection equipment to be delivered to the doping control station, the athlete is not entitled to simply leave the doping control station based on his/her assertion that no appropriate sample collection equipment was available.

4. To establish that the athlete has tampered or attempted to tamper with any of the steps or processes that make up the doping control process, the party supporting this has the

burden of establishing to the comfortable satisfaction of the adjudicating body that the athlete engaged in one or more of the actions specified in the definition of tampering. All of the actions specified in the definition of tampering require intent and certain actions also require fraudulent conduct, or the intent to deceive, on the part of the person involved.

CAS 2013/A/3341 2

WADA v. Daniel Pineda Contreras & COC, award of 28 May 2014

I. PARTIES

1. The World Anti-Doping Agency (“WADA” or the “Appellant”) is a Swiss private law foundation with its seat in Lausanne, Switzerland and its headquarters in Montreal, Canada.

WADA was created in 1999 to promote, coordinate and monitor the fight against doping in sport in all its forms.

2. Mr. Daniel Pineda Contreras (the “Athlete” or “First Respondent”) is a long-jump and sprint athlete. He is a member of the Athletics Federation of Chile (“FEDACHI”), which is the national governing body for athletics in Chile and which is affiliated with the International

Association of Athletics Federations (“IAAF”).

3. The Chilean Olympic Committee (the “COC” or “Second Respondent”) was created in 1934 and is the National Olympic Committee of Chile. Pursuant to the Olympic Charter, the mission of the National Olympic Committees is to “develop, promote and protect the Olympic Movement in their respective countries”.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

4. This section summarizes the main relevant facts that emerge from the written submissions and evidence offered by the Appellant, the First Respondent and the Second Respondent

(collectively, the “Parties”) in respect of the present dispute. Additional facts and allegations found in the Parties’ written submissions and evidence offered may be set out, where relevant, in connection with the legal discussion that follows. II.1. The Events of 30 June 2012

5. On 30 June 2012, the Athlete participated in the Bogota Grand Prix athletics competition in Bogota, Colombia. He finished in first place in the long-jump competition.

6. At 15:30 hr., after completion of his competition, the Athlete was notified by the chaperone delegated by the Colombian national anti-doping authority (“Coldeportes”) that he had been selected for doping control.

7. At 15:45 hr., the Athlete signed the doping control form (the “DCF”), indicating his consent to proceed with the doping control session.

8. After signing the DCF, the Athlete remained at the doping control station (the “DCS”) under the supervision of the doping control officer (the “DCO”), hydrated and at approximately 17:00 hr., communicated to the DCO that he was ready to attempt to provide a urine sample.

9. During his first attempt to provide a urine sample, the Athlete dropped the urine collection container into the toilet bowl.

10. During the course of his second attempt to provide a urine sample, the Athlete placed the urine CAS 2013/A/3341 3

WADA v. Daniel Pineda Contreras & COC, award of 28 May 2014 collection container on a surface above the division between the toilets. This second, open container fell to the floor and the Athlete refused to continue using this container due to the risk of contamination.

11. At this point in the doping control session, the remaining stock of urine collection containers

at the DCS was as follows: (i) According to the Appellant, there remained two containers, one of which had a very small hole in the plastic packaging which enveloped the container but which was nevertheless clean, not broken or contaminated, and was adequate for the purposes of the doping control. (ii) According to the Athlete, there remained one container, which container was poorly enveloped and sealed, scratched and which did not meet the minimum standards for collection equipment as prescribed by the rules of WADA.

12. The Athlete refused to provide a urine sample using the remaining urine collection container(s).

13. The DCO contacted a Coldeportes representative to bring additional urine collection containers to the DCS.

14. Before the additional urine collection containers were delivered to the DCS, the Athlete expressed his intention to not continue with the doping control session, documented some information in respect of such session, and left the DCS without providing a urine sample.

II.2. The Results Management Process

15. By letter to the IAAF dated 21 August 2012, Coldeportes reported the incident involving the Athlete during the doping control session at the Bogota Grand Prix on 30 June 2012 (the

“Coldeportes Report”).

16. In December 2012, the IAAF notified the Athlete of its investigation and requested an explanation from the Athlete.

17. By letter dated 28 December 2012, the Athlete provided his explanation to the IAAF, accompanied by a letter of support from FEDACHI dated 2 January 2013.

18. By letter dated 5 March 2013 to FEDACHI, the IAAF:

(i) communicated its rejection of the Athlete’s explanation, (ii) informed FEDACHI of the charges against the Athlete for anti-doping rule violations in respect of IAAF Rule 32.2(c) Refusing or failing without compelling justification to submit to Sample collection after notification or otherwise evading sample collection and IAAF Rule 32.2(e) Tampering or Attempted tampering with any part of Doping Control, and (iii) in accordance with IAAF Rule 38.2, asked FEDACHI to provisionally suspend the Athlete from all athletics competitions effective immediately, pending resolution of the case by CAS 2013/A/3341 4 WADA v. Daniel Pineda Contreras & COC, award of 28 May 2014

FEDACHI.

19. By letter dated 5 March 2013 to the Athlete, FEDACHI notified the Athlete that he was provisionally suspended from all athletics competitions (the “Provisional Suspension”).

20. By letter dated 14 May 2013 to the COC, FEDACHI provided information in respect of the Athlete’s alleged infringement of Articles 2.3 and 2.5 of the World Anti-Doping Code (the “WADC”) or Rules 32.2(c) & (e) of the IAAF anti-doping rules (the “ADR”) in order for the COC’s Court of Honor and Sports Arbitration (the “COC Court of Honor”) to hold hearings and deliver a judgment in respect of such alleged infringement, as requested by the IAAF.

21. In a decision dated 3 June 2013 (the “Decision”), the COC Court of Honor ruled, inter alia, as

follows: (i) the Athlete did not commit either of the anti-doping rule violations alleged by the IAAF, (ii) the Athlete acted negligently and imprudently during the doping control at the Bogota Grand Prix on 30 June 2012, and (iii) a three-month period of ineligibility shall be imposed upon the Athlete, starting on 5 March 2013.

22. On 5 June 2013, the Athlete was notified of the Decision.

23. On 6 June 2013, FEDACHI was notified of the Decision.

24. On 30 July 2013, FEDACHI notified the IAAF of the Decision.

III. SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CAS

25. On 4 October 2013, WADA filed its statement of appeal (the “Statement of Appeal”) with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”), pursuant to Article R48 of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration (the “Code”), to challenge the Decision (the “Appeal”). The Statement of Appeal

attached three exhibits and contained, inter alia, the Appellant’s nomination of Mr. Quentin Byrne-Sutton as arbitrator.

26. By communication dated 8 October 2013 to the Parties, the CAS Court Office acknowledged receipt of the Statement of Appeal.

27. On 18 October 2013, the Appellant filed its appeal brief (the “Appeal Brief”) together with six exhibits pursuant to Article R51 of the Code.

28. By letter dated 25 October 2013 to the CAS Court Office, the First Respondent nominated Mr.

Michele A. R. Bernasconi as arbitrator.

29. On 7 November 2013, the First Respondent filed an application with the CAS Court Office for CAS 2013/A/3341 5

WADA v. Daniel Pineda Contreras & COC, award of 28 May 2014 a 30-day extension of the time limit for filing his statement of defense pursuant to Articles R32 and R55 of the Code. By communication dated 13 November 2013 to the Parties and after having duly consulted the other Parties, the CAS Court Office confirmed, inter alia, that the extension specified in the previous paragraph had been granted to the First Respondent and requested that the Parties inform the CAS Court Office whether they would accept that the Appeal be submitted to a panel composed of a sole arbitrator.

30. By communication dated 29 November 2013 to the Parties, the CAS Court Office confirmed that all of the Parties would agree with the designation of Mr. Michele A. R. Bernasconi as the Sole Arbitrator in respect of the Appeal.

31. On 13 December 2013, the First Respondent filed its answer (the “Answer”), together with 10 exhibits pursuant to Article R55 of the Code, together with an exception of inadmissibility of the appeal.

32. By communication dated 17 December 2013, the CAS Court Office invited the Parties to

inform the CAS Court Office whether in respect of the Appeal, they preferred a hearing to be held or for the Sole Arbitrator to issue an award based solely on the Parties’ written submissions.

33. By communication dated 20 December 2013, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that pursuant to Article R54 of the Code and on behalf of the President of the CAS Appeals Arbitration Division, the panel appointed to decide the Appeal (the “Panel”) consists of Mr.

Michele A. R. Bernasconi.

34. By communication dated 8 January 2014, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that none of the Parties had requested that a hearing be held in respect of the Appeal and that pursuant to Article R57 of the Code, the Panel would decide whether to hold a hearing or to issue an award based on the Parties’ written submissions.

35. By communication dated 11 February 2014, the Parties were advised, inter alia, that (i) the Panel had granted the First Respondent 20 days to file a further submission commenting on the Appellant’s request, as set out in the Appeal Brief, that the period of ineligibility that should be imposed upon the Athlete pursuant to the Appeal should start on the date that the Panel’s award in respect of the Appeal enters into force, and (ii) Mr. Daniel Ratushny had been appointed as ad hoc clerk in respect of the Appeal.

36. By letter dated 6 March 2014 to the CAS Court Office, the First Respondent filed his submission in respect of the Sole Arbitrator’s communication of 11 February 2014.

37. By letter dated 13 March 2014 to the CAS Court Office, the Appellant filed his reply to the First Respondent’s submission dated 6 March 2014.

38. Since none of the Parties had requested the holding of a hearing, and after having reviewed the CAS file, the Panel decided, in accordance with Article R57 of the Code, to issue an award on

the basis of the Parties’ written submissions.

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WADA v. Daniel Pineda Contreras & COC, award of 28 May 2014

39. On 15 April 2014 and 22 April 2014, the Appellant and the First Respondent, respectively, signed the order of procedure (the “Order of Procedure”) confirming, inter alia, the jurisdiction of CAS, that their right to be heard has been respected and their agreement that the Sole Arbitrator may decide the present matter based on the Parties’ written submissions.

40. The Second Respondent did not file any written submissions in respect of the Appeal and did not otherwise participate in the Appeal.

IV. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

41. This section summarizes the substance of the Parties’ main arguments as set out in the Parties’ written submissions and evidence offered. While this section does not contain every contention and allegation made by the Parties, the Panel has carefully considered all of the written submissions and evidence offered by the Parties, including those not specifically mentioned in the following summary.

IV.1 The Appellant’s Submissions

42. In its Appeal Brief, the Appellant requests the following rulings by CAS: “1. The Appeal of WADA is admissible.

2. The decision rendered on 3 July (sic) 2013 by the Court of Arbitration for Sport of the Chilean Olympic Committee in the matter of Mr Daniel Pineda Contreras is set aside.

3. Mr. Daniel Pineda Contreras is sanctioned with a two-year period of ineligibility, starting on the date on which the CAS award enters into force. Any period of ineligibility (whether imposed to or voluntary accepted by Mr Daniel Pineda Contreras) before the entry into force of the CAS award shall be credited against the total period of ineligibility to be served.

4. All competitive results obtained by Mr Daniel Pineda Contreras from 30 June 2012, through the

commencement of the applicable period of ineligibility shall be disqualified with all of the resulting consequences including forfeiture of any medals, points and prices.

5. WADA is granted an Award for costs”.

43. The Appellant’s submissions in support of its requests may be summarized as follows:

IV.1.1 Applicable Rules

44. The ADR apply to the present case in accordance with Article 15.3.1 of the WADC.

CAS 2013/A/3341 7

WADA v. Daniel Pineda Contreras & COC, award of 28 May 2014 IV.1.2 Admissibility of the Appeal a) WADA’s right of appeal to CAS

45. The Appellant’s right to appeal the Decision to CAS is based on the following: “Article 42.8 ADR sets out the persons entitled to appeal the decisions rendered against national-level athletes when there is no appeal procedure in place at the national level, like in the case at hand. WADA is explicitly mentioned amongst such persons”. b) Compliance with the deadline to appeal to CAS

46. The time limits for appeals to CAS are specified in Rules 42.13 and 42.14 ADR, which state: “13. Unless stated otherwise in these Rules (or the Doping Review Board determines otherwise in cases where the IAAF is the prospective appellant), the appellant shall have forty-five (45) days in which to file his statement of appeal with CAS starting from the date of communication of the written reasons of the decision to be appealed (in English or French where the IAAF is the prospective appellant) or from the last day on which the decision could have been appealed to the national level appeal body in accordance with Rule 42.8(b). Within fifteen (15) days of the deadline for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file his appeal brief with CAS and, within thirty (30) days of receipt of the appeal brief, the respondent shall file his answer with CAS.

14. The filing deadline for an appeal to CAS filed by WADA shall be the later of (a) twenty-one (21) days

after the last day on which any party entitled to appeal in the case could have appealed; or (b) twenty-one (21) days after WADA’s receipt of the complete file relating to the decision”.

47. The Appellant has complied with the time limits specified in Rules 42.13 and 42.14 ADR as follows:  the IAAF received the case file on 30 July 2013 and could therefore file an appeal with CAS until 13 September 2013 (i.e., 45 days later);  WADA filed the Statement of Appeal with CAS on 4 October 2013 (i.e., 21 days after 13

September 2013);  WADA filed the Appeal Brief with CAS on 18 October 2013, i.e., within the 15-day deadline set out in Rule 42.13 ADR.

48. Based on the Appellant’s compliance with the applicable time limits and the provisions of Articles R48 and R65.2 of the Code, the Appeal is admissible.

IV.1.3 Anti-Doping Rule Violations

49. Rule 32.2 ADR states: “Athletes or other Persons shall be responsible for knowing what constitutes an anti-doping rule violation and the substances and methods which have been included on the Prohibited List. The following constitute anti-doping CAS 2013/A/3341 8

WADA v. Daniel Pineda Contreras & COC, award of 28 May 2014 rule violations: (…) (c) Refusing or failing without compelling justification to submit to Sample collection after notification as authorized in applicable anti-doping rules or otherwise evading Sample collection. (…) (e) Tampering or Attempted Tampering with any part of Doping Control”.

50. The reports of the DCO filed by the Appellant with its Appeal Brief establish the following:  Upon notification at 15:30 hr. that he had been selected for doping control, the Athlete was reluctant and initially refused to sign the DCF and undergo the doping control. He

explained that he had to be at the El Dorado airport of Bogota at 19:00 hr. for his flight back to Chile and thus did not have sufficient time for doping control.  The Athlete finally agreed to sign the DCF at 15:45 hr. at the insistence of the DCO, who repeatedly warned the Athlete that his failure to submit to doping control could lead to sanctions against him.  Despite the Athlete’s alleged concern about being on time at the airport to make his flight, the Athlete procrastinated once he arrived at the DCS and did not seem rushed or hurried prior to his first attempt to provide a urine sample at 17:00 hr.; not less than 75 minutes after his arrival at the DCS.  The Athlete deliberately invalidated or wasted the first two urine collection containers given to him.  Despite the DCO’s instructions to do so, the Athlete refused to use either of the two remaining, perfectly intact and sealed urine collection containers offered to him by the DCO. There is no evidence whatsoever that either of such containers did not meet the minimum criteria specified in Article 6.3.4 of the WADC International Standard for Testing (the “IST”).  Explaining that he was in a hurry, the Athlete refused to wait for the arrival of the additional requested urine collection containers, terminated the doping control session and, despite further warnings from the DCO, left the DCS at approximately 17:30 hr. without providing a urine sample.  The additional urine collection containers were delivered to the DCS by a Coldeportes representative at 17:40 hr.

51. In respect of the points summarized above, the Appellant states: “…when these actions are considered globally, they can only sensibly be regarded as a deliberate, persistent and flagrant attempt to vitiate the sample collection process”.

52. The Appellant cites the following statement from the DCO Reports: CAS 2013/A/3341 9

WADA v. Daniel Pineda Contreras & COC, award of 28 May 2014 “I believe that from the beginning … (the Athlete) delayed and hindered the process”.

53. The DCO and his findings should be considered credible and objective and should prevail over the assertions of the Athlete, who has an evident interest to escape a sanction. a) Rule 32.2(c) ADR

54. CAS has enforced the terms of Rule 32.2(c) ADR strictly, particularly in the following CAS jurisprudence: CAS 2004/A/714; CAS 2004/A/718; CAS 2005/A/925 and CAS

2008/A/1470.

55. The defence of a “compelling justification” has been interpreted restrictively by CAS. In the CAS

2005/A/925 award (para. 75), the Panel stated: “No doubt, we are of the view that the logic of the anti-doping tests and of the DC Rules demands and expects that, whenever physically, hygienically and morally possible, the sample be provided despite objections by the athlete. If that does not occur, athletes would systematically refuse to provide samples for whatever reasons, leaving no opportunity for testing” (emphasis added by the Appellant).

56. In respect of the Athlete’s refusal to use either of the two remaining urine collection containers, the Appellant states: “The situation when an athlete and the DCO do not agree as to the integrity of a container is expressly foreseen in the Annex D of the IST. Pursuant to Art. D.4.4., ‘If the DCO does not agree with the Athlete that all of the equipment available for the selection is unsatisfactory, the DCO shall instruct the Athlete to proceed with the Sample Collection Session’. In the case at hand, the DCO requested the Athlete to provide a sample, but the latter did not accept. Such refusal constitutes a violation”.

57. The Athlete committed the anti-doping rule violation specified in Rule 32.2(c) ADR.

b) Rule 32.2(e) ADR

58. The Appellant states: “Considering that the Athlete did not drop the two first containers accidentally, but deliberately in order to hinder the sample collection, he tampered with the doping control process… The comment to article 2.5 of the WADC provides some examples of tampering: ‘altering identification numbers on a Doping Control Form during Testing, breaking the B Bottle at the time of the B sample analysis or providing fraudulent information to an Anti-Doping Organization’ (emphasis added). By deliberately compromising the two first containers, as they were dropped (in the toilet bowl and the floor respectively), the Athlete tampered with the doping control”.

59. The Athlete committed the anti-doping rule violation specified in Rule 32.2(e) ADR.

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WADA v. Daniel Pineda Contreras & COC, award of 28 May 2014 IV.1.4 Determining the Sanction

60. Rule 40.3(a) ADR establishes a two-year period of ineligibility for the anti-doping rule violations specified in Rule 32.2(c) or Rule 32.2(e) ADR, unless the conditions provided in Rule 40.5 ADR

(No Fault or Negligence, No Significant Fault or Negligence, Substantial Assistance in Discovering or Establishing Anti-Doping Rule Violations, Admission of an Anti-Doping Rule Violation in the Absence of Other Evidence) or the conditions provided in Rule 40.6 ADR (Aggravating Circumstances), are met in the applicable case.

61. The Athlete had no compelling justification to refuse or fail to submit to sample collection and thus may not rely on the exceptional circumstance set out in Rule 40.5(a) ADR (No Fault or

Negligence).

62. The Athlete persistently and intentionally engaged in a series of acts to ultimately avoid the doping control and thus may not rely on the exceptional circumstance set out in Rule 40.5(b)

ADR (No Significant Fault or Negligence).

63. None of the exceptional circumstances provided in Rule 40.5 ADR are met and none of the aggravating circumstances provided in Rule 40.6 ADR exist.

64. The Athlete must be sanctioned with a two-year period of ineligibility.

IV.1.5 Comment on the Commencement of any Period of Ineligibility

65. In support of his arguments below, the Appellant states as follows: “While the IAAF, as a signatory of the WADA Code, has the duty to ‘adopt and implement anti-doping policies and rules which conform with the (WADA) Code’ (art. 20.3.1 of the WADA Code), the provisions of the WADA Code are not directly applicable (CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 15). In that respect, Rule 47 of the IAAF anti-doping rules specifies that ‘in case of conflict between these Anti-Doping Rules and the Code, these Anti-Doping Rules prevails’. Therefore, the IAAF ADR are exclusively applicable to this case”.

66. The Appellant cites Rule 40.10 ADR as applicable to the commencement of a period of ineligibility to be imposed upon an athlete for an anti-doping rule violation: “10. Except as provided below, the period of Ineligibility shall start on the date of the hearing decision providing for Ineligibility or, if the hearing is waived, on the date the Ineligibility is accepted or otherwise imposed. Any period of Provisional Suspension (whether imposed or voluntarily accepted) shall be credited against the total period of Ineligibility to be served.

(a) Timely Admission: where the Athlete promptly admits the antidoping rule violation in writing after being confronted (which means no later than the date of the deadline given to provide a written explanation in accordance with Rule 37.4(c) and, in all events, before the Athlete competes again), the period of Ineligibility may start as early as the date of Sample collection or the date on which another anti-doping rule violation last

occurred. In each case, however, where this Rule is applied, the Athlete or other Person shall serve at least oneCAS 2013/A/3341 11 WADA v. Daniel Pineda Contreras & COC, award of 28 May 2014 half of the period of Ineligibility going forward from the date the Athlete or other Person accepted the imposition of a sanction, the date of a hearing decision imposing a sanction or the date the sanction is otherwise imposed. (b) If a Provisional Suspension is imposed and respected by the Athlete, then the Athlete shall receive a credit for such period of Provisional Suspension against any period of Ineligibility which may ultimately be imposed. (c) If an Athlete voluntarily accepts a Provisional Suspension in writing (pursuant to Rule 38.2) and thereafter refrains from competing, the Athlete shall receive credit for such period of voluntary Provisional Suspension against any period of Ineligibility which may ultimately be imposed. In accordance with Rule 38.3, a voluntary suspension is effective upon the date of its receipt by the IAAF. (d) No credit against a period of Ineligibility shall be given for any time period before the effective date of the Provisional Suspension or voluntary Provisional Suspension regardless of whether the Athlete elected not to compete or was not selected to compete”.

67. In respect of Rule 40.10 ADR, the Appellant notes the following:  The Athlete has never admitted in writing that he committed an anti-doping rule violation and consequently, may not rely on Rule 40.10(a) ADR in respect of the commencement of the period of ineligibility.  Delays in the hearing process which are not attributable to the Athlete, while noted in Article 10.9 of the WADC, are not relevant in respect of the application of Rule 40.10

ADR, which applies exclusively to the commencement of the period of ineligibility.  The anti-doping rule violation occurred on 30 June 2012 and the Athlete served a threemonth suspension from 5 March 2013 until 6 June 2013.

68. The Appellant notes, however: “Considering that the anti-doping rule violation occurred more than 18 months ago and in order to be fair with the Athlete, the Appellant would be prepared to accept that the period of ineligibility starts on 5 March 2013, which corresponds to the commencement of the provisional suspension”.

69. In accordance with Rule 40.8 ADR, all competition results of the Athlete during the period between 30 June 2012 (including the results obtained by the Athlete at the Bogota Grand Prix) and 5 March 2013 must be annulled with all the resulting consequences for the Athlete, including the forfeiture of any titles, awards, medals, points and prize and appearance money.

IV.2 The First Respondent’s Submissions

70. In his Answer, the First Respondent requests the following rulings by CAS:

(i) In respect of the admissibility of the Appeal: “28. The Appeal of WADA is declared Inadmissible for non-compliance with the deadline for submit their CAS 2013/A/3341 12 WADA v. Daniel Pineda Contreras & COC, award of 28 May 2014 Statement of Appeal.

29. Therefore, and as a natural consequence of the first rule requested, terminate the case for being the Statement of Appeal late”.

(ii) In respect of the allegations made by the Appellant that the Athlete violated certain antidoping rules: “1. The Appeal of WADA is dismissed regarding that no anti-doping rule violation was committed.

2. The decision rendered on 3 July 2013 by the Court of Honor of the Chilean Olympic Committee on this matter remains valid and fully executed”.

71. The First Respondent’s submissions in support of its requests may be summarized as follows:

IV.2.1 Applicable Rules

72. The substantive issues of the Appeal, i.e., the alleged anti-doping rule violations, require the

application of the ADR and the WADC.

73. All procedural issues in respect of the Appeal should be governed by the Code and by the statutes of the COC Court of Honor (the “COC Statutes”). The only procedural rules of the ADR and the WADC that are relevant to the Appeal are those that do not contradict the procedural rules of the Code and the COC Statutes.

IV.2.2 Inadmissibility of the Appeal

74. The a