TAS - CAS 5853 de 2018

Tribunal Arbitral du Sport Court of Arbitration for Sport Arbitration CAS 2018/A/5853 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) v. Tribunal Nacional Disciplinario Antidopaje (TNDA) & Damián Marcelo Musto, award of 2 July 2019

Panel: Prof. Ulrich Haas (Germany), President; Prof. Massimo Coccia (Italy); Mr Carlos Del Campo

Colás (Spain) Football Dopage (hydrochlorotiazide; furosemide) Material scope of the FIFA Statutes’ arbitration clause related to doping-related decisions FIFA’s right to appeal doping-related decisions directly to the CAS in the context of national-level players Impact of the national anti-doping law on CAS jurisdiction Discretion not to issue a preliminary award on jurisdiction Late transmission of the Laboratory Documentation Package Determination of the applicable period of ineligibility in the context of a negligent ADRV Commencement of the period of ineligibility

1. By virtue of holding a license, a player submits to an arbitration clause by reference and is bound to the FIFA arbitration clause related to appeals by FIFA against dopingrelated decisions. Doping-related decisions of anti-doping organizations to whom the interested national federations delegated their disciplinary responsibilities and powers in doping matters are covered by the material scope of the arbitration clause, since the list of decisions referred to in Article 58 para. 5 of the FIFA Statutes is not exhaustive (“in particular”).

2. The FIFA ADR, in principle, differentiate in relation to the internal means of recourses between national-level players and international-level players. A decision may be appealed to a national-level appeal body before the appeal to CAS in cases involving national-level players whereas a final decision may be appealed exclusively to CAS in cases involving international-level players. However, in special circumstances, FIFA has a right to appeal doping-related decisions in the context of national-level players directly to the CAS, i.e. where no other party with a right to appeal has challenged the

decision (before the national-level appeal body) and, therefore, the decision became legally “final” within the national anti-doping organization’s process.

3. A player may be submitted to two different sets of rules, i.e. the FIFA ADR to which he submitted by entering into a license agreement with the interested national federation and a national law. Both sets of rules are not identical. The mere fact, however, that both sets of rules to which the player is submitted are not identical has no impact on the CAS jurisdiction. On the contrary, it suffices that the arbitration agreement is found in either one of the applicable sets of rules in order to establish the jurisdiction of the CAS 2018/A/5853 2

FIFA v. TNDA & Damián Marcelo Musto, award of 2 July 2019 CAS. This is all the more true considering that the FIFA ADR make it clear that they want to be applicable to all players irrespective of any concurrent set of rules.

4. According to Article R55 para. 5 of the CAS Code, it is at the discretion of the panel (“may rule”) whether to render a preliminary decision on its jurisdiction or to rule on its jurisdiction in the final award. When applying such discretion the panel – in principle – takes account of the reasoning submitted by the party requesting a preliminary decision, in particular why a preliminary decision is necessary to safeguard its interests and to prevent it from possible harm or why a decision on jurisdiction, for some other reasons, is urgent. Absent any compelling reason and/or urgent necessity for a preliminary decision, a preliminary award on jurisdiction should not be rendered.

5. The fact that a player was only provided with the Laboratory Documentation Package (“LDP”) at a late stage in the proceeding does not affect the case in an irreparable manner. The LDP is – for sure – an important source of information. The documents help to understand whether or not there have been deviations from the applicable International Standards. But the latter is a legal analysis that can be performed also at

a later stage, i.e. before the appellate instance. Thus, the fact that the player was only provided with the LDP before CAS does not amount to a breach of a party’s procedural rights.

6. The breadth of sanction for a negligent anti-doping rule violation under Article 22 para. 1 lit. a FIFA ADR is from a reprimand to 24 months ineligibility, depending on the player’s degree of fault. In exercising discretion to determine the appropriate sanction within this range, a difference is made between “normal degree of fault” ranging between 12-24 months and a “light degree of fault” ranging between a reprimand and 12 months. In order to determine into which category of fault a particular case might fall, it is helpful to consider both the objective and the subjective level of fault. The objective element describes what standard of care could have been expected from a reasonable person in the athlete’s situation. The subjective element describes what could have been expected from that particular athlete, in light of his/her personal capacities.

7. If there were delays in the context of the analysis of a player’s sample and, in particular, in the procedure before the anti-doping authority, if these delays were substantial and if they cannot be attributed to the player, there is room to backdate the player’s sanction at the discretion of the deciding body, pursuant to Article 28 para. 1 FIFA ADR.

However, one must note that backdating a period of ineligibility in team sports effectively amounts to waiving part of the sanction, since – differently from individual sports – “competitive results achieved during the period of ineligibility” can – in principle – not be disqualified (the exception being when multiple players test positive at the same time). Thus, restraint must be shown when backdating the period of ineligibility in order not to undermine the FIFA ADR. The fact that the player was adversely affected by the sanction, because he could not participate in the team preparations for one season, should be taken into account.

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I. PARTIES

1. The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (hereinafter “FIFA” or the “Appellant”) is the world governing body of football, headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland.

2. The Tribunal Nacional Disciplinario Antidopaje (hereinafter “TNDA” or “First Respondent”) is the adjudicating body of first instance for anti-doping rule violations (hereinafter “ADRV”) in Argentina with its own legal identity.

3. Mr Damián Marcelo Musto (hereinafter the “Player” or “Second Respondent”) is an Argentinean professional football player who currently plays for the Spanish football club SD Huesca in the Spanish first division. He was transferred on loan to SD Huesca on 26 July 2018 from the Mexican football Club Tijuana. Before being transferred to the Club Tijuana on 12

July 2017 he played for the Argentinian football club CA Rosario in the first Argentinian football division.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

4. The dispute in these proceedings revolves around the decision rendered by the TNDA on 19

June 2018 (hereinafter “the Decision”). The TNDA imposed a period of ineligibility of 7 months on the Player for an ADRV. The sanction ran from 16 January 2018 until 15 August 2018.

5. Below is a brief summary of the main facts and allegations based on the Parties’ written submissions, the CAS file and the content of the hearing that took place in Lausanne, Switzerland on 05 April 2019. Additional facts and allegations found in the Parties’ submissions and evidence may be set out, where relevant, in other parts of this award.

6. On 20 June 2017, the Player submitted to an in-competition doping control organized by the

Argentinian National Anti-Doping Organization (hereinafter the “NADO”).

7. The Player’s samples were originally sent to the laboratory in Paris, France. Once the latter’s accreditation had been suspended by the World Anti-Doping Agency (hereinafter “WADA”), the Player’s samples were forwarded to the WADA-accredited laboratory in Madrid. The analysis of the A-sample in the Madrid laboratory revealed the presence of two prohibited substances, namely “Hydrochlorothiazide” and “Furosemide”. The analysis of the B-sample confirmed the result of the A-sample analysis. 8. “Hydrochlorothiazide” and “Furosemide” are both listed in the WADA’s 2017 Prohibited List under class S5, “Diuretics and Masking Agents”. The substances are prohibited at all times (i.e. inand out-of-competition).

9. In January 2018, the Player was notified by the NADO of the Adverse Analytical Finding

(hereinafter the “AAF”). Later, the NADO also informed the Player about the estimated concentrations of the prohibited substances found in his samples: Hydrochlorothiazide: CAS 2018/A/5853 4 FIFA v. TNDA & Damián Marcelo Musto, award of 2 July 2019 15ng/ml (A-sample) and 11ng/ml (B-sample), Furosemide: 22ng/ml (A-sample) and 24ng/ml (B-sample).

III. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TNDA

10. Based on the AAF, formal proceedings were initiated against the Player before the TNDA. No provisional suspension was imposed on the Player.

11. On 24 May 2018, a hearing was held before the TNDA.

12. On 19 June 2018, the TNDA issued the Decision that – inter alia – reads (in the English translation) as follows: “1) A suspension (disqualification) from playing in competitions is hereby ordered for a period of 7 (seven) months

for the [Player], counting from 16 January 2018, in accordance with the explanation set forth in Recital VII, which means that the suspension period ordered herein will end on 15 August 2018. 2) Let the National Anti-Doping Commission be notified of this ruling and requested to make the relevant notifications to the [Player], the appropriate national and international associations and the [WADA]”.

13. The Decision was notified to the Player on 21 June 2018.

IV. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT

14. On 7 August 2018, FIFA filed its appeal before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (hereinafter the “CAS”) against the Decision and submitted its Statement of Appeal according to Article R48 of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration (hereinafter the “Code”). The appeal is directed against the TNDA and the Player as Respondents.

15. On 24 August 2018, the First Respondent advised the CAS Court Office, that it will not take part in this procedure and that it will ratify any award issued by the CAS in this matter.

16. On 7 September 2018, the Appellant filed its Appeal Brief.

17. On 19 September 2018, the CAS Court Office noted that the Respondents failed to jointly nominate an arbitrator within the set time limit. It further advised the Parties that, in consequence thereof and according to Article R53 of the Code, it would be for the President of the CAS Appeals Arbitration Division, or her Deputy, to nominate an arbitrator in lieu of the

Respondents.

18. On 1 October 2018, the CAS Court Office advised the Parties that the arbitrator designated in lieu of the Respondents had declined to serve as arbitrator in the present matter and invited the Respondents to jointly nominate a new arbitrator within 10 days from receipt of this letter.

19. On 4 October 2018, the Second Respondent nominated a new arbitrator.

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20. On the same date, the Appellant objected to the letter of the CAS Court Office dated 1 October

2018. It submitted that Respondents’ right to nominate an arbitrator had elapsed, that no new deadline could be set by the CAS Court Office and that it was solely for the President of the CAS Appeals Arbitration Division to nominate an arbitrator in lieu of the Respondents.

21. By letter of 5 October 2018, the CAS Court Office acknowledged receipt of the letters by the Appellant and the Second Respondent. It confirmed that pursuant to Article R53 of the Code it was for the President of the CAS Appeals Arbitration Division, or her Deputy, to nominate an arbitrator in lieu of the Respondents.

22. By letter of 1 November 2018, the CAS Court Office advised the Parties that the Panel appointed to decide the present case was constituted as follows: President: Mr Ulrich Haas, Professor in Zurich, Switzerland Arbitrators: Mr Massimo Coccia, Professor and attorney-at-law in Rome, Italy Mr Carlos Del Campo Colás, Secretary General of Liga Nacional de Fútbol

Profesional in Madrid, Spain

23. On 5 November 2018, the Second Respondent filed its Answer, raising an objection to the jurisdiction of the CAS and requesting that this issue be decided as a threshold matter.

24. The First Respondent failed to file its Answer.

25. On 7 November 2018, the CAS Court Office advised the parties that Mr Oliver Vogel, attorneyat-law in Wiesbaden, Germany, had been appointed as ad hoc clerk in these proceedings.

26. By letter of 8 November 2018, the CAS Court Office noted that the Second Respondent – inter alia – had raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the CAS and granted the Appellant and the

First Respondent a time limit of 10 days to file a supplement strictly limited to the Second Respondent’s objection to the jurisdiction of the CAS.

27. On 19 November 2018, the Appellant filed its comments.

28. With letter dated 19 November 2018, the CAS Court Office noted that the First Respondent had failed to file its comments on this issue of jurisdiction within the prescribed time limit.

29. With letter of 21 November 2018, the Parties were invited to inform the CAS Court Office by 28 November 2018 whether they preferred a hearing to be held in this matter or for the Panel to issue an award based solely on the Parties’ written submissions.

30. With letter of 27 November 2018, the Second Respondent informed the CAS Court Office of its preference to hold a hearing.

31. On 28 November 2018, the Appellant sent a letter requesting that a hearing be held.

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32. By letter of 17 January 2019, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that the Panel had decided not to bifurcate this case but to hear the issue of jurisdiction along with the merits of the case. It further informed the Parties that the Panel had also decided to hold a hearing in this matter.

33. On 29 January 2019, the CAS Court Office advised the Parties that the Panel had decided to dismiss the Second Respondent’s request (contained in his) Answer according to which “the Panel shall request the NADO all documents related to the present procedure from the beginning, including the requests made by Musto of the documentation package”. Furthermore, the Parties were advised that it was up to them to adduce and present the evidence they deem necessary to make their case and that it was – in principle – not for the Panel to investigate the matter ex officio. Finally, the Second Respondent was invited to file witness statements with the CAS Court Office for Mr Agustin

Fattal Jaef (in-house lawyer of CA Rosario), Mr Julio Pigliacampo (the agent of the Player) and Mrs Sabrina Goddard (nutritionist).

34. By letter dated 4 February 2019, the Second Respondent requested the Panel to reconsider its decision of 29 January 2019 whereby it dismissed the request for the production of additional documents.

35. On 6 February 2019, the CAS Court Office invited the Parties to comment on the Second Respondent’s letter of 4 February 2019.

36. With letter dated 7 February 2019, the CAS Court Office advised the Parties that the hearing in the present case would be held on 05 April 2019 at the CAS Court Office, Lausanne,

Switzerland.

37. With letter of 11 February 2019, the Appellant informed the CAS that FIFA and the Second Respondent had agreed on the following: i. that FIFA request the Laboratory Documentation Package (“LDP”) from the Madrid laboratory; ii. that following the receipt of the LDP: a. the Second Respondent would have 7 days to submit comments regarding the LDP; and b. the Appellant would have 7 days to reply to the Second Respondent’s comments.

The Second Respondent also confirmed that, in view of the above, his request of 4 February 2019 was to be deemed withdrawn.

38. By letter of 12 February 2019, the CAS Court Office acknowledged receipt of the letter dated 11 February 2019 and approved its contents. The letter further advised that it was the Panel’s understanding that the Appellant and the Second Respondent would request/procure the LDP themselves. The Parties were invited to confirm that the Panel’s understanding was correct within 3 days as from the receipt of this letter. Furthermore, the Parties were informed that the CAS 2018/A/5853 7

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award of 2 July 2019 Panel considered the Second Respondent’s request made in his letter of 4 February 2019 to be moot.

39. On 13 February 2019, the Appellant confirmed that the Panel’s understanding of the Parties’ agreement was correct and that the LDP had already been requested in the meantime.

40. On 18 February 2019, the Second Respondent filed the witness statements for Mrs Sabrina Goddard and Mr Agustin Fattal Jaef, but not for Mr Julio Pigliacampo.

41. By email of 8 March 2019, FIFA forwarded the LDP to the CAS Court Office and to the Second

Respondent.

42. With letter dated 08 March 2019, the CAS Court Office acknowledged receipt of the LDP and granted the Second Respondent a deadline of 7 days to file his comments strictly limited to the

LDP.

43. On 14 March 2019, the Second Respondent filed his comments on the LDP.

44. By letter of 14 March 2019, the CAS Court Office invited the Appellant and the First Respondent to submit their replies to the Second Respondent’s comments within 7 days.

45. With email of 21 March 2019, the Appellant provided the CAS Court Office with its comments on the Second Respondent’s submissions regarding the LDP.

46. The First Respondent did not file any comments on the Second Respondent’s submissions regarding the LDP.

47. By letter of 22 March 2019, the CAS Court Office granted the Respondents a time limit of 5 days to comment on the new documents annexed to the Appellant’s submissions.

48. On 28 March 2019, the CAS Court Office noted that the Respondents had failed to file comments on the new documents annexed to the Appellant’s submissions.

49. Still on 28 March 2019, the CAS Court Office invited the Parties to sign and return the Order

of Procedure (“OoP”) by 2 April 2019.

50. By email of 30 March 2019, the First Respondent informed the CAS Court Office that the address to which all the correspondence had been sent so far would no longer be valid as of 1

April 2019.

51. By letter of 1 April 2019, the Second Respondent requested that the OoP be amended.

52. With letter of 2 April 2019, the CAS Court Office advised the First Respondent that it was up to the party of the proceedings to inform the CAS Court Office of any change of address.

Furthermore, the CAS Court Office acknowledged the objections raised by the Second Respondent to the OoP and invited him to record these objections in the OoP and to return a signed copy thereof by 3 April 2019.

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53. On 2 April 2019, the Appellant returned a signed copy of the OoP.

54. On 5 April 2019, the Second Respondent returned a signed copy of the OoP including his objections.

55. The First Respondent did not return the OoP singed.

56. On 5 April 2019, a hearing was held at the CAS Court Office in Lausanne, Switzerland.

57. Besides the members of the Panel, Mr Daniele Boccucci (Counsel to the CAS) and Mr Oliver Vogel (Ad hoc Clerk), the following persons attended the hearing:

1. For the Appellant:

a. Dr Volker Hesse, legal counsel b. Mr Jaime Cambreleng, Head of Litigation c. Ms Audrey Cech, legal counsel, litigation department

1. For the Second Respondent:

a. Mr Gustavo Casasola, legal counsel b. Mr Ariel Reck, legal counsel

58. The Panel heard evidence from the following persons: a) On behalf of the Appellant: Prof Martial Saugy, expert (in person)

b) On behalf of the Second Respondent: a. Mr Damián Marcelo Musto (by video-conference) b. Mr Agustin Fattal Jaef, lawyer of CA Rosario (by telephone-conference)

59. At the hearing, the Second Respondent waived the witness testimonies of Mrs Sabrina Goddard

and Mr Julio Pigliacampo.

60. At the closing of the hearing, the Parties expressly stated that they did not have any objections with regard to the procedure. The Parties further confirmed that they were afforded ample opportunity to present their case, submit their arguments and answer the questions posed by the Panel and that their right to be heard had been respected.

V. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

61. The following is a summary of the Parties’ submissions and does not purport to be comprehensive. However, the Panel has thoroughly considered all the evidence and arguments submitted by the Parties, even if no specific or detailed reference has been made thereto in the following outline of their positions and in the ensuing discussion of the merits.

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A. The Appellant

62. The Appellant – in essence – is of the view that the Decision must be set aside and the Player must be sanctioned with a 2-year period of ineligibility starting on the date on which this award is communicated. In support of this request, the Appellant submits that:

63. The CAS has jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

(a) This ensues from Article R47 of the Code in conjunction with Articles 57 and 58 para. 5 of the FIFA Statutes. In addition, the jurisdiction of the CAS is also based on Articles 80 para. 3 and 75 para. 1 of the FIFA Anti-Doping Regulations (hereinafter the “FIFA

ADR”). (b) The Player is an international-level player within the meaning of the FIFA ADR. He is a professional football player who participated in various competitions of the Confederation of North, Central America and Caribbean Association Football (hereinafter the “CONCACAF”) and the Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol (hereinafter the “CONMEBOL”). (c) Notwithstanding the above, the jurisdiction of the CAS also follows from Articles 81 and 75 para. 3 FIFA ADR. According thereto, FIFA has a right of appeal against decisions (within the meaning of Article 75 para. 2 FIFA ADR) that involve national-level players. Consequently, it is irrelevant for the question of CAS jurisdiction whether the Player is an international-level player or not. Furthermore, the FIFA ADR provide a right to appeal of FIFA directly to the CAS, i.e. without having to exhaust internal remedies of the national adjudicating bodies. (d) The aforesaid is backed by CAS jurisprudence, e.g. CAS 2015/A/4215, where the panel stated under para. 125 as follows: “It is apparent from the above FIFA ADR provisions that: a) FIFA may appeal a final anti-doping rule violation decision involving an International Level Player rendered at association level (in casu the KFA) to the CAS (Article 75.1 of the FIFA ADR). b) In anti-doping rule violation matters involving non International-Level Players, FIFA has the right to appeal to the relevant National Anti-Doping Organisation, in this case the KADA as confirmed by the Player (Article 75.3 of the FIFA ADR); and c) FIFA has an option of filing a direct appeal to the CAS against any anti-doping rule violation decision rendered at national level without necessarily having to first exhaust the remedies available at the relevant National Anti-Doping organization (emphasis added), - in casu the KADA - if no other party has appealed the said decision (Article 81 of the FIFA ADR)”.

(e) This adjudicatory system is not only in line with the prerequisites of the World AntiDoping Code (“WADC”), but also with the Argentinian anti-doping law. The latter recognizes – inter alia – the jurisdiction of the CAS. The provisions of the Argentinian anti-doping law confirm FIFA’s right to appeal any decisions directly to the CAS.

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FIFA v. TNDA & Damián Marcelo Musto, award of 2 July 2019 (f) The Appellant, additionally, submits that: - The Player is not disputing CAS’ jurisdiction ratione personae but only ratione materiae. However, CAS has also jurisdiction ratione materiae with regard to the Decision. - The Player is a professional player with an impressive career. At the time of sample collection (20 June 2017) he was registered with the AFA. On 12 July 2017, he was transferred to the Club Tijuana and, consequently, registered with the Mexican Football Federation. On 26 July 2018, he was transferred again to the Spanish club SD Huesca and, thus, registered with the Spanish Football Federation. All these federations are members of FIFA and all players affiliated to these federations are bound by virtue of indirect membership to the FIFA Regulations. Consequently, the Player is submitted to the FIFA ADR. This also follows from Article 1.1 FIFA ADR according to which these regulations apply to players by virtue of their agreement, membership, affiliation, authorization, accreditation or participation. Thus, the FIFA Regulations including the FIFA ADR are applicable to the present case (and not Argentinian law). - It is not a mandatory prerequisite for the jurisdiction of CAS that FIFA exhaust the internal remedies. According to Articles 81 and 75 paras. 1, 2 and 3 FIFA ADR (and in conformity with the relevant CAS jurisprudence, e.g. CAS 2015/A/4215) FIFA may opt to appeal directly to the CAS against a first-instance decision

involving a football player “without having to exhaust other remedies in the Anti-Doping Organization process” (Article 81 FIFA ADR) if no other party has appealed the decision. In the case at hand no other party appealed the Decision within the Argentinian adjudicatory system. - Article 81 FIFA ADR applies to both, national and international-level-players. The provision refers to “remedies in the Anti-Doping Organisation’s process”. This wording not only covers decisions rendered by national football federations, but also decisions rendered by a national anti-doping organization. - The CAS awards referred to by the Player (CAS 2017/A/5316 and CAS 2016/A/4563) are not relevant in the present case. In both proceedings neither the jurisdiction of the CAS nor the status of the football player involved was in dispute. - The CAS award referred to by the Player (CAS 2008/A/1588) is not pertinent, because it is based on regulations no longer in force (FIFA Doping Control Regulations 2008, FIFA Disciplinary Code 2008). - Even if Argentinian anti-doping law was applicable in this case (instead of the FIFA ADR) – quod non – the CAS would have jurisdiction, because the contents of the Argentinian anti-doping law is identical to the FIFA ADR. Similarly to Article 81 FIFA ADR, “Ley 27434 modificatoria de la Ley 26912” (Article 34 para. 2 amending Article 86 of the Ley 26912) acknowledges FIFA’s right as an “International Sports Federation” to appeal “directly to the Court of Arbitration for Sport without having to exhaust other remedies”. The provision does not differentiate between national-level and international-level players. - The argument of the Player that Article 86 of the Argentinian anti-doping law only applies to decisions of the second instance (and not the TNDA) must be rejected. Such understanding would – according to FIFA – not make any sense, since the

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FIFA v. TNDA & Damián Marcelo Musto, award of 2 July 2019 second instance is the final (national) instance and, thus, all internal means of recourse would have been exhausted with no national instance left to be bypassed based on Article 86 of the Argentinian anti-doping law. - The jurisdiction of the CAS does not depend on whether the Player is qualified as an international-level or a national-level player. This follows from Articles 81 and 75 para. 3 FIFA ADR, since the latter provision refers to both type of players. - Irrespective of the above, the Player is an international-level player within the meaning of the WADC. The WADC reserves the right to define an internationallevel athlete to the relevant international federation. However, the intention of the WADC is clear in that the term international-level athlete should cover “athletes who compete in sport at international level”. The Player clearly fulfills this definition, since he played in the top leagues of various countries (Uruguay, Argentina, Mexico and Spain) and participated in various international competitions of two different confederations (CONMEBOL and CONCACAF). - The Player also complies with the definition of an international-level player in the FIFA ADR. He played eleven (11) international matches for the club CA Rosario before submitting to the doping control on 20 June 2017. He remained an international-level player also thereafter having played four (4) international matches for the Club Tijuana from February to March 2018. According to CAS jurisprudence (CAS 2015/A/4215, para. 130) a player must be qualified as an international-level player “by virtue of his eligibility” for past and even future international matches without even necessarily having been fielded. The fact that only 5% of the matches played by the Second Respondent were “international” is of no avail, since the definition in the FIFA ADR does not refer to a specific

minimum quota or percentage of international matches played. - Even if Argentinian anti-doping law was applicable – quod non – the result, once again, would remain unchanged, because “Ley 27434 modificatoria de la Ley 26912” (Article 34 para. 2 amending Article 86 of the Ley 26912), with respect to FIFA’s right to appeal to the CAS does not differentiate between national-level and international-level players.

64. The Appell