OIM - Migration Policy Practice (Volume XIV, Number 3, September 2025)

Short articles to better connect migration research, policy and practice worldwide

MIGRATION

POLICY

PRACTICE

ISSN 2223‑5248 Vol. XIV, Number 3, September 2025 2 Introduction: A note of gratitude and reflection – the final issue of Migration Policy Practice Marie McAuliffe, Richa Arora and Jenna Nassiri 4 Building solutions for the world’s 83 million internally displaced persons: Recent lessons on how Robert Piper 14 The economic integration of migrants and the importance of the policy context in different European countries Neli Demireva and Wouter Zwysen 20 Living at work: Ensuring decent migrant worker housing in Malaysia Katharine Jones, Anita Ghimire and Yvonne Khor 26 From money to goods: Rethinking remittances as grassroots humanitarian praxis in Zimbabwe borderland communities Lameck Kachena 34 Gender dynamics in international student mobility: The case of the United Kingdom Ruth Neville and Athina Anastasiadou 44 Recent immigration flows in Albania: Trends, challenges and policy solutions Armela Xhaho, Gledis Nano and Eda Gemi 50 Leveraging transnational remote work for inclusive sustainable development Hari KCVol. XIV, Number 3, September 2025

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2 As1 we present this final issue of Migration Policy Practice , we do so with a deep sense of appreciation and pride. Since its inception, Migration Policy Practice has sought to bridge the worlds of migration research, policy and practice, showcasing evidence‑based insights that inform policy, programmatic, and operational decision‑making, and support migrants around the world. Over the years, Migration Policy Practice has featured contributions from scholars and practitioners heralding from all continents, covering pressing migration and displacement issues, such as climate‑induced displacement, irregular migration, social cohesion and migrant inclusion as well as the ethical use of artificial intelligence in migration systems. Through its contributions to evidence‑based analysis, Migration Policy Practice has served as an open‑source platform for timely, policy‑relevant

issues, such as climate‑induced displacement, irregular migration, social cohesion and migrant inclusion as well as the ethical use of artificial intelligence in migration systems. Through its contributions to evidence‑based analysis, Migration Policy Practice has served as an open‑source platform for timely, policy‑relevant research – substantive contributions from around the world that we believe are more critical than ever in a world marked by rapid transformations, including the rise of mis‑ and disinformation across a wide range of policy domains, including migration. Whether responding to geopolitical crises, public health emergencies or technological transformations, migration policy needs to be grounded in empirical evidence and robust analysis. Solid evidence‑based policy development and revision 1 Marie McAuliffe, IOM; Richa Arora, GiZ; and Jenna Nassiri, IOM and York University. Introduction A note of gratitude and reflection – the final issue of Migration Policy Practice Marie McAuliffe, Richa Arora and Jenna Nassiri1 are not just ideals – they are imperatives for creating systems that are effective, equitable and responsive to human needs. We have enjoyed the collaborative spirit that authors, peer reviewers and editorial advisory committee members have brought to Migration Policy Practice , which has made it stronger and more relevant to our global audience. It has been a privilege to engage with so many talented authors, researchers and policy specialists committed to advancing thoughtful, rights‑based migration governance. Our production team in the IOM Publications Unit, led by Valerie Hagger, has been a pleasure to work with in delivering Migration Policy Practice over many years. We are also grateful to our peer reviewers and the Editorial Advisory Committee, who have played an essential role in maintaining the quality and integrity of the work published. Their time, expertise and generosity have ensured that Migration Policy Practice has remained a valued resource for the global migration community. This final issue brings together timely research on a range of pressing migration topics. Articles explore solutions to internal displacement

integrity of the work published. Their time, expertise and generosity have ensured that Migration Policy Practice has remained a valued resource for the global migration community. This final issue brings together timely research on a range of pressing migration topics. Articles explore solutions to internal displacement (Piper), the economic integration of migrants across different European policy contexts (Demireva and Zwysen), housing conditions for migrant workers in Malaysia (Jones, Ghimire and Khor) and the role of remittances in disaster response within Zimbabwean communities (Kachena). Other contributions examine gender dynamics in international student mobility to3 Vol. XIV, Number 3, September 2025 MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE the United Kingdom (Neville and Anastasiadou), emerging trends and policy solutions for vulnerable asylum‑seekers in Albania (Xhaho, Nano and Gemi), and the potential of transnational remote work to support inclusive and sustainable development (KC). On behalf of the editorial team, thank you for being part of this journey. We hope that the work shared through Migration Policy Practice will continue to inspire and inform migration research and policy long into the future. Marie, Richa and Jenna Peer reviewers 2024–2025 • Ana Beduschi , University of Exeter

• Jacqueline Bhabha , Harvard University
• Tomas Ernst, International Organization for Migration
• Meltem Ersan , Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality
• Andrew Geddes , European University Institute
• Eleonore Kofman , Middlesex University
• Nnamdi Ifeanyi Maduekwe , National Population

Commission of Nigeria

• Linda Oucho , African Migration and Development Policy

Centre • Jackie Owigo , East Africa Research and Innovation Hub • S. Irudaya Rajan , International Institute of Migration and Development • Michel Rouleau‑Dick , Åbo Akademi UniversityVol. XIV, Number 3, September 2025

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4 Introduction 1 As resources are slashed across the United

• S. Irudaya Rajan , International Institute of Migration and Development • Michel Rouleau‑Dick , Åbo Akademi UniversityVol. XIV, Number 3, September 2025

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4 Introduction 1 As resources are slashed across the United Nations and wider aid system, there has perhaps never been as high a premium on finding lasting solutions for people caught in protracted crises. Emergency aid – humanitarian assistance – needs to be protected for short‑term interventions that alleviate extreme suffering and vulnerability. Affected individuals and communities need to be supported to return quickly towards greater self‑reliance, under the active engagement and leadership of their own governments. This implies the right kind of funding and policy support designed to reinforce government leadership and systems. The case for a quicker pivot towards such a “solutions approach” is especially compelling for the world’s internally displaced persons (IDPs), who are among the world’s most vulnerable people and need a more effective response from local and international actors alike. IDPs are persons forced from their homes by factors outside their control and seek safety still within their own country, unlike refugees who have crossed a border. This phenomenon has increased dramatically over recent years – from around 24 million in 1992, when the then 1 Robert Piper is formerly the Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary‑General on Solutions to Internal Displacement (2022–2024). The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations or any other organizations with which the author is affiliated. Comments and feedback provided by Prof. Walter Käelin, Mona Folkesson, William Chemaly and Marie McAuliffe are also gratefully acknowledged. Any errors or omissions remain the author’s nevertheless. Building solutions for the world’s 83 million internally displaced persons: Recent lessons on how Robert Piper1 United  Nations Secretary‑General appointed a first Representative on Internally Displaced

are also gratefully acknowledged. Any errors or omissions remain the author’s nevertheless. Building solutions for the world’s 83 million internally displaced persons: Recent lessons on how Robert Piper1 United  Nations Secretary‑General appointed a first Representative on Internally Displaced Persons,2 to over 83 million today.3 The causes of internal displacement are multiple. Conflict and sudden‑onset disasters triggered by natural hazards are the primary drivers, but criminal violence and slow‑onset disaster events like natural resource depletion, sea‑level rise and desertification can also play a part. Adding to this pattern of growth is the increasingly protracted nature of displacement. Hence, while the number of new displacements each year is increasing, the fact that more and more existing IDPs are also not finding solutions adds to this pattern of growth. Conflict and disaster‑driven displacements unfold differently. While these patterns may be changing as climate and conflict increasingly intersect, generally speaking most disaster displacement tends to be relatively short‑term (i.e. measured in months), as compared to most conflict displacement, which is more likely to become protracted (i.e. measured in years). Estimated international humanitarian spending on internal displacement has been around 2 According to an independent review of the Inter‑Agency Standing Committee (IASC) response to internal displacement (p. 9), there were 24 million IDPs in 1992. See Lewis Sida, Erin Mooney, Oliver Lough, Leen Fouad, Kevin Kennedy, Tina Nelis, Abeer Hashem Al‑Absi, Janvier Koko Kirusha, Fekadu Adugna Tufa, Raul Chambote, Mustapha Alhassan and Neem Institute, and Francesca Randazzo Eisemann, Independent Review of the IASC Response to Internal Displacement (London, ODI, 2024). 3 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Global Report on Internal Displacement 2025 (Geneva, IDMC, 2025).5

Neem Institute, and Francesca Randazzo Eisemann, Independent Review of the IASC Response to Internal Displacement (London, ODI, 2024). 3 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Global Report on Internal Displacement 2025 (Geneva, IDMC, 2025).5 Vol. XIV, Number 3, September 2025 MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE USD 5 billion annually over recent years. 4 This number is conservative and does not include assistance to host communities to mitigate the impact of IDP arrivals. It also does not include spending by governments of affected countries.5 These escalating numbers – of affected persons, impact, costs and spending – moved 57 Member States to approach the United Nations Secretary‑General in 2019 to encourage him to commission a special panel to look into the issue. An eight‑person High ‑Level Panel on Internal Displacement looked at the issue afresh in 2020–2021 and made a set of recommendations on how the approach generally to internal displacement needed to change to keep up with what was clearly a growing and morphing challenge.6 The United Nations itself integrated most of the independent Panel’s recommendations into its own Action Agenda on Internal Displacement, 7 which it launched in mid‑2022. The Action Agenda contained 33 commitments by 20+ United Nations agencies across three axes of action – prevention of new displacement, responding to displacement and solutions to protracted displacement. 4 This rough estimate was calculated by my Office, the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Solutions to Internal Displacement (OSA), and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) based on extrapolations from humanitarian response plans’ spending and IDP targeting over the past five years. 5 A new IDP “tag” was introduced by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development in its financial tracking system in 2023, which will hopefully

(OCHA) based on extrapolations from humanitarian response plans’ spending and IDP targeting over the past five years. 5 A new IDP “tag” was introduced by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development in its financial tracking system in 2023, which will hopefully greatly help gather more robust data on internal displacement spending in the coming years, as it becomes more systematically applied by donors to their data sets. 6 United Nations Secretary‑General’s High‑Level Panel on Internal Displacement, Shining a Light on Internal Displacement: An Agenda for the Future (New York, United Nations, 2021). 7 OSA, The United Nations Secretary‑General’s Action Agenda on Internal Displacement: Follow‑Up to the Report of the UN Secretary‑General’s High‑Level Panel on Internal Displacement (New York, United Nations, June 2022). For an overview of implementation of the Action Agenda at two and a half years, see OSA, The UN Secretary‑General’s Action Agenda on Internal Displacement: Progress during the mandate of the Special Adviser on Solutions to Internal Displacement 2022–2024 (n.p., OSA, 2024). I was asked by the Secretary‑General to lead a small, temporary, inter‑agency team to catalyse action around these multiple commitments and engagements to ensure the momentum was not lost. Our office, the Office of the Special Adviser on Solutions to Internal Displacement (OSA), closed at the end of 2024 as planned – it was intended to be a catalyst not a permanent new entity. This article contains some reflections at the end of the mandate about the nature of internal displacement and some of the key lessons we learned over those 30 months. Reflecting the mandate, the focus here is on the solutions dimension of the task – that is, how to break this worrying pattern of protracted displacement.8 A historically overlooked group The issue of internal displacement has been, historically, chronically overlooked. The

learned over those 30 months. Reflecting the mandate, the focus here is on the solutions dimension of the task – that is, how to break this worrying pattern of protracted displacement.8 A historically overlooked group The issue of internal displacement has been, historically, chronically overlooked. The High‑Level Panel’s final report – “Shining the Light on Internal Displacement” – underlined this reality. Refugees are a substantially smaller number than IDPs among the world’s overall “forcibly displaced” persons (less than half of the number of IDPs today) yet are widely acknowledged internationally and much more visible politically and to the general public. Migrants are not technically “ forcibly displaced”, but as another 8 A number of observers have published assessments of the work of the Office. See for example: Steven Goldfinch, “ The UN Office on Internal Displacement closed: Now what?” Center For Global Development (CGD) Note 386 (CGD, January 2025); Caitlin Sturridge, Kerrie Holloway and Sarah Miller, “ What next for internal displacement? Four priority actions for 2025”, Expert comment (ODI, January 2025); Nadine Knapp and Anne Koch, “ The legacy of the UN Special Adviser on Solutions to Internal Displacement: How to maintain political momentum after the mandate expires”, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP), SWP Comment No. 51 (Berlin, SWP, November 2024).6 Vol. XIV, Number 3, September 2025 MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE key category of people on the move, they also typically receive much more attention, internationally, than IDPs. Why this relative obscurity? The sheer breadth of IDP situations may be part of the explanation. Short term, long term, conflict or disaster displacement can present very different scenarios, once we get beyond the initial physical event of the displacement itself. Data constraints also contribute to the visibility

Why this relative obscurity? The sheer breadth of IDP situations may be part of the explanation. Short term, long term, conflict or disaster displacement can present very different scenarios, once we get beyond the initial physical event of the displacement itself. Data constraints also contribute to the visibility challenge to some extent. Overall, tracking of numbers and profiling of specific populations has gotten better and better over recent years, thanks to organizations like IOM, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the Joint IDP Profiling Service and REACH. But important data gaps exist that are key to build a clear narrative around internal displacement. Government sensitivities around internal displacement surely also play a part in the relatively low visibility of this issue. Countries deliberately displacing people in their own countries (Myanmar for example) are, needless to say, not going to promote this issue internationally. Even where displacement might be arguably the unintended consequence of government counter‑insurgency measures, here too governments are often reluctant to engage internationally. The absence of a dedicated intergovernmental institutional home and legal anchor for IDPs may be a symptom or a cause of the relative lack of attention to internal displacement. Refugees and migrants have their “own” dedicated agency as it were, focused on their plight. Both have international legal frameworks that dictate their rights and the obligations of signatories to them. Both have their own “Global Compact”, which provides not only a set of undertakings by signatories but also a regular intergovernmental space to discuss their situations and needs. IDPs have none of this – no agency, no global convention, no dedicated forum. The issue belongs to everyone and no one at the same time. On the other hand, a dedicated agency for internal displacement arguably makes little sense and is not an idea seriously promoted by anyone. The 1998 United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement9 recognized by the United Nations General Assembly as “an important international framework for the protection of

On the other hand, a dedicated agency for internal displacement arguably makes little sense and is not an idea seriously promoted by anyone. The 1998 United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement9 recognized by the United Nations General Assembly as “an important international framework for the protection of internally displaced persons” 10 and subsequently reflected in the regional 2009 Kampala Convention11 also go much of the way towards a convention equivalence.12 The absence of some kind of international forum to focus on this issue remains an obvious gap in our international architecture however. A recent surge in attention brings renewed attention around protracted displacement in particular While the issue of internal displacement has been historically overlooked, action over recent years has arguably started to reverse this trend. 9 United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Representative of the Secretary‑General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/39: Addendum – Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (E/C.N.4/1998/53/Add.2 of 11 February 1998). 10 United Nations General Assembly resolution 60/1 on the 2005 World Summit Outcome (24 October 2005), para. 132. 11 African Union, African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) (23 October 2009). 12 See Walter Kälin, Internal Displacement and the Law (Oxford, United Kingdom, Oxford University Press, 2023).7 Vol. XIV, Number 3, September 2025 MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE The High‑Level Panel on Internal Displacement submitted its report in September 2021. The Panel focused especially on the increasingly protracted nature of displacement. Internally displaced persons may seek to return to their place of origin, but they may also opt to integrate permanently in their place of displacement or another location in the country. Beyond

submitted its report in September 2021. The Panel focused especially on the increasingly protracted nature of displacement. Internally displaced persons may seek to return to their place of origin, but they may also opt to integrate permanently in their place of displacement or another location in the country. Beyond physical location, “resolution” of displacement implies restoring safety and security, often as compensation for lost assets and some recourse to justice. The process of reversing the impact of years of displacement is more often than not complex, both politically and structurally. These observations lead the Panel to its core recommendation – that governments in affected countries, above all, needed to take greater responsibility to find solutions for their own internally displaced citizens. 13 No one can substitute for that government leadership. No one else can make undertakings on behalf of a State. No one else can make the difficult political calls around issues like compensation. No one else can mobilize the longer‑term policy and financing engagements necessary to address structural drivers of displacement. No one else can convene the multisectoral response required for such a complex undertaking. At the same time, the High‑Level Panel reserved some of its criticism for the international community, returning as it does to internal displacement situations with a short‑term humanitarian took‑kit year after year, often working through third parties on stand‑alone projects rather than hand‑in‑hand with governments and, more often than not, tackling symptoms rather than causes. 13 See UN Secretary‑General’s High‑Level Panel on Internal Displacement. Government at the centre? “It’s complicated.” This notion of pivoting to a government‑led, development‑financed solutions approach poses a number of challenges. Below are just some of the most notable. First, as noted earlier, in some contexts, governments are deliberately displacing their own citizens and often unwilling to even discuss the issue, let alone seeking to resolve the situation responsibly and with respect for the rights of

a number of challenges. Below are just some of the most notable. First, as noted earlier, in some contexts, governments are deliberately displacing their own citizens and often unwilling to even discuss the issue, let alone seeking to resolve the situation responsibly and with respect for the rights of the displaced themselves. In these contexts, the notion of government leadership is obviously very problematic. This reality represents a minority of situations perhaps, but they are very real and are the most problematic contexts for the IDPs themselves and the actors seeking to help them who risk becoming instrumentalized and part of the problem. Second, in many contexts of high displacement numbers, a government may be willing but not necessarily able to assert the necessary leadership. Pulling together a government solutions strategy for millions of IDPs requires clear policy positions and strong coordination across ministries and between capitals and regions. Implementation at scale – hundreds of thousands of houses across north‑east Nigeria for example – requires robust government systems for procurement and delivery. It requires systems at the local level. Third, there is sometimes legitimate resistance to this pivot coming from the humanitarian community itself. Displacement settings are complex and varied. One part of the same country may be ready for government‑led solutions, while another part of the country remains a humanitarian response setting with8 Vol. XIV, Number 3, September 2025 MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE high protection needs. Furthermore, even in locations where government‑led solutions are possible, this takes time; in the interim, communities may continue to face very real humanitarian needs. How did the Office go about operationalizing the Panel recommendations?14 The 30‑month mandate of the Office was an opportunity to test how to bridge the gap between good ideas and concrete action. At the country level we promoted “solutions pathways”. In line with the High‑Level Panel’s recommendations, these pathways contained distinct components around (1)  strong

The 30‑month mandate of the Office was an opportunity to test how to bridge the gap between good ideas and concrete action. At the country level we promoted “solutions pathways”. In line with the High‑Level Panel’s recommendations, these pathways contained distinct components around (1)  strong government leadership and convening an all‑of‑government approach, (2)  a new generation of solutions strategies that recognize the structural and development issues that need to be addressed for solutions to be lasting and (3) a financing framework, which encompasses as wide a range as possible of potential domestic and international funding sources. Strong IDP participation, clear accountabilities and robust data cut across all the components. Progress at the country level across our 15  pilot countries 15 went at different speeds and some situations (the Sudan, most tragically) saw serious reversals in the situation of their internally displaced, but by the end of 2024 nearly 12 million IDPs had been placed on solutions pathways by their governments in the Central 14 Details on what was accomplished by the OSA, and under the Action Agenda, can be found on the OSA website. See, for example, OSA, 2024 and OSA, “End of mandate note” (December 2024). 15 The complete list of 15 pilot countries was: Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Libya, Mozambique, the Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, Vanuatu and Yemen. African Republic, Colombia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Libya, Mozambique, Nigeria and Somalia. Many of these same governments also committed financing towards the task. An IDP solutions fund was created to provide strategic funding for United Nations country teams (UNCTs) to support governments in their leadership. 16 Solutions advisers were placed in Resident Coordinator offices to support inter‑agency coordination. Resident Coordinators and agency country leaders were convened in different configurations to tease out challenges, needs and

for United Nations country teams (UNCTs) to support governments in their leadership. 16 Solutions advisers were placed in Resident Coordinator offices to support inter‑agency coordination. Resident Coordinators and agency country leaders were convened in different configurations to tease out challenges, needs and emerging lessons. What did we learn? About government leadership … The most important takeaways from the mandate have been around the role of government in solutions work. Even in the most benign contexts of disaster‑induced displacements, the act of displacement often represents a failure of the State in its duty of care. Whether it is a failure to impose building codes or the behaviour of security forces in counter‑insurgency operations, when people are displaced there has almost inevitably been a breakdown in the social contract. Seen through this lens, it is useful to think of pathways to solutions in part as the process by which government rebuilds a frayed social contract. 17 Importantly, we also saw how the international community can undermine this delicate process in different ways, for example by branding its aid strongly at a time when the government needs to be seen to be stepping up by its own citizens. 16 See the Internal Displacement Solutions Fund. 17 See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Turning the Tide on Internal Displacement: A Development Approach to Solutions (New York,

UNDP, 2022).9

Vol. XIV, Number 3, September 2025 MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE The experience of our pilot countries time and time again was that local governments – governors in Nigeria, regional presidents in Ethiopia, mayors in Colombia and the like – proved to be highly attuned and responsive to this issue . At the local level, we saw a great sense of urgency and a vision for solutions pathways. It is clear that solutions processes hinge on this local leadership. Local politicians are more willing to invest political capital in a solutions process and to take perhaps unpopular

to this issue . At the local level, we saw a great sense of urgency and a vision for solutions pathways. It is clear that solutions processes hinge on this local leadership. Local politicians are more willing to invest political capital in a solutions process and to take perhaps unpopular but necessary positions on policy options. The three governors of the States of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa in north‑east Nigeria, for example, were willing to invest a fixed percentage of their revenue in the plan they developed for the five years to come. Notwithstanding this critical role of local leadership, the process underlined the limits of local leadership as well – the absence of clear national policies and standards on issues like compensation and justice naturally hindered progress at the regional level. In most settings we also saw that ensuring local leadership required investing early in the capacity of local governments . Urban authorities need planning systems and data. District‑level governments need planning and coordination systems to integrate this work into their day‑to‑day programming. Building implementation capacity at the local and regional levels is critical if solutions are to be delivered by local actors and at scale. This capacity‑building cannot wait for a perfect peace and a risk‑free operating environment, if/when the development actors arrive. The experience also underlined the intensely pol