RELE - The Impact of Digital Surveillance on Freedom of Expression in the Americas

The Impact of Digital Surveillance on Freedom of Expression in the Americas Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Pedro Vaca Villarreal Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression

OEA/Ser.L/V/II

CIDH/RELE/

INF.33/25 September 2025 Original in EnglishOAS Cataloging-in-Publication Data Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Informe especial sobre la situación de la libertad de expresión en Chile: 2024 / Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. v. ; cm. (OAS. Documentos oficiales ; OEA/Ser.L/V/II)

ISBN 978-0-8270-8040-9

1.  Freedom of expression--America.  2.  Electronic surveillance--America.

3.  Privacy, Right of--America.  4.  Freedom of information--America.  5.

Human rights--America.  I.  Vaca Villarreal, Pedro.  II.  Title.  III.  Series. OEA/Ser.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF.33/25Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Members José Luis Caballero Ochoa Andrea Pochak Arif Bulkan Roberta Clarke Carlos Bernal Pulido Edgar Stuardo Ralón Orellana Gloria Monique de Mees Executive Secretary Tania Renaum Panszi Chief of Staff Patricia Colchero Aragonés Assistant Executive Secretary for Monitoring, Promotion and Technical Cooperation María Claudia Pulido Escobar Assistant Executive Secretary for the Petitions and Cases System Jorge Meza Flores Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression Pedro Vaca Villarreal Special Rapporteur on Economic, Social, Cultural, and Environmental Rights

Assistant Executive Secretary for Monitoring, Promotion and Technical Cooperation María Claudia Pulido Escobar Assistant Executive Secretary for the Petitions and Cases System Jorge Meza Flores Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression Pedro Vaca Villarreal Special Rapporteur on Economic, Social, Cultural, and Environmental Rights Javier Palummo Lantes This report was approved on 7 September 2025.The Impact of Digital Surveillance on Freedom of Expression in the Americas

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 2

A. Background and purpose of the report 2

B. Methodology and structure 2

II. DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE IN THE AMERICAS 5

A. Surveillance technologies and documented applications 5

1. Spyware 5

a. Mexico 5 b. El Salvador 7 c. Dominican Republic 8 d. Colombia 8 e. Other cases in the region 8 f. Transnational digital repression 9

2. Online profiling and cyber patrolling 9

3. Facial recognition and biometrics 10

4. Geolocation tracking and SS7 exploitation 11

5. Network monitoring, advertising intelligence (AdInt), data brokers, and AI governance frameworks 13

6. Migration-related surveillance 16

B. Normalization of surveillance 20

C. Human rights impacts of surveillance abuses 22

1. Surveillance generates widespread chilling effects on freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, association, movement and thought 24

2. Surveillance undermines human rights defense and investigative and critical journalism 25

3. Surveillance results in significant intersectional and gender-based harms 31

4. Surveillance impunity creates a state of continuous violation of the rights of targeted individuals 36

III. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 43

IV. PROGRESS AND GOOD PRACTICE 54

V. LEGITIMACY IN THE SURVEILLED WORLD: DISTINGUISHING LEGITIMATE FROM

INDISCRIMINATE USE OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES 58

A. The Inter-American Court’s approach to surveillance 59

IV. PROGRESS AND GOOD PRACTICE 54

V. LEGITIMACY IN THE SURVEILLED WORLD: DISTINGUISHING LEGITIMATE FROM

INDISCRIMINATE USE OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES 58

A. The Inter-American Court’s approach to surveillance 59

1. Fulfillment of the international human rights law requirements of legality, legitimate aim, suitability, necessity, and proportionality 59

2. A robust domestic system for control of the use of surveillance technologies 60

3. An independent civilian oversight authority 61

4. A mechanism for remedy and reparation in the event of surveillance abuse 63

B. Guardrails around private sector participation in state surveillance 64

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 69The Impact of Digital Surveillance on Freedom of Expression in the

Americas

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INTRODUCTION

A. Background and purpose of the report

1. Well into the third decade of the 21 st century, it is widely documented and understood that states’ use of advanced digital surveillance technologies presents an existential threat to human rights, in the Americas and beyond. Counter-terrorism initiatives, law enforcement alarm over “going dark ” as an insecure digital ecosystem incorporates enhanced encryption, and other efforts to address criminal activity and national security threats have all propelled surveillance capabilities. State architectures of compliance with international human right s law in the use of such tools, however, have failed to keep up with technological advances. Invasive digital surveillance techniques – deemed exceptional under international human rights law frameworks due to their impact on the rights to freedom of expression, privacy, and a host of other rights – are increasingly normalized in practice and public perception. Recalibration is long overdue, yet state actors have not yet mustered the political will to tackle the root of their surveillance excess.

2. The human rights impacts of digital surveillance are severe and widespread. In the Americas alone, the Office of the Special Rapporteur (SRFOE) of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

(IACHR) has observed the targeting of human rights defenders, environmental activists,

2. The human rights impacts of digital surveillance are severe and widespread. In the Americas alone, the Office of the Special Rapporteur (SRFOE) of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

(IACHR) has observed the targeting of human rights defenders, environmental activists, journalists, lawyers, opposition leaders, and public health experts. These individuals have felt their privacy violated and have no means of knowing what information was taken from them, or when and how it will be used against them. In many instances, digital surveillance is one component of ongoing repression and persecution, and in some cases has preceded physical harm. The effects are felt not only by the targeted individuals whose rights are violated, but by their families and contacts, and by society at large, as human rights defense, media freedom, public discourse and engagement, and democracy itself are undermined. Predictably, surveillance abuses have fundamentally altered the risk exposure societies face, with the commercialization of tools that facilitate extraterritorial targeting of investigative journalists, diaspora communities, and even state officials.

3. The SRFOE has prepared this thematic report on the use of digital surveillance technologies in the Americas to assess the human rights impacts of surveillance in this region; consider the legal frameworks and standards applicable to surveillance practice within the OAS, including the jurisprudence of the Inter -American Court of Human Rights; and highlight the key policy issues and practical gaps that remain in achieving compliance with international human rights law as it concerns digital surveillance. The report bu ilds on the monumental efforts and achievements of civil society, journalists, independent experts, and others who have worked for many years to call attention to digital surveillance technologies and abuses. The report recognizes as well the existing initiatives of states and the private sector to bring more accountability to the commercial surveillance market.

B. Methodology and structure

4. This report was prepared using a mixed methodology that combines various primary and secondary sources of information, in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the impact of digital surveillance on freedom of expression in the Americas.

surveillance market.

B. Methodology and structure

4. This report was prepared using a mixed methodology that combines various primary and secondary sources of information, in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the impact of digital surveillance on freedom of expression in the Americas.

5. Regarding primary sources, the SRFOE used multiple information gathering mechanisms:The Impact of Digital Surveillance on Freedom of Expression in the

Americas

3 5.1. It obtained information from OAS Member States, based on a request for information, as part of its monitoring mandate, in order to obtain official data and learn about laws and measures implemented in relation to digital surveillance.1 5.2. It received written input through an open public consultation addressed to civil society organizations, journalists, media outlets, human rights defenders, researchers, academics, and other stakeholders.2 5.3. It conducted interviews with 16 individuals with expertise concerning digital surveillance, including representatives of civil society organizations and academic institutions. 3 5.4. It also conducted interviews with 28 individuals whose devices were documented to have been infected with Pegasus spyware.4 5.5. It also gathered input during a peer review of the initial draft of this report, held on April 24, 2025, in Washington, D.C. 5.6. It also drew upon relevant information from public hearings held before the IACHR, including “Mexico: Protection of Human Rights Defenders and Journalists” (189th Period of Sessions, February 28, 2024); “Human rights and the use of facial recognition technologies in Brazil” (187th Period of Sessions, July 11, 2023); “The human rights situation in the context of cyber -surveillance in El Salvador” (183rd Period of Sessions, March 16, 2022); “Use of surveillance technologies and their impact on freedom of expression in the context of the pandemic in the region” (181st Period of Sessions, October 27, 2021); and “Protection of human rights of defenders and communicators in Mexico”

March 16, 2022); “Use of surveillance technologies and their impact on freedom of expression in the context of the pandemic in the region” (181st Period of Sessions, October 27, 2021); and “Protection of human rights of defenders and communicators in Mexico” (180th Period of Sessions, July 1, 2021).

6. Regarding secondary sources , the following were considered: (a) reports, guides, and other relevant documents from civil society organizations; (b) information from official sources; (c) reports, resolutions, and statements from international organizations; (d) information from the media; and (e) academic research.

7. This report is organized into six chapters. Chapter I presents the introduction, which sets out the background, purpose, and methodology of the report. Chapter II assesses the experience of digital surveillance in the Americas, providing detail on the surv eillance technologies deployed, highlighting the increasing normalization of surveillance in public life, and examining the resulting human rights impacts. Chapter III explores the applicable legal framework, covering relevant international instruments, St ate obligations in deploying surveillance, and the specific rights and standards implicated by the use of surveillance technologies. Chapter IV lays out good practices and progress achieved thus far in addressing the human rights impacts of digital surveillance, and notes remaining gaps. Chapter V applies the standards laid out in the Inter -American Court of Human Rights’ 2024 decisio n in the Case Miembros de la Corporación Colectivo de Abogados "José Alvear Restrepo" vs. Colombia, and considers the factors essential to establishing legitimate use by States of digital surveillance technologies. Finally, Chapter VI presents conclusions and recommendations for OAS Member States and the international community to address this issue.

1 The Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression (SRFOE) received written inputs from the OAS Permanent Missions of Argentina, Ecuador, and Mexico. 2 The SRFOE received written inputs from Article 19; Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos de la Pontificia; Universidad

1 The Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression (SRFOE) received written inputs from the OAS Permanent Missions of Argentina, Ecuador, and Mexico. 2 The SRFOE received written inputs from Article 19; Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos de la Pontificia; Universidad Católica del Perú; Fundación Ciudadanía y Desarrollo (FCD); Media Legal Defence Initiative; R3D; Association for Progressive Communications (APC); Derechos Digitales; El Veinte; Amnesty International, Americas Regional Office; Access Now; Karisma Foundation, as well as independent experts and academics. 3 The SRFOE held interviews with Access Now; Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF); SocialTIC; Amnesty International’s Security Lab; Knight First Amendment Institute; R3D, as well as independent experts and academics. 4 The names of individuals interviewed by the SRFOE are withheld to maintain confidentiality.The Impact of Digital Surveillance on Freedom of Expression in the Americas

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8. The SRFOE emphasizes that the cases and countries discussed in this report are illustrative of regional patterns rather than exhaustive, recognizing that surveillance abuses may be occurring in additional countries beyond those specifically examined herein.The Impact of Digital Surveillance on Freedom of Expression in the

Americas

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I. DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE IN THE AMERICAS

9. The experience of digital surveillance in the Americas elucidates the risks of surveillance technology and its long -term human rights impacts and policy implications. The region has grappled for decades with surveillance abuses, 5 including some of the earliest documented cases of the deployment of NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware against journalists and civil society. This chapter explores documented cases and reports indicating that State authorities have employed a wide spectrum of surveillance tactics in the region, and how surveillance practices continue to evolve. It then examines the troubling trend toward normalization of surveillance in the Americas, and the human rights impacts of digital surveillance.

A. Surveillance technologies and documented applications

1. Spyware

spectrum of surveillance tactics in the region, and how surveillance practices continue to evolve. It then examines the troubling trend toward normalization of surveillance in the Americas, and the human rights impacts of digital surveillance.

A. Surveillance technologies and documented applications

1. Spyware

10. The use of targeted invasive surveillance technology, or spyware, in the region is of particular concern, given the far -reaching human rights implications of the total device access provided by commercial spyware. In addition to states’ own deployment of s pyware tools, cases have also emerged of politically motivated extraterritorial targeting within the region, which has highlighted the importance of defending against the malicious use of such tools by external actors.

a. Mexico

11. Mexico was one of the first countries where the IACHR and its Special Rapporteurship documented the use of NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware 6. The research and reporting around spyware abuse in Mexico has brought to light a wide range of constituencies targeted with invasive surveillance tools for political advantage or to prevent accountability of powerful interests. Research from civil society organizations ARTICLE 19, Citizen Lab, R3D, and SocialTIC documented the use of NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware during the 2012 -2018 presidential administration against at least 25 targets 7, including: anti-corruption advocates from Mexicans Against Corruption and Impunity (MCCI) and the Mexican Institute for Competitiveness (IMCO) 8; human rights defenders, including members of the Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez Human Rights Center AC (Centro Prodh)9; journalists from media outlets, as well as family members of journalists10; lawyers representing families of victims in highprofile cases11; members of the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (GIEI) established

5 See, e.g., University of California, ‘Discredit, disrupt, and destroy’: FBI records acquired by the Library reveal violent surveillance of Black leaders, civil rights organizations , January 18, 2021; Open Canada, Surveillance in Canada: Who are the watchers? ,

5 See, e.g., University of California, ‘Discredit, disrupt, and destroy’: FBI records acquired by the Library reveal violent surveillance of Black leaders, civil rights organizations , January 18, 2021; Open Canada, Surveillance in Canada: Who are the watchers? , July 6, 2017; Canada’s History, Spying on Canadians , November 14, 2018; Eduardo Beroni and Collin Kurre, “Surveillance and Privacy Protection in Latin America: Examples, Principles, and Suggestions”, in Fred H. Cate, and James X. Dempsey (eds), Bulk Collection: Systematic Government Access to Private-Sector Data, Oxford Academic, 19 Oct. 2017; Privacy International and Asociación por los Derechos Civiles (ADC), Who’s watching the Watchers? A comparave study of intelligence organisaons oversight mechanisms, May 2014. 6 The Citizen Lab, The Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group’s iPhone Zero -Days used against a UAE Human Rights Defender , August 24, 2016. 7 See The Citizen Lab, Reckless VII: Wife of Journalist Slain in Cartel-Linked Killing Targeted with NSO Group’s Spyware, March 20, 2019; Information submitted by R3D in response to the public consultation by the IACHR Office Special Rapporteur for Free dom of Expression, August 2024, p. 2 -3; Information submitted by Article 19 Office for Mexico and Central America in respon se to the public consultation by the IACHR Office Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, August 2024, p. 3. 8 The Citizen Lab, Reckless V: Director of Mexican Anti-Corruption Group Targeted with NSO Group’s Spyware, August 30, 2017. 9 R3D, Ejército mexicano espió con Pegasus a dos personas defensoras de derechos humanos del Centro Prodh, April 18, 2023; Centro Prodh, Espionaje al Centro Prodh.

9 R3D, Ejército mexicano espió con Pegasus a dos personas defensoras de derechos humanos del Centro Prodh, April 18, 2023; Centro Prodh, Espionaje al Centro Prodh. 10 The Citizen Lab, Reckless VI: Mexican Journalists Investigating Cartels Targeted with NSO Spyware Following Assassination of Colleague, November 27, 2018; R3D and Privacy International, The right to privacy in Mexico: Alternative report to the Human Rights Committee, 127th Session - Mexico, September 2019. 11 The Citizen Lab, Reckless IV: Lawyers for Murdered Mexican Women’s Families Targeted with NSO Spyware, August 2, 2017.The Impact of Digital Surveillance on Freedom of Expression in the Americas

6 by the IACHR to investigate the 2014 mass disappearance in Iguala of 43 students from Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers’ College 12; public health researchers and advocates working on issues such as national health policies, including individuals from the Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública, consumer rights organizations and health advocacy coalitions 13; legislators and politicians14.

12. In 2021, the Pegasus Project 15 revealed a leak of more than 50,000 phone numbers selected as potential Pegasus targets; 15,000 of those bore the country code for Mexico. 16 Numbers included human rights defenders and relatives of the 43 disappeared Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers College students, as well as public officials. 17 The Pegasus Project further reported that at least 25 journalists in Mexico were targeted with Pegasus spyware over a two -year period, 18 including a journalist whose phone was selected for targeting in the weeks before his killing in 2017. 19

13. More cases of spyware abuse were documented between 2018 -2024. It is noteworthy that the additional spyware cases that have come to light appear to have a connection with the targets’ work concerning human rights abuses by the military, including the invol vement of the military in the

13. More cases of spyware abuse were documented between 2018 -2024. It is noteworthy that the additional spyware cases that have come to light appear to have a connection with the targets’ work concerning human rights abuses by the military, including the invol vement of the military in the mass disappearance of the Ayotzinapa students.20

14. All of these incidents demonstrate the reported illegitimate use of spyware over many years in Mexico, whether that be to obtain information about political opposition or social movements, or to prevent accountability for human rights abuses. Journalistic investigations, requests for access to information, and document leaks such as those of the Guacamaya collective indicate that Pegasus spyware was allegedly acquired and/or used by state entities including the National Defense Secretariat, the Military Intelligence Center, the Center for Intelligence and National Security, and the Attorney General’s Office.21 According to available information, in Mexico, the military does not have legal authority to intercept the private communications of civilians. 22

15. While NSO Group’s Pegasus is the most prominent spyware tool utilized in Mexico, various other commercial spyware tools are known to have been acquired at different points in time from multiple

12 The Citizen Lab, Reckless III: Investigation Into Mexican Mass Disappearance Targeted with NSO Spyware, July 10, 2017. 13 The Citizen Lab, Bitter Sweet: Supporters of Mexico’s Soda Tax Targeted With NSO Exploit Links, February 11, 2017. 14 The Citizen Lab, Reckless Redux: Senior Mexican Legislators and Politicians Targeted with NSO Spyware, June 29, 2017. 15 A collaboration of more than 80 journalists from 17 media organizations in 10 countries, coordinated by Forbidden Stories with Amnesty International as technical partner; Information submitted by Amnesty International, Americas Regional Office, in response to the public consultation by the IACHR Office Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, August 2024, p. 1. 16 Information submitted by R3D in response to the public consultation by the IACHR Office Special Rapporteur for Freedom of

to the public consultation by the IACHR Office Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, August 2024, p. 1. 16 Information submitted by R3D in response to the public consultation by the IACHR Office Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, August 2024, p. 3. 17 Information submitted by R3D in response to the public consultation by the IACHR Office Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, August 2024, p. 3. 18 Information submitted by Amnesty International, Americas Regional Office, in response to the public consultation by the IACHR Office Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, August 2024, p. 1; Deutsche Welle (DW), Pegasus spyware: Mexico one of the biggest targets, July 22, 2021; 19 Forbidden Stories, Pegasus: The new global weapon for silencing journalists, July 18, 2021. 20 Information submitted by R3D in response to the public consultation by the IACHR Office Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, August 2024, p. 3; see also The Citizen Lab, Triple Threat NSO Group’s Pegasus Spyware Returns in 2022 with a Trio of iOS 15 and iOS 16 Zero-Click Exploit Chains, April 18, 2023; Reuters, Mexican armed forces were complicit in students' disappearance, new report finds, July 25, 2023; Human Rights Watch, Ayotzinapa, Mexico’s Army, and López Obrador’s Silence , September 26, 2023; ARTICLE 19, Espionaje contra Camilo Vicente Ovalle expone sabotaje militar al esclarecimiento de abusos de la Guerra Sucia , June 5, 2023; The New York Times, He Was Investigating Mexico’s Military. Then the Spying Began, May 22, 2023; The New York Times, Pegasus spyware reaches

into Mexican president’s inner circle, May 25, 2023; R3D, ARTICLE 19 Mexico and Central America, and SocialTIC, “Ejército Espía” Report, 2022; ARTICLE 19, Mexico: Army used Pegasus to spy on human rights defender Raymundo Ramos, March 07, 2023. 21 Information submitted by R3D in response to the public consultation by the IACHR Office Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, August 2024, p. 8-9. 22 Information submitted by R3D in response to the public consultation by the IACHR Office Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, August 2024, p. 9.The Impact of Digital Surveillance on Freedom of Expression in the Americas

7 international vendors.23 According to the information received by this Office, an extensive network of intermediary companies have reportedly facilitated contracts between state entities and surveillance technology providers.24

b. El Salvador

16. In another example of widespread targeting of journalists, human rights defenders, and others, investigations confirmed the use in El Salvador of NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware. A number of Salvadorans, including journalists and politicians, received an Apple threat notification warning of targeting by state-sponsored attackers in November 2021.25 A subsequent investigation undertaken by Citizen Lab and Access Now, in collaboration with Frontline Defenders, SocialTIC , and Fundación Acceso and with independent review of technical data by Amnesty International’s Security Lab, confirmed that the mobile devices of individuals were infected with NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware between July 2020 and November 2021, including journalists and staff from El Faro newspaper, GatoEncerrado, El Diario de Hoy, Diario El Mundo, La Prensa Gráfica, Revista Disruptiva, as well as independent journalists, economists and columnists for independent media, and staff members from civil society or ganizations including Cristosal and Fundación DTJ. 26 The IACHR and the Regional Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

Disruptiva, as well as independent journalists, economists and columnists for independent media, and staff members from civil society or ganizations including Cristosal and Fundación DTJ. 26 The IACHR and the Regional Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) for Central America and Dominican Republic expressed their deep concern about this evidence of illegal surveillance and urged the State to effectively and i mpartially investigate these allegations.27

17. The IACHR had granted precautionary measures for 34 individuals who work at El Faro newspaper in February 2021, recognizing that their “right to life and personal integrity… are in a serious and urgent situation” after they were “subjected to constant stigmatization, harassment, criminalization and threats from the government.”28 The IACHR requested, inter alia, that the state of El Salvador “take the necessary measures so that the beneficiaries can carry out their journalistic activities in exercise of their right to freedom of expression, without being subjected to acts of intim idation, threats and harassment.”29 Yet the devices of many of these individuals were infected with Pegasus in or around that period of time. In April 2023, El Faro moved its legal and administrative operations to Costa Rica, forced into partial exile in order to continue its operations. 30

23 This would include Gamma International’s FinFisher, Hacking Team’s Galileo Remote Control System, and QuaDream spyware. Information submitted by R3D in response to the public consultation by the IACHR Office Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Exp ression, August 2024, p. 5-6. 24 Information submitted by R3D in response to the public consultation by the IACHR Office Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, August 2024, p. 33-37. 25 Information submitted by Access Now in response to the public consultation by the IACHR Office Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, August 2024, p. 1.

Expression, August 2024, p. 33-37. 25 Information submitted by Access Now in response to the public consultation by the IACHR Office Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, August 2024, p. 1. 26 The Citizen Lab, Project Torogoz: Extensive Hacking of Media & Civil Society in El Salvador with Pegasus Spyware , January 2022. 27 IACHR, IACHR, Its Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression and OHCHR Are Concerned About Evidence of the Use of Pegasus Malware to Spy on Journalists and Civil Society Organizations in El Salvador, Press Release 022/22, January 31, 2022. 28 IACHR, Resolution 12/2021, Precautionary Measure No. 1051-20, 34 identified members of the digital newspaper “El Faro” regarding El Salvador, February 4, 2021, paras. 3 and 5; See also IACHR, Press Release No. 160/22, IACHR Grants Follow-Up Resolution Concerning Precautionary Measure for Members of Salvadoran Newspaper El Faro, July 13, 2022. 29 IACHR, Resolution 12/2021, Precautionary Measure No. 1051-20, 34 identified members of the digital newspaper “El Faro” regarding El Salvador, February 4, 2021, para. 53. 30 Information submitted by Access Now in response to the public consultation by the IACHR Office Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, August 2024, p. 4.The Impact of Digital Surveillance on Freedom of Expression in the Americas

8 c. Dominican Republic

18. In the Dominican Republic, an investigative journalist was targeted and her device was infected with NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware three times between 2020 and 2021. The journalist’s work focused on issues of corruption and impunity. 31 While this was the first documented instance of a Pegasus infection, interviews conducted in 2022 and 2023 by Amnesty International with

with NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware three times between 2020 and 2021. The journalist’s work focused on issues of corruption and impunity. 31 While this was the first documented instance of a Pegasus infection, interviews conducted in 2022 and 2023 by Amnesty International with journalists and human rights defenders in the country indicated that “nearly all . . .